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Abstract 
 
Concentrated ownership is perceived as an inefficient form of ownership because it allegedly 
increases the risk of minority expropriation, which is further exacerbated by the disproportionality of 
control and cash-flow rights of the controller. This thesis challenges the perception of concentration 
as a per se inefficient ownership structure. It argues that the 'inefficiency bias' is based on the over-
simplified, incorrect assumption that concentration is characterised by the presence of one 
controlling shareholder and therefore disregards the variety of the forms of concentration. To 
substantiate this argument, this thesis categorises the forms of concentration based on the identity 
and number of the controllers and examines their impact on corporate governance. It is shown, that 
the distinct characteristics of the varieties of shareholders' profiles have an ambivalent impact on 
corporate governance: Families are strongly committed investors but also prone to extract private 
benefits of control; the state is inefficient in monitoring but can also be a driver of good corporate 
governance practices; multiple large shareholders improve internal contestability of control but 
shareholders' agreements can also be used for minority expropriation.  
In this context, the effectiveness of the legal framework to mitigate the arising corporate governance 
problems becomes the key factor which differentiates efficient from inefficient corporate ownership 
structures. The different corporate governance problems of concentration imply that adapted legal 
solutions and adequately flexible rules are the prerequisites of effective investor protection. Given 
the varieties of concentration, legal effectiveness and strong investor protection can therefore only 
be defined by reference to a given ownership structure. This thesis presents concrete examples of 
investor protection mechanisms which are adapted to the distinct characteristics of the varieties of 
concentration: In the case of family and state ownership, effective minority protection takes the form 
of special minority rights of board-representation; within multiple large blockholdings, shareholders' 
agreements limit the abuse of the governance rights of majority shareholders. Ultimately, the thesis 
deals with the implications of this complex interaction between ownership structures and corporate 
governance which compromise the reliability of indices as a metric of the quality of corporate 
governance, to the extent that the applied methodology fails to encompass the differences in 
shareholders' profiles and that a functional approach to the substantive legal analysis preceding the 
compilation of an index is not adopted.  
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I. THE MAIN PROPOSITIONS AND METHODOLOGY OF THE THESIS 
1. The main propositions of the thesis 
Controlling shareholders represent a challenge to the prevailing conception of corporate 
governance in the Anglo-American world. The main corporate governance problem within Anglo-
Saxon corporations revolves around the agency issue, defined as the costs of the misalignment of 
shareholders and managers interests.1 This conflict results from the prevailing dispersed ownership 
structures, which promote shareholder passivity due to low incentives to monitor and important 
collective action problems. By contrast, concentrated ownership gives rise to a different problem. 
In its more absolute form, when control is held by a single shareholder, important conflicts of 
interests arise between minority and majority shareholders.2 Since concentrated ownership is 
prevalent around the world, the conflicts of interests of minority and majority shareholders 
constitute one of the typical corporate governance problems within public companies globally.3 In 
this light, this thesis is focused on the merits of the ‘controlling shareholder’ systems, both on their 
                                                          
1
 Berle, A. A., and G. C. Means, (1932), The Modern Corporation and Private Property, New York, NY: MacMillan. 
2
 Shleifer, A., and R. Vishny, (1997), A Survey of Corporate Governance, Journal of Finance, 52:737; Enriques L. & Volpin 
P., (2007), Corporate Governance Reforms in Continental Europe, Journal of Economic Perspectives, 21:117; R.J. Gilson 
and Gordon, J.N., Controlling Controlling Shareholders (June 2003). Columbia Law and Economics Working Paper No. 228; 
Stanford Law and Economics Olin Working Paper No. 262. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=417181. 
3
The most important comparative corporate governance works showing that companies with a controlling shareholder 
are the dominant form among publicly traded firms in most countries include: 
Becht M. and Röell A.A., (1999), Blockholdings in Europe: An International Comparison. European Economic Review, Vol. 
43(4-6):1049. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=167128; Franks J.R. and Mayer C., (2001), Ownership and 
Control of German Corporations. Review of Financial Studies, 14(4):943. Available at SSRN: 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=900656; Holderness C.G., (2009), The Myth of Diffuse Ownership in the United States, The 
Review of Financial Studies, 22(4):1377; La Porta R., Lopez de Silanes F., Shleifer, A. and Vishny R.W., (1999a), Investor 
Protection and Corporate Governance. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=183908. 
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own terms and in comparison with the ‘widely-held’ systems of corporate ownership.4 The 
ultimate aim is to contribute to the corporate governance debate by enhancing the understanding 
of the diversity of corporate governance systems around the world and their interaction with 
corporate ownership structures.  
To this end, the thesis challenges the ‘inefficiency bias’ of concentrated ownership, according to 
which concentration is a corporate governance mechanism which enables controlling shareholders 
to extract private benefits of control to the detriment of minority shareholders. The 'inefficiency 
bias' has been established by the 'law and finance' literature5 and in particular the 'legal origin' 
hypothesis of LaPorta et al. (hereafter LLSV)6, according to which civil law jurisdictions and the 
prevalent concentrated ownership structures offer weaker legal protection to investors, therefore 
increasing the risk of their expropriation. The findings of corporate governance indices, namely the 
LLSV Anti-Director Index and the Self-Dealing Index compiled by Djankov et al. (hereafter DLLS)7, 
reinforce the 'inefficiency bias' of concentration. This bias is particularly pervasive within the more 
complex forms of concentration emerging around the world, such as pyramids and companies with 
multiple classes of shares. This is due to the fact that the structures characterised by control-
enhancing mechanisms facilitate the separation of cash-flow and control rights and, consequently, 
increase the incentives of the controllers to extract private benefits of control to the detriment of 
the remaining minority shareholders.   
This thesis thoroughly assesses the validity of the 'inefficiency bias' of concentration and highlights 
a variety of misconceptions regarding concentrated ownership. In this respect, it is argued that the 
                                                          
4
 Gilson R.J., (2005), Controlling Shareholders and Corporate Governance: Complicating the Comparative Taxonomy; 
Stanford Law and Economics Olin Working Paper No. 309; Columbia Law and Economics Working Paper No. 281. 
Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=784744. 
5
 The 'law and finance' scholarships includes the following papers: La Porta R., Lopez-de-Silanes F., and Shleifer A., 
(1999b), Corporate Ownership Around the World, Journal of Finance, 54:471; La Porta R., Lopez-de-Silanes F., and 
Shleifer A., (2006), What Works in Securities Law?, Journal of Finance, 61:1; La Porta R., Lopez-de-Silanes F., and Shleifer 
A., (2008), The Economic Consequences of Legal Origin, Journal of Economic Literature, 46:285; La Porta R., Lopez-de-
Silanes F., Shleifer A., and Vishny R. W., (1997), Legal Determinants of External Finance, Journal of Finance, 52:1131; La 
Porta R.,  Lopez-de-Silanes F., Shleifer A., and Vishny R.W., (1998), Law and Finance, Journal of Political Economy 
107:1113; La Porta R., F. Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer A. and Vishny R.W., (2000a), Agency Problems and Dividend Policies 
Around the World, Journal of Finance, 55:1; La Porta R., Lopez-de-Silanes F., Shleifer A. and Vishny R.W., (2000b), Investor 
Protection and Corporate Governance, Journal of Financial Economics, 58:3; La Porta R., Lopez-de-Silanes F., Shleifer A., 
and Vishny R.W., (2002), Investor Protection and Corporate Valuation, Journal of Finance, 57:1147. 
6
 La Porta et al (1998, 2008) ibid. 
7
 Djankov S., Lopez de Silanes F., La Porta R. and Shleifer A., (2008), The Law and Economics of Self-Dealing, Journal of 
Financial Economics, 88:430. 
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'inefficiency bias' results from the over-simplified assumption of the 'law and finance' literature 
that concentration is typically manifested in its absolute form which involves ownership by one 
controlling shareholder against small dispersed shareholders. This assumption is strongly 
contested in light of the variety in the forms of concentrated ownership. Furthermore, as 
concentration may take various forms according to the identity of the controller and the presence 
of multiple large shareholders, the corporate governance problem differs from one closely-held 
company to another. The complex interrelations among shareholders shape the type and the 
pervasiveness of the inherent conflicts of interests. For example, the type and identity of the 
controlling shareholder, such as families and the state, often mitigate the intensity of the risk of 
minority expropriation, due to their long-term investment horizon and their active engagement in 
the company. Similarly, the existence of multiple large shareholders often re-shuffles the balance 
of power among the shareholders and limits the entrenchment of minority-expropriating and 
value-destructing corporate owners in control.  
The aforementioned analysis indicates that the varieties of concentration are closely associated 
with the effectiveness of the law to address the corporate governance issues arising within such 
structures. Given the important differences in the type of corporate governance problems of 
concentration which range from the extraction of private benefits of control in the case of family 
ownership to the inefficient monitoring of the state as a blockholder, there is no one-size-fits-all 
standard when determining the effectiveness of a legal system or framework to address such 
problems. Instead, the main proposition of this thesis is that what constitutes effective regulation 
is shaped by the type of concentrated ownership. This is reflected in the definition of legal 
effectiveness in this thesis, according to which legal effectiveness refers to the extent to which an 
issue can be dealt with by the law and if so, how well it is dealt with in terms of consistency and 
predictability, on the one side, and the delivery of efficient and just outcomes, on the other.  
 
In the context of this thesis, legal effectiveness is also defined on the basis of the type of 
concentrated ownership involved. For example, in the case of family ownership legal effectiveness 
refers to the capacity of the rules to limit the extraction of private benefits of control by the 
controlling family. In the case of state ownership, legal effectiveness refers to the capacity of the 
rules and complementary institutions to enhance the
The complex relationship of concentrated ownership structures and corporate governance 
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the managers, while mitigating the risk of corruption and the risk that the interests of the state-
owned enterprises are secondary and subservient to political considerations. Furthermore, in the 
case of multiple blockholders, legal effectiveness refers to the capacity of the rules to allow for 
beneficial shareholder collaboration and responsible, active ownership, while limiting the risk of 
shareholders agreements being employed as expropriating mechanisms. This thesis considers a 
number of factors when evaluating the effectiveness of the law in addressing the arising corporate 
governance issues. Such factors include the consistency and predictability in the application of the 
law, the enforceability of the legal rules and agreements, how the law facilitates the efficient use 
of resources and whether the law reflects the best practices and high standards of corporate 
governance. 
 
Measuring the legal effectiveness of corporate governance systems has been the key objective of 
comparative corporate governance studies which build on the notion of indices. However, the 
complex relationship of ownership structures and corporate governance has been disregarded by 
the variety of commercial ratings8 and academic indices9 developed to measure the quality of 
corporate governance and investor protection. In the wider context of the criticisms10 of the 
aforementioned indices as a reliable indicator of the quality of corporate governance, the thesis 
challenges the ‘inefficiency bias’ of concentrated ownership by comparing country- and firm-level 
investor protection mechanisms, while taking into account the complex forms in which 
concentration manifests. More specifically, as the effects of concentrated ownership structures 
vary substantially according to the forms that concentration might take, the analysis is structured 
around the profiles of the controlling shareholders of a company and the exercise of control by 
one sole or multiple large shareholders forming a coalition.11 
                                                          
8
 ISS (part of the MSCI Group), Governance Risk Indicators, http://www.issgovernance.com/grid-info (last accessed 
09.11.2011). 
9
 See Djankov et al. (2008) supra note7; La Porta et al. (1998) supra note5.  
10
 For criticism see Bhagat S. et al., (2008), The Promise and Peril of Corporate Governance Indices, Columbia Law Review 
108:1803, 1807; Daines R. et al.,(2008), Rating the Ratings: How Good Are Commercial Governance Ratings? 8-14 (John 
M. Olin Program in Law & Econ., Stanford Law School, Working Paper No. 360, 2008), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1152093. 
11
 On the profiles of the controlling shareholders of a company see Chapter II. On the impact of multiple large 
shareholders forming a controlling coalition see Chapter IV. 
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In this light, the first proposition of this thesis suggests that the differences of the multiple types of 
shareholders’ profiles are the determinants of the nature and the pervasiveness of the corporate 
governance problems of concentration. The second hypothesis highlights the importance of 
effective law and argues that the quality of the legal framework of investor protection rather than 
the origin determines the impact of concentrated ownership on corporate governance. This 'legal 
effectiveness' argument draws on the ‘law matters’ thesis originally presented by LLSV but 
constructively reconsiders their approach as it measures the quality of investor protection on the 
basis of a categorisation of shareholders profiles. The prevalence of 'legal effectiveness' over 'legal 
origin' as the determinant of the efficiency of a given ownership structure is substantiated through 
concrete examples of legal mechanisms and provisions. Emphasis is placed on the mechanisms 
that are adapted to protect minority shareholders in family or state-owned companies and where 
multiple blockholders are present. This assessment clearly illustrates how the law can effectively 
influence the character of the various forms of concentrated ownership as benign or malign.   
 
2. The outline of the thesis 
Chapter I sets the general context of this thesis by reviewing the law and finance literature and 
challenging the LLSV hypothesis that concentration is a per se inefficient ownership structure. In 
this respect, the reliability of the LLSV and DLLS indices is questioned on the grounds of 
methodology and substance. For instance, the assessment of the quality of investor protection 
through the two indices is contested because the variables used are not always relevant and 
because important rules and principles operating as functional equivalents to investor protection 
law are disregarded. In this regard, more recent versions of corporate governance indices fail to 
support the propositions of LLSV that civil law jurisdictions, bad law and concentrated ownership 
structures are inter-linked in the way the LLSV indices suggest. The changes in the methodology 
and the variables included in the index, as proposed by newest studies, better reflect the 
idiosyncracies of concentrated ownership structures and, thus, provide a more reliable assessment 
of the quality of investor protection across civil and common law systems around the world. 
Nevertheless, they still fail to distinguish among the various forms of concentration. In this context, 
The complex relationship of concentrated ownership structures and corporate governance 
An introduction 
 
 18 
Chapter I of the thesis sets the basis for restating the LLSV ‘law matters’ hypothesis and shifts the 
focus on the 'legal effectiveness', rather than the 'legal origin' of a given regulatory framework.  
Chapter II examines the implications of family ownership for corporate governance. Families 
display exceptional commitment to the success of the companies they invest in, as manifested by 
their participation in the governance of their investees and their long-term investment horizon. 
Their activism, however, may have a negative aspect as owners are entrenched in control and 
extract high levels of private benefits. Nevertheless, family ownership is generally found to have a 
beneficial impact on corporate performance, even when control-enhancing mechanisms are 
employed.12 This suggests that the effectiveness of investor protection, rather than the form of 
ownership alone, determines the actual nature of concentration as a malign or benign form of 
ownership. Similarly, Chapter II examines the role of the state as a corporate owner and indicates 
that the transparency deficit, the monitoring deficiencies and the social objectives of the state 
often pose problems for minority shareholders of state-owned enterprises.  
Given the ambivalent nature of controlling shareholders, the role of effective law is to facilitate the 
efficient use of the resources of family owners and the state by limiting the scope of abuse and 
minority expropriation. Chapter III assesses the determinants of legal effectiveness by examining 
company-specific investor protection mechanisms, which are adapted to the distinct 
characteristics of family and state ownership. More specifically, it presents the legal mechanisms 
developed by the Greek legal system as a response to concentration and in particular to the 
control of the state and families over corporations. The case study of the Greek legal framework 
reveals a series of distinctive minority protection mechanisms which aim to limit the extraction of 
private benefits in the case of family ownership or safeguard the interests of minority shareholders 
in the case of state ownership. These additional aspects of the minority protection framework in 
Greece constitute important findings of the case study. These provisions act as functional 
equivalents to company law and, therefore, confirm the necessity of a functional approach to 
comparative studies. When viewed from this perspective, the analysis highlights the deficiencies of 
the LLSV indexing methodology and the risks deriving from the over-reliance on indices to measure 
the quality of the law. The examination of the distinctive minority protection mechanisms shows 
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that the law reflects the best practices and high standards of corporate governance as identified by 
the corporate governance studies of international institutions on state-owned enterprises such as 
the 2005 OECD Survey on the Governance of State-owned Enterprises. It, therefore, reinforces the 
'legal effectiveness' argument as presented by the restated ‘law matters’ thesis.  
The assessment of family and state ownership is complemented by the examination of complex 
structures involving multiple large shareholders. Chapter IV tackles the corporate governance 
implications triggered by the presence of multiple large shareholders within a company. It argues 
that multiple large shareholders are beneficial for corporate governance because they mitigate the 
intensity of the conflicts of interests among shareholders. For instance, as multiple large 
shareholders compete over the formation of controlling coalitions, their high incentives to monitor 
and challenge corporate decisions effectively limit private benefit extraction. Similarly, their 
activism as corporate owners is aligned with the notion of responsible ownership and increases 
competition for control internally. In this respect, the interaction of multiple large shareholders 
towards forming controlling coalitions has the potential to upgrade the role of minority 
shareholders, as the actors who determine control through their participation in coalitions. Their 
positive impact on corporate governance depends on a variety of factors such as the number of 
large shareholders in the company and the distribution of ownership among them.  
In this light, legal effectiveness could be defined as the capacity of the law to facilitate the efficient 
use of the resources of active and responsible shareholders by allowing beneficial shareholders 
interactions. Chapter V, therefore, assesses the impact of the legal framework on large 
shareholders' interactions, as manifested through the formation of coalitions. The focus turns on 
the approach of the law to shareholders' agreements, viewed as the legal expression of 
shareholders coalitions. The overall approach of the legal system to shareholders' agreements is 
important because it determines their effectiveness and reliability as corporate governance 
mechanisms. The legal treatment of shareholders agreements is, therefore, earmarked as the area 
of corporate and contract law to be evaluated against factors such as the consistency and 
predictability of the law and the enforceability of legal agreements and rules. The analysis is 
structured around a comparison of the legal framework which applies to shareholders' agreements 
in the UK and in Greece, two jurisdictions representing two systems of different legal origin.  
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The comparative analysis of the treatment of shareholders agreements is structured around two 
prerequisites of effectiveness which promote beneficial shareholders interactions. More 
specifically, the first prerequisite for beneficial shareholders interaction is a facilitative regulatory 
regime regarding shareholders coalitions. The legal nature of shareholders' agreements, their 
interaction with the articles of association and their relationship with mandatory provisions of 
company law determine the character of the regulatory regime as permissive or restrictive of 
shareholders coalitions. The second prerequisite of beneficial shareholders coordination is the 
availability of effective rules and principles that are designed to strike down shareholders' 
agreements of an expropriating nature, while ensuring that shareholders agreements which 
protect minorities are not disregarded by the majority shareholders, which fact may sometimes 
even amount to an abuse of the corporate form.  
The comparative analysis highlights a number of legal mechanisms which impose limits on 
shareholders agreements such as the articles of association and the mandatory provisions of the 
law in both jurisdictions. It is argued that such mechanisms set the line between beneficial and 
harmful shareholders' agreements. In Greece, for instance, the general rules of the Greek Civil 
Code which prohibit abusive contracts, act as a filter of shareholders' agreements which are used 
in order to expropriate minorities rather than facilitate shareholders' interaction and monitoring. 
Despite the generally permissive approach to shareholders' agreements adopted by both 
jurisdictions and the similar techniques employed to balance the potential negative effects of 
shareholders agreements, the analysis identifies several points of legal inefficiency which mainly 
derives from the legal uncertainty in the relationship of shareholders agreements with company 
law. This legal uncertainty impedes rather than promotes the beneficial coordination of 
shareholders and often distorts the economic reality that shareholders' agreements establish. 
Similarly, the comparative analysis indicates that the lack of effective specific performance 
remedies, which is particularly the case in Greece, discourages the coordination of shareholders, 
because shareholders are provided with a leeway to avoid their obligations under the shareholders 
agreement. This is evident especially in light of the fact that any damages awarded for the breach 
will not reflect the actual loss suffered by the other members of the shareholders agreement.  
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While the focus remains on the notion of 'legal effectiveness', Chapter VI assesses the EU 
regulatory framework, which primarily affects shareholders agreements through the requirements 
imposed on the disclosure of significant ownership stakes and takeovers. The analysis identifies a 
number of factors which determine the ineffectiveness of the EU legal framework, as it fails to 
facilitate beneficial shareholders interactions and to benefit from the limits imposed when 
shareholders cross-monitor the extraction of private benefits of control. More specifically, it is 
argued that the duplication of disclosure requirements and the resulting high compliance costs 
imposed on shareholders agreements by the European Takeover Bid Directive and the 
Transparency Directive negatively affect large shareholders interaction and amount to an 
inefficient use of resources. In addition to this, the EU rules on takeovers, most notably the 
mandatory bid rule and the break-through rule, have a distorting effect as they effectively deter 
shareholders coordination and limit the positive impact of shareholders agreements on corporate 
governance. These rules are, therefore, misplaced and ill-adapted to the concentrated ownership 
structures prevailing across Continental Europe, thereby constituting an example of legal 
inefficiency mainly because they disregard the wider context in which they are called to operate. 
 
3. The methodology and jurisdictional focus of the thesis 
The thesis examines the profiles of the most prevalent types of controlling shareholders. It shows 
that the governance problems of concentrated ownership are determined by two factors, namely 
the identity of the controlling shareholder, most notably a family or the state, and the number of 
large shareholders in the company. The aim of this analysis is to illustrate the different challenges 
that the identity and number of the controller pose for investor protection. To this end, the thesis 
reviews the variety of relevant theoretical research and empirical studies by different disciplines. 
The overall analysis builds on this literature and seeks to explain the ambivalent effect of 
concentrated ownership structures on corporate performance, as presented by the vast number of 
papers in the area of corporate governance.  This thesis also assesses the effectiveness of different 
legal systems to address the conflicts of interests emerging as a result of concentration. To this 
end, the analysis covers Greece, the UK and the influential EU regulatory framework. The profiles 
of shareholders identified in the thesis, namely family ownership, state ownership and multiple 
The complex relationship of concentrated ownership structures and corporate governance 
An introduction 
 
 22 
large shareholders, are also the main drivers for the effectiveness assessment of the investor 
protection mechanisms within concentrated ownership structures. 
In this regard, Chapter III presents a country-specific case study of the Greek legal framework of 
investor protection mechanisms in state- and family-owned corporations. The case study 
reinforces the 'legal effectiveness' argument and also reveals the importance of functional 
equivalents to company law, mainly in the form of the general rules and principles of the Greek 
Civil Code. The Greek legal system is selected because of its civil law origin, which is viewed 
critically by LLSV and the related literature. Similarly, as the typology of ownership in Greece 
includes the state and families as the prevalent corporate owners, the mechanisms of investor 
protection, as adapted to address the special characteristics of different types of owners, provide a 
concrete example of effective regulation.  
Similarly, the hypothesis that the 'legal effectiveness' rather than the 'legal origin' determines the 
quality of investor protection is further substantiated through a case study of the law which applies 
to shareholders coalitions. To this end, Chapter V outlines and describes the legal mechanisms 
which limit the effect of shareholders agreements as expropriation tools within blockholders 
ownership structures. The jurisdictions of the comparative study include the UK and Greece, which 
are intentionally selected because of their different legal origin, a common law and civil law system 
respectively, and the different prevalent ownership structures, namely dispersed ownership in the 
UK and concentrated ownership in Greece. Despite the differences in the legal treatment of 
shareholders' agreements by the two systems, both approaches provide for a legal framework 
which is equally permissive of beneficial shareholders coalitions. The elements of inefficiency in 
both systems, however, suggest that the legal treatment of shareholders agreements across both 
legal systems could be improved further.  
Additionally, the EU regulation of shareholders agreements is presented as an example of 'legal 
ineffectiveness'. More specifically, Chapter VI analyses two case studies, one in Germany and the 
other in France, as part of the comparative assessment of the implementation of EU law across 
jurisdictions. Taking into account the EU aspect of regulation is imperative, given the considerable 
impact of legislation originating from the EU. This assessment reveals the differences in the 
implementation of EU law across jurisdictions and the inadequacy of the current legal framework 
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to promote beneficial shareholders’ coalitions and to create a level playing field across the EU. The 
selection of the EU legal framework which is relevant across a substantial number of jurisdictions 
therefore introduces an important comparative perspective in the analysis of the legal treatment 
of shareholders agreements and the effectiveness of the law to address their problematic aspects. 
 
II. THE GENERAL CONTEXT OF THE THESIS 
1. Concentrated ownership structures and the agency problem 
Corporate governance systems around the world are distinguished into two broad categories 
according to the prevailing ownership structures.13 The first category involves the systems in which 
dispersed corporate ownership is widespread, while the second category comprises systems in 
which the ownership of corporations is concentrated in the hands of one or a group of 
shareholders who exert corporate control in proportion with or even disproportionately to their 
economic participation in the companies involved.14 Ownership structures are crucial because they 
determine the nature of the governance problems to be addressed by corporate governance 
strategies.15 In the context of dispersed ownership, for instance, the source of tensions among the 
various constituencies often lies with the consequences of incorporation as such, most notably the 
misalignment of interests of the shareholders and the managers.16 Specialised managers develop 
into a powerful constituency, as shareholders inject their capital in companies incorporated into 
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 Berglof E., (1997), A note on the typology of financial systems, in Hopt K. et al, Comparative corporate governance: 
Essays and materials, p.151. 
14
 Similarly, the UK corporate governance system is an ‘outsider’ one, because within the diffused share ownership the 
monitoring function is exercised by an institution outside the firm, such as the takeover market. By contrast, continental 
European systems are characterised as ‘insider systems’, because the concentration of ownership facilitates the exertion 
of corporate control by the shareholders-owners, in the hands of whom the task of monitoring the management rests. 
See Julian Franks and Colin Mayer, (1997), Corporate governance and control in the UK, Germany and France, Journal of 
Applied Corporate Finance, 9(4):30; Goergen M. and Renneboog L., (1999), Strong managers and passive investors in the 
UK, in Barca and Becht, Ownership and control: A European perspective, OUP. 
15
La Porta et al. (1999) supra note5; Bebchuk L.A. and Hamdani A., (2009), The Elusive Quest for Global Governance 
Standards (2009). University of Pennsylvania Law Review, 157:1263; Harvard Law and Economics Discussion Paper No. 
633. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1374331. 
The authors highlight the shortcomings of the metrics developed to assess the governance of public companies around 
the world. They underline that the impact of many key governance arrangements depends considerably on companies’ 
ownership structure: measures that protect outside investors in a company without a controlling shareholder are often 
irrelevant or even harmful when it comes to investor protection in companies with a controlling shareholder, and vice 
versa. Consequently, governance metrics that purport to apply to companies regardless of ownership structure are 
bound to miss the mark with respect to one or both types of firms.  
16
 Paul Davies, Introduction to Company Law, 2002, OUP. 
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separate legal entities and assign the management to skilful, knowledgeable individuals with the 
competence to discharge the managerial functions.17 Theoretically, the role of managers is to 
promote the success of the company and maximise shareholders' value in exchange for their 
remuneration.18 This division of powers is considered to be one of the beneficial consequences of 
incorporation.19  
However, managers are not only a source of competitive advantage for the company but also a 
source of costs, deriving from the fact that their incentives and interests are not always aligned 
with the interests of shareholders. More specifically, they often come across a plethora of 
opportunities to divert the value created by the company’s operations from its shareholders to 
themselves. The negative impact of managerial misconduct on the value of the company can be 
multiple, as managers may divert corporate opportunities20, get excessive remuneration21 or 
engage into self-dealing22 transactions. Similarly, their shirking and incompetence may also deprive 
shareholders of the value yet to be realised23, while an empire-building culture also implies that 
the company resources are allocated inefficiently by way of over-investing.24 Finally, considerable 
costs are entailed in the consumption of perquisites, provided and paid for by the company, in 
order for managers to satisfy their desire to be distinguished by owning items or enjoying services 
                                                          
17
 In the UK, for example, the underlying assumption that directors are better positioned and equipped to manage the 
company than shareholders is illustrated in the Model Articles (Article 3) for both private and public companies of the CA 
2006, providing that 'Subject to the articles, the directors are responsible for the management of the company’s business, 
for which purpose they may exercise all the powers of the company.' 
18
 In the UK, for example, Section 172, CA 2006 sets out the role and main duty of the directors to promote the success of 
the company for the benefit of its members as a whole. 
19
 Davies (2002) supra note16. 
20
 D. Kershaw, Company Law in Context, 2009, OUP, p.468. 
21
 Bebchuk L.A. and Fried J.M., (2003), Executive Compensation as an Agency Problem. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 
17:71; Harvard Law and Economics Discussion Paper No. 421. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=364220; 
Bebchuk L.A. and Fried J.M., (2004), Pay Without Performance: The Unfulfilled Promise of Executive Compensation. 
Harvard University Press, 2004; UC Berkeley Public Law Research Paper No. 537783. Available at SSRN: 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=537783. 
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 Conac P.-H., Enriques L. and Gelter Martin, (2007), Constraining Dominant Shareholders’ Self-Dealing: The Legal 
Framework in France, Germany, and Italy, (October 2007), European Company and Financial Law Review, 4(4); ECGI - Law 
Working Paper No. 88/2007; Harvard Olin Fellows' Discussion Paper No. 18/2008. Available at SSRN: 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1532221; Enriques L., (2000), The Law on Company Directors' Self-Dealing: A Comparative 
Analysis (April 01, 2000). International and Comparative Corporate Law Journal, 2(3):297, 2000. Available at SSRN: 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=135674. 
23
 Keshaw (2009) supra note20, p.170-171. 
24
 Shleifer&Vishny (1997) supra note2. 
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to which the society attributes a particular importance.25 All aforementioned tensions are the 
negative side of the same coin, namely of specialized management.  
The problems arising in the relationship of shareholders and managers have been conceived and 
described by economists in terms borrowed from the principal and agent relationship.26 As a 
relationship of dependency is developed among the two constituencies, important conflicts of 
interests arise. The agency problem is described as the misalignment of the interests of the 
shareholders, who are viewed as the principals, and the managers, who act as their agents. The 
agency costs are reflected in the discounted price potential investors are willing to pay for the 
shares of a company and, therefore, affect the cost of capital of a corporation. As the cost of 
capital is a decisive factor for investment and sustainable growth, the reduction of agency costs is 
also important for the financial system as a whole.27 The separation of ownership from control28 
resulting from dispersed ownership accentuates agency costs due to the weakened incentives of 
shareholders to monitor their investment because of the high costs, the free rider problem and the 
inherent collective action limitations.29 
The mechanisms for mitigating the agency problem are based on four main forces which can act as 
a deterrent to managerial misconduct. These include the market for corporate control, the 
external regulation of companies through company law and listing rules30, the competition in the 
                                                          
25
 Yermack D., (2005), Flights of Fancy: Corporate Jets, CEO Perquisites, and Inferior Shareholder Returns (March 2005). 
AFA 2005 Philadelphia Meetings. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=529822. 
26
 Jensen M. and Meckling W., (1976), Theory of the firm: managerial behavior, agency costs, and ownership structure, 
Journal of Financial Economics, 3:305; Jensen M.C., (1976), A Theory of the Firm: Governance, Residual Claims and 
Organisational Forms, Harvard University Press, December 2000; Journal of Financial Economics (JFE), 3(4). Available at 
SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=94043. The scholars described the problem in agency-principal terms, which are more 
general than what a lawyer would understand as agency. 
27
 For an explanation of the cross-country differences in the cost of equity capital by reference to legal institutions and 
securities regulations see Hail L. and Leuz C., (2005), International Differences in the Cost of Equity Capital: Do Legal 
Institutions and Securities Regulation Matter?. ECGI - Law Working Paper No. 15/2003; Rodney L. White Center for 
Financial Research Working Paper No. 17-04; AFA 2005 Philadelphia Meetings. Available at SSRN: 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=641981. 
28
Berle&Means (1932) supra note1;  Fama E.F. and Jensen M.C., (1983), Separation of Ownership and Control, in M.C. 
Jensen, Foundations of Organisational Strategy, Harvard University Press, 1998, and Journal of Law and Economics, 26, 
1983. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=94034.  
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 Kershaw (2009) supra note20, p.163-171; Grossman, S., and O. Hart, (1980), Takeover Bids, the Free-Rider Problem, 
and the Theory of the Corporation, The Bell Journal of Economics, 11:42. 
30
However, it must be noted that the move of stock trading from traditional stock exchanges to alternative trading 
platforms substantially mitigates the monitoring role of stock exchanges for the purposes of transparency and corporate 
governance. For the role of stock exchanges on corporate governance see Christiansen H. and Koldertsova A., (2009), The 
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product markets31 and the internal governance arrangements. Such mechanisms comprise both 
legal and non-legal strategies.32 Examples of legal strategies that can discipline managers include 
the regulation of executive compensation, the regulation of board composition and the 
adjustment of the internal governance structure so as to allocate the power between the board, 
the managers and the shareholders efficiently.33 The functions of each strategy are often 
complementary to each other and it is their aggregate effect which often leads to the successful 
mitigation of the agency problem. However, in extreme cases, the failure of corporate governance 
mechanisms to align shareholders and managers interests can have negative implications. The 
recent banking crisis in the UK has indicated how important efficient corporate governance is. In 
the case of UK banks such as RBS and Lloyds, for example, the limited shareholders' understanding 
and monitoring of the risk embedded in the business model and the activities of banks, coupled 
with the passive role of non-executive board members, wiped out shareholders' equity and led to a 
wider crisis, only to be contained through unprecedented government intervention.34 
Although the agency problem and the dispersed ownership structures are typical in countries such 
as the UK35 and the US, they are not prevalent throughout the world. Instead, many countries are 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
Role of Stock Exchanges is Corporate Governance, OECD, Financial Market Trends, Vol.1, 2009, available at 
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/3/36/43169104.pdf (last accessed 27/09/2011).  
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Hermalin B., (1992), The effects of competition on executive behavior, Rand Journal of Economics 23:350; Guadalupe, M., 
Pérez-González, F., (2010), The impact of product market competition on private benefits of control. Working paper, 
available at http://www0.gsb.columbia.edu/faculty/mguadalupe/papers/Paper%20Mar2010%20v2.pdf (last accessed 
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B. Hansmann, Gérard Hertig, Klaus J. Hopt, Hideki Kanda, and Edward B. Rock, 'The Anatomy of Corporate Law', (2009), 
OUP. 
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disciplinary mechanisms are some of the main strategies against managerial misconduct. 
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 For an extensive review of corporate governance in UK financial institutions and the failures which partly led to the 
crisis see The Walker Review, Sir David Walker, A review of corporate governance in UK banks and other financial industry 
entities, Final Recommendations, 26 November 2009, available at http://www.hm-
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Working Paper No. 130/2009. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1448118. 
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 However, the UK is a distinct case in that institutional shareholders own a significant percentage of equity in the UK. 
See for example Stapledon G.P., (1996), Institutional shareholders and corporate governance, Clarendon Press; 
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characterized by concentrated ownership structures, where corporations have a controlling 
shareholder or multiple shareholders.36 Concentrated ownership implies that shareholder activism 
and management monitoring are rational responses of owners in preservation of their interests, 
because the costs of monitoring and the free-rider problem are not inhibiting factors and the 
collective action problems of shareholders in dispersed structures are eliminated.37 However, 
ownership concentration transforms the agency problem into a problem of conflicts in the 
interests of minority and majority shareholders. More specifically, as the scope for managerial 
misconduct diminishes, the conflicts of interests of the controlling and the minority shareholders 
are accentuated. In extreme cases, such as the Parmalat scandal38, minorities are vulnerable to 
expropriation and fraud by the majority, which leads to important financial losses and often to the 
bankruptcy of the company.  
Viewed from this perspective, concentration empowers controlling shareholders to extract private 
benefits of control to the detriment of non-controlling shareholders.39 Such private benefits may 
take both a pecuniary and non-pecuniary form.40 The typology of the private benefits of control is 
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similar to the agency costs incurred by shareholders in a widely-held company. For example, the 
controllers may divert business opportunities from the company to another wholly-owned 
company; they may engage into self-dealing transactions or get excessive remuneration as 
managers of the company. Similarly, they themselves or their family members may be managing 
the company despite their incompetence or shirking; they may be consuming perquisites the 
company provides for; they may also satisfy their desire to become powerful and respectful 
individuals in their society through the company.41 Finally, as controlling shareholders pursue their 
own interests, the risk of suboptimal management by owners-managers and excessive risk 
concentration42 may be detrimental for minority investors.43 
The aforementioned examples indicate that the ownership structure determines the corporate 
governance problems to be addressed.44 For instance, in countries in which a relatively small 
number of dominant families control many public companies through pyramids and other forms of 
control-enhancing mechanisms, important inefficiencies derive from the presence of the 
controlling shareholder and the related high risk of minority expropriation. In this context, one of 
the underlying propositions of this thesis is that the danger of expropriation is inherent in both 
ownership systems, concentrated and dispersed, with the difference lying in the identity of the 
expropriator: Dispersed ownership facilitates managerial misconduct to the detriment of the 
company and its shareholders, while concentrated ownership gives rise to conflicts of interests 
between minority and majority shareholders, therefore increasing the risk of private benefits 
extraction by the controllers. The use of control-enhancing mechanisms appears to exacerbate the 
conflicts of interests as disproportionate control reduces the disciplinary effect on the actions of 
the controlling shareholders. Therefore, despite the arguments that corporate governance systems 
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around the world appear to converge45, important differences remain with regard to the nature of 
the governance risks and the conflicts which affect investors. 
 
2. Concentrated ownership and the 'inefficiency bias' 
2.1. Concentrated ownership structures and the ‘legal origin’ hypothesis   
In the late 1990s, the traditional distinction of financial systems into bank- and market-centred46 
on the basis of the prevalent institution available to market participants for raising capital, has 
been criticised as an unfruitful way of explaining the differences in corporate governance systems 
around the world. This criticism was manifested in a series of papers47 by La Porta et al (LLSV) who 
sought to explain the large differences observed between countries in terms of ownership 
concentration in publicly traded firms, in the breadth and depth of financial markets and in the 
access of firms to external finance. They proposed a classification based on an ‘investor protection 
matters’ approach according to which ‘…all outside investors, be they large or small, creditors or 
shareholders, need rights to get their money back.’ In this light, scholars argued, ‘investor rights are 
a more primitive determinant of financial development than is the size of particular institutions’, 
such as banks and capital markets.48 
In their study, LLSV argue that the legal system and the minority protection mechanisms 
established within it explain the different patterns of corporate ownership and finance around the 
world. The LLSV hypothesis, therefore, establishes a correlation between the legal and the financial 
system. As investor protection rights are the prerequisites of developed capital markets, good 
investor protection determines the patterns of corporate ownership structures and the efficient 
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 Coffee J., (1999), The Future as History: The Prospects for Global Convergence in Corporate Governance and its 
implications, Northwestern Law Review, 93:641; Hopt K.J., (2011), Comparative Corporate Governance: The State of the 
Art and International Regulation, American Journal of Comparative Law, 59:1; ECGI - Law Working Paper No. 170/2011. 
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allocation of resources within a financial system. In this context, the LLSV hypothesis associates 
concentration of ownership with high costs of capital49 and ‘bad law’50, by considering that 
concentration is the response of shareholders who are unwilling to part with control for fear of 
being expropriated due to deficient investor protection.  
LLSV found that the average ownership concentration of the three largest shareholders around the 
world was 46% and the median 45% but they also managed to establish an important correlation 
between the legal origin and the level of concentration. When measured by legal origin, French-
origin civil law countries, for example, were found to exhibit an average ownership by the three 
largest shareholders of 54%. In German-origin civil law countries concentration of ownership by 
the three largest shareholders is 34%, while concentration in Scandinavian civil law countries is 
37%. Finally, common law countries were in the middle with 43% average ownership of the three 
largest shareholders. LLSV, therefore, supported that strong investor protection is positively 
correlated with dispersion of ownership, while, in contrast, weak investor protection is positively 
correlated with concentrated ownership. LLSV considered their results to be at least suggestive of 
the fact that concentration is an adaptation to poor legal protection, namely a response of 
investors to inefficient legal systems with weak investor protection.51 It is this latter finding of the 
LLSV study which is strongly contested in this thesis. 
2.2. Measuring corporate governance: Ratings and indices 
In order to test their hypothesis, LLSV measured the levels of ownership concentration for 45 
countries around the world by taking the median and the average ownership stake of the three 
largest shareholders among the ten largest publicly traded companies within each country. The 
Anti-Director Rights Index rates countries on the basis of six components, with the 'oppressed 
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For LLSV, poor investor protection has an important cost on the financial system. More specifically, they explain that 
‘…one of these costs of heavily concentrated ownership in large firms is that their core investors are not diversified. The 
other cost is that these firms probably face difficulty raising equity finance, since minority investors fear expropriation by 
managers and concentrated owners.’ See La Porta et al. (1998) supra note5.  
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ownership concentration, accounting for the higher concentration of ownership in the French civil law countries. The 
results support the idea that heavily concentrated ownership results from, and perhaps substitutes for, weak protection 
of investors in a corporate governance system.’   
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minorities' variable being the most relevant in the context of concentrated ownership structures.52 
Subsequent attempts to measure investor protection through an improved index involve the Anti-
Self-Dealing Index created by Djankov et al (DLLS).53 The latter index focuses on private 
enforcement mechanisms, such as disclosure, approval, and litigation, governing a specific self-
dealing transaction. Both academic indices produce results that illustrate concentration as a sub-
optimal type of corporate ownership structure and the minority protection regimes within civil law 
systems as less effective54, thus establishing an 'inefficiency bias' against concentration.  
The misconception of concentrated ownership established by LLSV is premised upon an 
‘imperative causality’ relationship between civil law legal systems, low investor protection and the 
concentration of ownership. This approach has shifted the focus of the corporate governance 
debate to the legal origin rather than the actual effectiveness of investor protection rules, as 
assessed through a substantive comparative analysis of the law. The 'legal origin' proposition also 
downplayed the importance of the factor of ownership structures as a determinant of legal 
effectiveness. As the LLSV study constructed stereotypes of corporate governance systems 
according to their legal origin, the role of the patterns of ownership in determining the corporate 
governance problems to be addressed by any given legal framework was perceived as secondary. 
Contrary to this approach, this thesis studies the interaction of the ownership structures and 
corporate governance on the basis that ownership structures dictate what rules will be effective in 
a given context.  
 
3. Concentrated ownership and disproportionate control 
The ‘inefficiency bias’ of concentrated ownership structures is more intense, when control is not 
proportionate to the cash-flow rights of the controller.55 In order to achieve disproportionality, a 
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  La Porta et al. (1999) supra note5, Table 7. 
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 For the methodology and variables of the Anti-Self Dealing Index created by Djankov et al see Chapter I. 
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 One important type of controlling shareholders are those labelled 'controlling minority shareholders' by Bebchuk, 
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wide variety of control-enhancing mechanisms (hereafter CEMs) is often used.56 One type of such 
mechanisms are corporate voting devices such as non-voting shares, multiple voting shares, shares 
with preferential rights, golden shares or shares with special features whose beneficiaries can be 
the state, a regional government, or even a municipality.57 Shareholder agreements, cross-
shareholdings and pyramidal structures are also common CEMs.58 Controlling shareholders, such 
as family owners and the state, resort to these mechanisms as a means of achieving the desired 
balance between liquidity and control.59 For instance, a famous example of the function of CEMs is 
found in the shares held by the German state of Lower Saxony in Volkswagen AG. In this case, the 
shares held by the state carry special rights and enable the state to veto certain key decisions of 
Volkswagen AG, such as a merger or an acquisition.60 Similarly, family owners such as the 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
For evidence about the significant amount of tunnelling that takes place in such firms see Johnson, S., La Porta R., Lopez-
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Oxford University Press for European Finance Association, 12(1):1. 
57
 ibid. For more details on the characteristics of the mechanisms see EU 2007 Report. 
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Parasites, Working Paper, HBS and Hebrew University.  
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 Becht M., (1999), European Corporate Governance: Trading off liquidity against control, European Economic Review, 
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Wallenberg61 family in Sweden and the Agnelli family in Italy62, make extensive use of corporate 
voting devices and shareholders' agreements in order to maintain their control over a group of 
companies.63 
3.1. Control-enhancing mechanisms and the separation of cash-flow from control rights 
The separation of cash-flow from control rights, resulting from the use of control-enhancing 
mechanisms, distorts the incentives of the controller and accentuates the conflicts of interests 
between minority and majority shareholders.64 More specifically, controlling minorities, unlike 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
These three provisions of the VW law (which are also reflected in provisions of the Articles of Association of the company) 
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controlling majorities, do not internalize most of the value effects of their decisions as their stake 
represents only a small fraction of the cash-flow rights in the firm under their control.65 For 
example, the limited financial exposure of controlling minorities imposes fewer limitations on their 
incentives to take risks66, although the consequences of risky decisions may have a significant 
impact on the non-controlling shareholders. In this regard, as the fraction of their cash-flow rights 
declines, controlling minorities can progressively externalize more costs of their misbehaviour, 
therefore causing a sharp increase in the rate of the agency costs involved.67 The limited economic 
participation of controlling shareholders in the company also implies that they are more interested 
in extracting private benefits than maximising the value of the company's shares or the dividends 
awarded to shareholders.  
Control-enhancing devices manage to restrict the disciplinary effect of the principal mechanisms 
which limit agency costs, such as the takeover market.68 More specifically, controlling minorities 
are less exposed to hostile takeovers and proxy contests which discipline management and 
corporate insiders generally69, because the deviations from the one-share-one-vote principle 
insulate the company from market powers with a disciplining effect, contrary to the situation in 
dispersed systems.70 In the context of a takeover, for example, control-enhancing devices promote 
controlling shareholders who are most likely to extract the highest private benefits possible.71 
Assumming that the bidder is willing to pay a premium which is less than or equal to the private 
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benefits to be extracted, the winning bidder is the one that is able to offer the highest control 
premium for the multiple-class shares.72 The higher the magnitude of private benefits, the higher 
the voting premium paid for the shares as well.73 As a result, the contest is ultimately most likely to 
be won by the party who is more able to extract private benefits of control to the detriment of the 
minority shareholders of the company, since this person is also more able to pay the highest 
control premium.74 
The misalignment of shareholders interests also leads to the increase of the company’s cost of 
capital, as the potential to extract private benefits is reflected in the price of the shares. For 
example, recent empirical studies suggest that almost 80% of investors consider control-enhancing 
mechanisms as a deterrent for investment and take the potential of extracting private benefits into 
account in their investment decisions.75 Consequently, they expect a discount in the shares of the 
company anywhere from 10 to 30%.76 Empirical studies also support the distortive effect of 
disproportionality of ownership and control rights on firm value.77 For instance, research 
conducted on a sample of publicly traded corporations from East Asian economies, in which 
concentration of ownership is high and is coupled with sharp divergence between cash-flow rights 
and ownership, underlines the potential for significant control entrenchment due to 
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disproportionate large ownership.78 The negative correlation between firm value and the wedge 
between the voting and the cash flow rights of the largest shareholder is also established in 
European companies79, while similar studies on US dual-class companies confirm the efficiency 
distortions caused by control-enhancing devices and show that firm value is increasing in cash-flow 
ownership and decreasing in voting ownership.80 Viewed from this perspective, CEMs appear to 
entrench the controller in power and promote the rigidities and volatility in the economy in the 
long run.81 Moreover, private benefit extraction reduces the return on investments substantially 
and ultimately causes serious underinvestment problems and suboptimal allocation of capital.82 
3.2. Control-enhancing mechanisms: Efficient response or market failure? 
Despite the theoretical predictions that CEMs exacerbate the conflicts of interests, their 
proliferation and persistence suggest that important efficiency considerations render such 
mechanisms necessary for investors.83 For example, corporate voting instruments determine 
control rights84, increase the liquidity of the controller and provide investors with a form of 
leverage which enables them to maximize their financial returns.85 Additionally, given that the 
wide managerial discretion inherent in dispersed shareholdings also has substantial agency costs86, 
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concentrated ownership and the use of CEMs may constitute an efficient response to the 
characteristics of the financial system or the company rather than a market failure.  
Factors such as the nature of the investment, the stage of the company's development and the 
surrounding institutions determine the optimality and the desirability of concentration and CEMs. 
For instance, for investments entailing high monitoring costs due to information asymmetries, it is 
vital that shareholders have the opportunity to use control-enhancing devices to ensure control 
over their investment. Moreover, in light of the heterogeneity of a company's shareholders87, the 
existence of multiple voting and ownership structures actually promotes optimal arrangements 
between entrepreneurs and providers of risk capital.88 For example, deviations from the one-
share-one-vote rule form part of complex financing arrangements between venture capitalists and 
entrepreneurs.89 From this perspective, the use of CEMs meets the demands of the corporate 
reality and promotes economic development, because it allows rational investors to use the 
ownership and voting structures corresponding to their needs.  
Similarly, CEMs are often used in IPOs90, as initial owners who do not want to leave control up in 
situations where the amount of private benefits could attract unfriendly takeover bids.91 For 
example, in the countries in which the controllers can obtain higher benefits of control, initial 
owners of a company will normally choose to adopt a dual-class structure before offering the 
company’s securities to the public, as they wish to retain control. In this context, it has, thus, been 
argued that the CEMs constitute an optimal legal standard at least with respect to the IPO stage, as 
their use enables the initial owners’ choice to go public, thus generating lower social costs than 
those caused by the prohibition of dual-class structures.92 In addition to this important trade-off, 
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economic theory also suggests that the case of IPOs is non-problematic in terms of agency costs, as 
the initial shareholders bear the cost of limiting voting structures.93  
Beyond the case of developed economies, the use of CEMs in emerging economies provides 
investors with the liquidity required to finance their activities in the absence of many of the 
institutional mechanisms such as deep and liquid capital markets, which facilitate market 
transactions.94 As a response, investors resort to alternative internal financing mechanisms by 
vertical integration and diversification within a group, for example.95 Similarly, oversight by 
controlling shareholders constitutes an efficient alternative to the missing disciplinary mechanisms 
such as the market for corporate control, and is often demanded by investors themselves, in order 
for the latter to invest in a country.96 In this light, CEMs and the contractual freedom they 
represent limit the risk of adopting a one-size-fits-all approach, which disregards the divergence in 
the preferences of investors and distorts their incentives.  
Viewed from another perspective, the disproportionate control facilitated by CEMs does not 
automatically imply a destruction of corporate value.97 In this regard, private benefits extraction is 
viewed as compensation for the costs of holding a large block or engaging into monitoring98 and 
have an important role as incentives. More specifically, empirical studies indicate a risk of 
underinvestment and obstacles to innovation, if entrepreneurs are given too little incentive in the 
form of private benefits.99 This finding indicates that the extraction of private benefits is efficient 
to the extent that the agency costs of concentration are less than the agency costs created by 
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alternative ownership structures.100 Similarly, disproportionate control is efficient if its costs are 
less than the transaction costs that shareholders would incur if power was exercised directly.101 
CEMs, therefore, appear to be more than a market failure or inefficiency. Building on this 
proposition, this thesis suggests that the impact of CEMs on corporate governance is determined 
by the legal protection of minority shareholders.102 Aligned with the aforementioned proposition, 
empirical studies indicate that the agency costs of dual-class shares and similar structures tend to 
be comparatively larger in countries in which legal rules are lax and private benefits of control are 
consequently also large.103 
 
III. THE RATIONALE FOR THIS THESIS: CONCENTRATED OWNERSHIP AND THE 
INTERCONNECTEDNESS OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE SYSTEMS 
As the interconnectedness of the financial and corporate governance systems increases, it is now 
more important than ever to understand the impact of different concentrated and dispersed 
ownership structures on corporate governance. Such interconnectedness is the result of a global 
economy, where investments flow throughout countries, as investors seek exposure to new 
markets and buy out stakes in companies with concentrated ownership. The Parmalat scandal 
clearly illustrates this point as it highlights the global dimension and impact of corporate 
governance failures.104 More specifically, Parmalat raised money on international capital markets 
                                                          
100
 Shleifer&Vishny (1986) supra note37.   
101
 Gilson (2005) supra note4. 
102
 La Porta et al (2002) supra note5. 
Reputational factors also limit the agency costs of controlling minority structures, as controllers who intend to return to 
the equity market must establish a reputation for sound management. See Becht (1999), supra note59. As the argument 
goes, when controlling shareholders exert proportionate control in a company, they have to sacrifice their liquidity 
because they have to hold shares representing the majority of the capital of the company. The implication of this is that 
they might face restrictions to finance any plans of the company in the future. Thus, they will need to sustain a good 
reputation in the market regarding the governance of the controlled company in order to be able to attract investors.   
However, the enhanced liquidity offered to controlling shareholders through the use of CEMs renders the role of 
reputational factors marginal. Investor protection, therefore, constitutes the determining factor in mitigating 
shareholders' conflicts of interests. 
Also see Gilson R.J., (2007), Controlling Family Shareholders in Developing Countries: Anchoring Relational Exchange. 
Columbia Law and Economics Working Paper No. 311; Stanford Law and Economics Olin Working Paper No. 333; ECGI - 
Law Working Paper No. 79/2007; Rock Center for Corporate Governance at Stanford University Working Paper No. 10. 
Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=957895. 
103
 Ibid. Also see Nenova (2003) supra note39, Dyck&Zingales supra note40. 
104
 See Enriques L. and Gatti M., (2007), EC Reforms of Corporate Governance and Capital Markets Law: Do They Tackle 
Insiders’ Opportunism?, Northwestern Journal of International Law & Business, 28(1):1. 
The complex relationship of concentrated ownership structures and corporate governance 
An introduction 
 
 40 
from lenders based in some 100 countries.105 However, in light of this interconnectedness, the 
oversight of global capital markets and corporate governance by fragmented supervisory regimes, 
usually organised on a national basis only, is inconsistent and problematic. For example, regulatory 
arbitrage is not rare, as companies seek out regulatory weak points all around the world, and 
exacerbates the risk of corporate governance frauds against investors in general and minority 
investors in particular. 
The exposure of investors to the problems of concentrated ownership may also be the result of the 
listings of foreign companies in a jurisdiction with liquid capital markets, such as the UK.  The UK 
capital market provides an illustrative example of the increasing interconnectedness of company 
law and corporate governance systems, as developed in the context of global financial markets. 
More specifically, as more companies of foreign origin are listed on the London Stock Exchange to 
access capital, investors are exposed to considerable conflicts of interests. For example, mining 
and resources companies, originating from emerging markets, currently make up one third of the 
FTSE 100, while IPO activity of mining and resources companies in the UK capital market accounted 
for 70% of the total activity for the first semester of 2011.106 The data highlights that such 
                                                          
105
 Cova supra note38. 
106
 See Alison Smith and Kate Burgess, Governance concerns rise after spate of London IPOs, FT, 17.06.2011, available at 
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/7411f846-9843-11e0-ae45-00144feab49a.html#axzz1Yo0KkPMk (last accessed 29.09.2011). 
The article refers to the trend that majority-owned companies, such as Glencore and Vallares, get listed on the London 
Stock Exchange and concerns are raised with regard to the suitability of the UK Combined Code to address this new 
problems and safeguard effective corporate governance in the context of concentrated ownership structures. 
Employees and managers at Glencore have important stakes in the company as follows: Ivan Glasenberg 15,8%, Daniel 
Francisco Mate Badenes 6%, Aristotelis Mistakidis 6%, Tor Peterson 5,3%, Alex Beard 4,6%, Steven Kalmin 1%. The six 
significant shareholders own 48,7% of the company, while two of them (Ivan Glasenberg and Steven Kalmin) also sit on 
the board. The company is now also listed on the London Stock Exchange and Hong Kong Stock Exchange. See Glencore 
IPO Prospectus (2011), p.298-299.  
Vallares is a listed company which plans to use the money provided by investors through its listing to buy into companies 
in need of capital. Instead of buying the company, Vallares will be offering shares in itself, thus providing the company 
with access to the global financial markets. The aforementioned business structure mostly involves closely-held 
companies with access to good resources but limited access to capital. A similar structure has already been in place as 
Vallar Plc used the capital raised in London capital markets in order to agree a deal with Indonesia's Bumi Resources, a 
company controlled by Indonesia's Bakri family. The new company, Bumi plc, is now on the threshold of FTSE 100. For 
more see William MacNamara, Vallares deal straight from Hannam's handbook, FT, 07.09.2011 available at 
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companies are not only marginally important but rather represent an important part of new 
listings. In light of the concentrated ownership structures of such companies, minority 
shareholders face substantial corporate governance challenges and, as new entrants, they are 
often exposed to important corporate governance deficiencies. The case of ENRC, the London-
listed Kazakh mining group, clearly shows the high risk often undertaken by minority investors.107 
More specifically, the independent directors of the ENRC board have been dismissed by the 
controlling shareholders of the company allegedly because the former repeatedly complained 
about corporate governance flaws, most notably the lack of board independence.108 The tumult 
associated with corporate governance concerns has caused a substantial fall in the shares of the 
company to the detriment of minority shareholders. 109 
The presence of closely-held corporations in the UK capital markets highlights the mismatch 
between the prevalent corporate governance problems within such structures, namely the 
conflicts of interests between minority and majority shareholders, and the governance problems 
which the UK Corporate Governance Code is designed to address, namely managerial opportunism 
and shareholders’ apathy.110 For example, the Stewardship Code in the UK is designed to increase 
the engagement of institutional shareholders, who own almost 80% of the shares listed on the 
London Stock Exchange (LSE), in corporate governance.111 As the 2010 reforms of the corporate 
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governance rules for listed companies, brought about by the UK Corporate Governance Code112 
and the Stewardship Code, focus on dispersed ownership structures and the particular role of 
institutional shareholders in the UK, the issue of the conflicts of interests among minority and 
majority shareholders remains unaddressed. The increased emphasis placed on the role of the 
chairman, the annual re-election of the board and the calls for increased participation of women in 
the boardroom hardly have the potential to mitigate the conflicts of interests generated by the 
presence of a controlling shareholder in the company. Although potential entrants to the LSE need 
to comply with Listing Rules which require compliance with the UK Corporate Governance Code113, 
the effectiveness and adequacy of current regulation to achieve good corporate governance within 
companies with concentrated ownership is under criticism.114 In this wider context, understanding 
concentrated ownership and the different problems generated by this structure constitutes a 
prerequisite for designing effective investor protection mechanisms and for promoting market 
confidence. 
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CHAPTER I: THE ' INEFFICIENCY BIAS' OF CONCENTRATION AND THE 'LEGAL 
EFFECTIVENESS' ARGUMENT 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Corporate governance has received considerable attention in the past years, most notably due to 
its perceived correlation with firm performance, financial development and growth.1 In particular, 
the compilation of indices measuring the quality of investor protection has been at the centre of 
comparative corporate governance research as indicated by the creation of the Anti-Director 
Rights Index by LaPorta et al.2 (hereafter LLSV) and the Anti-Self-Dealing Index by Djankov et al.3 
(hereafter DLLS), which are two of the most important academic indices. The objective of 
corporate governance indices is to measure the quality of investor protection against expropriation 
by managers or controlling shareholders. The aforementioned investor protection indices 
document the low performance of civil law countries, characterised by concentrated ownership 
structures, and support the ‘law matters’ thesis established by LLSV, according to which controlling 
shareholders emerge as a response to low investor protection which also enables them to extract 
                                                          
1
 On the focus on corporate governance see: Claessens St., (2006), Corporate Governance and Development, World Bank 
Research Observer, 21:91, stating the '(c)orporate governance...has now become a mainstream concern-a staple of 
discussion in corporate boardrooms, academic meetings, and policy circles around the globe.'; Listokin Y., (2008), 
Interpreting Empirical Estimates of the Effect of Corporate Governance, American Law and Economics Review, 10:90, 
stating that '(o)ver the last decade, a series of important empirical articles have evaluated the impact of many levers of 
corporate governance on firm value and performance.'; Gillan S.L., (2006), Recent Developments in Corporate 
Governance: An Overview, Journal of Corporate Finance, 12:381, stating that '(t)he amount of corporate governance 
research has increased dramatically during the last decade.' 
On corporate governance and firm performance/financial growth see: Bhagat S., and Bolton B., (2008) Corporate 
Governance and Firm Performance, Journal of Corporate Finance, 14:257; Black B.S. et al., (2006), Does Corporate 
Governance Predict Firms’ Market Values? Evidence from Korea, Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, 22:366.   
2
 La Porta R.,  Lopez-de-Silanes F., Shleifer A., and Vishny R.W., (1998), Law and Finance, Journal of Political Economy 
107:1113. 
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 Djankov S., Lopez de Silanes F., La Porta R. and Shleifer A., (2008), The Law and Economics of Self-Dealing, Journal of 
Financial Economics, 88:430. 
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large private benefits of control.4 This hypothesis has provided the basis for the 'inefficiency bias' 
of concentrated ownership structures by linking them to weak investor protection, which is 
allegedly the case predominantly within civil law jurisdictions.5  
This Chapter challenges the common perception that concentrated ownership is inefficient and 
contests the foundations of the 'inefficiency bias'. More specifically, the analysis contests the 
reliability of the LLSV propositions by outlining the criticisms against the LLSV study and 
emphasises the inaccuracies and the methodological deficiencies which render the indices an 
unreliable measure of the quality of investor protection across the world. Building on the criticisms 
against LLSV and DLLS, this Chapter also argues that the methodology employed to produce 
reliable metrics for the quality of corporate governance must be adapted to the varieties of 
corporate ownership as they arise around the world. In this respect, this Chapter constitutes the 
cornerstone of this thesis, as it disproves the LLSV propositions which establish the 'inefficiency 
bias' of concentration, it highlights the importance of ownership structures as a factor of corporate 
governance, in general, and the varieties of concentration, in particular, and it sets the context in 
which the legal effectiveness argument is developed. 
 
II. CRITICISMS AGAINST THE LLSV HYPOTHESIS AND THE ANTI-DIRECTOR RIGHTS INDEX 
1. Important LLSV findings and relevant studies 
The LLSV 'law matters' thesis postulates that 'investor protection' is instrumental in three broad 
areas, namely in determining the patterns of ownership structure, in the development of financial 
                                                          
4
 LaPorta et al (1998) supra note2.The explanation provided for this is a simple one: Because investor protection is low, 
investors aim at gaining control or are not willing to part with control for fear of subsequent exploitation by another 
controlling shareholder who could assemble control through the market and extract private benefits without significant 
restrictions by the legal system. Under this analysis, controlling shareholder systems will also most probably be 
characterized by weak equity markets, because too much liquidity is tied up in control blocks, and by large differences in 
the price of controlling and minority blocks as a result of private benefit extraction by the controlling shareholder. Their 
assertions, therefore, align with the typical characteristics of financial systems characterized by concentrated ownership 
structures but no causal link is established between concentrated ownership and low investor protection which results in 
the increase of the cost of capital.   
5
 LaPorta et al (1998), supra note2.   
In the process of establishing empirical links between the quality of legal regimes, capital markets and corporate 
governance systems, ‘law and finance’ scholars have associated controlling shareholder structures with ‘bad law’. 
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markets and in the efficient allocation of resources, namely through capital allocation and the 
distribution of dividends.6 In a series of papers7, LLSV explained that weak investor protection 
provides strong incentives to shareholders to gain and retain control in order to be able to exercise 
their rights and avoid being expropriated.8 LLSV also suggested that the legal origins of legal 
systems do not only determine the law, but through the law they play a key role in shaping the 
opportunities for external finance and, consequently, the characteristics of the financial markets as 
well.9 In the context of the LLSV ‘law matters' approach to corporate governance, rules and legal 
techniques are regarded as the key mechanism against expropriation. Therefore, the effectiveness 
of the legal system in mitigating the agency problem and conflicts of interest, which may arise at 
the level of the company, substantially enhances the confidence and willingness of investors to 
provide capital at a lower cost.  
In order to establish a correlation between the legal and the financial system, the next step of LLSV 
was to assess the effectiveness of the different legal systems. The latter task would necessitate the 
comparability of the outcome of such an assessment exercise. What resulted from this process was 
the creation of one of the most influential works on corporate governance and comparative 
company law of the last fifteen years. More specifically, LLSV compared a set of key legal rules 
protecting shareholders and compiled an index by rating the relevant rights with either one or zero 
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 Wurgler J., (2000), Financial markets and the allocation of capital, Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, Vol. 58(1-2), 
p.187. 
7
 LaPorta et al (1998), supra note2; La Porta R., Lopez-de-Silanes F., and Shleifer A., (1999b), Corporate Ownership Around 
the World, Journal of Finance, 54:471; La Porta R., Lopez-de-Silanes F., and Shleifer A., (2006), What Works in Securities 
Law?, Journal of Finance, 61:1; La Porta R., Lopez-de-Silanes F., and Shleifer A., (2008), The Economic Consequences of 
Legal Origin, Journal of Economic Literature, 46:285; La Porta R., Lopez-de-Silanes F., Shleifer A., and Vishny R. W., (1997), 
Legal Determinants of External Finance, Journal of Finance, 52:1131; La Porta R., F. Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer A. and 
Vishny R.W., (2000a), Agency Problems and Dividend Policies Around the World, Journal of Finance, 55:1; La Porta R., 
Lopez-de-Silanes F., Shleifer A. and Vishny R.W., (2000b), Investor Protection and Corporate Governance, Journal of 
Financial Economics, 58:3; La Porta R., Lopez-de-Silanes F., Shleifer A., and Vishny R.W., (2002), Investor Protection and 
Corporate Valuation, Journal of Finance, 57:1147 
8
 For example, LaPorta et al (1998) supra note2  argued that poor investor protection renders the issuance of new shares 
to the public an unattractive option for raising finance, either because minority investors may only be willing to buy 
shares at low prices or unwilling to buy shares as an investment generally, thus affecting the demand for such 
investments. As a result, the loss in corporate value is not limited to cases of direct expropriation of minorities by the 
controllers but also extends to affecting the value of their investment because the expected loss in the form of extracted 
private benefits is projected on investors’ assessments of firm value. 
9
 Because of the correlation of legal origins with the law and because legal families originated before financial markets 
had developed, LaPorta et al (1998) supra note2  point out that it is unlikely that laws were written primarily in response 
to market pressures. Instead what seems more likely is that the legal families have shaped the legal rules, which in turn 
influenced the financial markets.  
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according to the perceived effectiveness of the rule.10 According to the findings of their indexing 
methodology, countries with a common law tradition11 have the strongest protection12 of outside 
investors, namely shareholders and creditors, whereas French civil law countries have the weakest 
protection. German civil law and Scandinavian countries fall in between, although they have been 
found to have stronger protection of creditors, especially secured creditors.13 The LLSV findings 
indicate that investor protection and, consequently, the development of the financial system are 
extensively affected by the legal tradition and the political history of a given country.14  
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 More specifically, in their research, LaPorta et al. (1998) supra note2 compared a set of key legal rules protecting 
shareholders and creditors in 49 countries around the world with the ultimate objective to examine the variation of legal 
rules and enforcement quality across countries and across legal families. In order to achieve this, they aggregated the 
documented rules into shareholder (anti-director) and creditor rights indices for each country. They also considered 
several measures of enforcement quality, such as the efficiency of the judicial system, as well as a measure of the quality 
of accounting standards. 
The definitions and method of rating of the six components of the index designed by LLSV (1998, Table I) are the 
following: 
 1. Pre-emptive rights to new issues: 2. Cumulative voting or proportional representation: 3. Shares not blocked before 
meeting: 4. Proxy by mail allowed:.5. Percentage of share capital to call an extraordinary shareholders’ meeting:. 6. 
Oppressed minorities mechanism.  
11
 Also LaPorta et al (2000) supra note7, with further references to literature. The protective stance of common law is 
further explained by the tendency of the judges to use their discretion to prevent expropriation because of historical and 
political reasons. More specifically, LaPorta et al (1997) supra note7 argue that common law evolved to protect private 
property against the Crown, which protection was extended to investors. In civil law countries, the state has had a central 
role in economic activity and traditionally used codes and statutes in order to regulate economic activity, thus imposing 
severe limitations on the judges' discretion to shape the law. In this light, civil law is associated with greater government 
intervention in economic activity and weaker protection of private property than common law. 
12
 With regard to causation, in order to identify why common law is more protective of shareholders’ rights as opposed to 
civil law legal traditions, LaPorta et al (1997) supra note7 developed two explanations. According to the judicial 
explanation, common law protects investors better, because legal rules in the common law system are usually made by 
judges, who are based on precedents and are inspired by general principles such as fiduciary duty or fairness. For this 
reason judges have more discretion, which in the case of expropriation they exert by applying what has been called a 
‘smell test’ and focus on whether the practise is unfair to outside investors. Such discretion results in the limitation of the 
expropriation by the insiders in common law countries. In contrast, laws in civil law systems are made by legislatures, and 
judges are not supposed to go beyond the statutes and apply ‘smell tests’ or fairness opinions. Thus, civil law systems 
entail significant restrictions and flexibility is compromised, since judges cannot rule against what is not explicitly 
prohibited by the statutes.  
This justification is exposed to criticism on the basis that the functional equivalent of the smell tests performed by judges 
in common law systems is the use of general legal principles within civil law systems. Such general legal principles provide 
judges with the discretion to achieve fairness and constitute an additional mechanism against minority expropriation. 
Johnson, S., La Porta R., Lopez-de-Silanes F., and Shleifer A., (2000), Tunnelling, American Economics Review Papers and 
Proceedings, 90:22; Coffee J., (1999), The future as history: the prospects for global convergence in corporate governance 
and its implications, Northwestern Law Review, 93:631. 
13
ibid. In respect to the differences in creditor protection, the researchers commented that 'differences among legal 
origins are best described by the proposition that some countries protect all outside investors better than others, and not 
by the proposition that some countries protect shareholders while other countries protect creditors.' 
14
 On the existence of important links between investor protection and the ownership structures see for example, for the 
case of Germany: Gorton G. and Schmid G., (2000), Class struggle inside the firm: A study of German codetermination, 
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Whilst the Anti-Director Rights Index rates countries on the basis of six components, of which the 
'oppressed minorities' variable is the most relevant in the context of concentrated ownership 
structures15, the Anti-Self-Dealing Index focuses on private enforcement mechanisms, such as 
disclosure, approval and litigation, governing a specific self-dealing transaction. The methodology 
involves the description of a particular self-dealing situation16 and the use of a questionnaire in 
order to obtain lawyers' advice regarding the legal treatment of such a situation. The questions 
posed include, among others, the approvals required, the disclosure requirements, the duties of 
directors and controlling shareholders, how the validity of the transaction could be challenged and 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
NBER Working Paper No. 7945, October 2000; Edwards J.S.S. and Fischer K., (1994), Banks, Finance and Investment in 
Germany, Cambridge University Press: Cambridge. 
For Italy see Barca F., On Corporate Governance in Italy: Issues, Facts and Agenda (September 1995), Bank of Italy, 
Research Department. Again, such data come from the research conducted by La Porta et al (1998) supra note2 which 
described ownership concentration in their sample of 49 countries. Also see La Porta et al (1999) supra note7 where the 
patterns of control in the largest firms from each of 27 wealthy economies are examined.  
Claessens, S., Djankov S., and Lang L.H.P., (2000), The Separation of Ownership and Control in East Asian Corporations, 
Journal of Financial Economics, 58:81; Claessens S., Fan J.P.H., Djankov S. and Lang L.H.P., (1999) On Expropriation of 
Minority Shareholders: Evidence from East Asia. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=202390. Their findings apply 
to all countries in their sample except for Japan, which is considered to have fairly good shareholder protection 
See for example, Modigliani F., Perotti E.C. and van Oijen P., (1998), Security versus Bank Finance, Tinbergen Institute 
Discussion Papers 98-051/2, Tinbergen Institute; Modigliani F. and Perotti E., (2000), Security Markets versus Bank 
Finance: Legal Enforcement and Investors' Protection, International Review of Finance, International Review of Finance 
Ltd., 1(2):81. 
15
 The definitions and method of rating of the six components of the index designed by LaPorta et al (1998) supra note2  
LLSV (Table I) are the following: 
 1. Pre-emptive rights to new issues: 2. Cumulative voting or proportional representation: 3. Shares not blocked before 
meeting: 4. Proxy by mail allowed:.5. Percentage of share capital to call an extraordinary shareholders’ meeting:. 6. 
Oppressed minorities mechanism 
Definition of oppressed minority variable: Index of the difficulty faced by (minority) shareholders owning 10% or less of 
the capital stock in challenging (i.e. by either seeking damages or having the transaction rescinded) resolutions that 
benefit controlling shareholders and damage the company. Equals one if minority shareholders may challenge a 
resolution of both the shareholders and the board (of directors or, if available, of supervisors) if it is unfair, prejudicial, 
oppressive, or abusive; equals one half if shareholders are able to challenge either a resolution of the shareholders or of 
the board (of directors or, if available, of supervisors) if it is unfair, prejudicial, or oppressive; equals zero otherwise. 
Greece receives 0 on both the original and the revised Anti-Directors Rights Index. 
16
 Djankov et al (2008) supra note3. Their methodology and case study are described as follows: As a first step, the 
stylized transaction between two companies ('Buyer' and 'Seller;) is described to the Lex Mundi law firms. It is assumed 
that Mr. James owns 90% of Seller and 60% of Buyer, and that the latter is a publicly-traded firm. Mr. James is a director 
of Buyer and his son is its CEO. Seller operates a chain of retail hardware stores and has recently shut down many stores. 
As a result, some trucks in Seller’s fleet are not being used.  
Mr. James proposes that Buyer purchases Seller’s idle trucks for a cash payment equivalent to 10% of Buyer’s assets (the 
transaction). He argues that Buyer could use additional trucks to expand its sales. Mr. James is on both sides of the 
transaction and could benefit if Buyer overpays for Seller’s trucks. In fact, under the case facts, a $100 wealth transfer 
from Buyer to Seller would reduce the value of Mr. James’ equity in Buyer by $60 but increase the value of his equity in 
Seller by $90. Although the proposed transaction has a possible business purpose, it involves an obvious conflict of 
interest. 
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the availability of direct and derivative suits.17 The DLLS findings further support the 'legal origin' 
hypothesis, as the comparative assessment of shareholder protection against self-dealing indicates 
a 'pronounced difference between common and French civil law countries'. 18 DLLS suggest that the 
differences among legal origins are explained on the basis that common law systems are more 
suspicious of conflicted transactions than civil law systems, thus subjecting such transactions to 
closer regulation and legal scrutiny.  
 
2. Criticisms of LLSV and related studies 
The array of criticisms of LLSV range from the assessment of the validity of their proposition that 
the law does matter19 to the substantive objections raised with regard to the accurate description 
of the legal rights determining the variables of the LLSV index.20 Although the LLSV study 
                                                          
17
 Djankov et al (2008) supra note3. 'The lawyers received the aforementioned case study and were asked to describe the 
minimum legal requirements in force in May 2003 regarding: (1) who approves the transactions; (2) what needs to be 
disclosed to the board of directors or supervisory board, the shareholders, the stock exchange, and the regulators; (3) 
what are the duties of officers, directors, and controlling shareholders; (4)how the transaction’s validity could be 
challenged; (5) what causes of action are available if Buyer suffers damages; (6) what needs to be proved under each 
cause of action; (7) who has standing to sue under each available cause of action; (8) availability of direct and derivative 
suits; (9) access to information and discovery rights; and (10) fines and criminal sanctions.  
The lawyers based their answers on all binding (i.e., not voluntary guidelines) laws and regulations applicable under our 
case facts and substantiated their answers with references to all relevant legal provisions.' 
18
 For the US see Gompers P.A., Ishii J.L. and Metrick A., (2003), Corporate Governance and Equity Prices. Quarterly 
Journal of Economics, 118(1):107. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=278920 (last accessed on 19.09.2011). The 
authors constructed an index of the quality of corporate governance for a large number of publicly traded U.S. firms, and 
found that higher quality as defined by their index was associated with improved future stock performance. 
For commercial corporate governance indices see the Governance Risk Indicators by Institutional Shareholder Services 
(ISS), available at http://www.issgovernance.com/grid-info (last accessed on 19.09.2011) 
For a presentation and criticism of the market for corporate governance ratings being used in the formulation of voting 
recommendations by proxy advising firms, see Paul Rose, (2007), The Corporate Governance Industry, Journal of 
Corporate Law, 32(4):887; Sonnenfeld J., (2004), Good Governance and the Misleading Myths of Bad Metrics, Academy of 
Management Executive, 18:108.  
19
 For example, Coffee (2000), suggests that legal reforms, while important, are likely to follow, rather than precede, 
market changes and presents the historical development of the markets in both the U.S. and the U.K as an illustrative 
example. His argument basically questions the extent to which the law shapes the financial system by determining its 
characteristics, such as the size and depth of the capital markets. See Coffee J., (2000) The Rise of Dispersed Ownership: 
The Role of Law in the Separation of Ownership and Control, Columbia Law and Economics Working Paper No. 182. 
Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=254097 
20
 Spamann H., (2010), The Antidirector Rights Index Revisited, Review of Financial Studies, 23:467. Previous versions of 
this paper include Spamann H., (2006), On the Insignificance and/or Endogeneity of La Porta et al.'s 'Anti-Director Rights 
Index' under Consistent Coding (March 2006). Harvard Law School John M. Olin Center Discussion Paper No. 7; ECGI - Law 
Working Paper No. 67/2006. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=894301; Spamann H., (2008), 'Law and Finance' 
Revisited (February 1, 2008), Harvard Law School John M. Olin Center Discussion Paper No. 12. Available at SSRN: 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1095526 . 
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documents a correlation between concentration and low investor protection, this correlation does 
not equal causation. In this regard, the LLSV approach to concentration is overly simplistic, given 
the lack of conclusive evidence that concentrated forms of ownership emerge necessarily or 
exclusively as a response to weak investor protection.21 The simplicity of the methodology and 
explanations which made the LLSV research so influential also becomes the source of criticism by 
scholars of comparative company law and corporate governance. The criticism of LLSV and their 
indexing methodology has an important impact on the validity, accuracy and credibility of the 
‘legal origin’ hypothesis presented by the scholars. More specifically, the possible inaccuracy of 
their comparative analysis and findings would also compromise the reliability of the vast number 
of studies using the findings of the LLSV indices as reference. In this regard, it has been estimated 
that almost 100 empirical papers are based on the original index.22  
Although the extensive consideration of the criticisms against LLSV certainly surpasses the scope of 
this study, nevertheless, it is a prerequisite for deconstructing the 'inefficiency bias' of 
concentration. With this consideration in mind, this Chapter questions the reliability of the LLSV 
assessment of the legal effectiveness of investor protection across jurisdictions and strikes down 
the related 'legal origin' hypothesis. A variety of weaknesses of the LLSV indexing methodology are 
considered as follows. Firstly, the accuracy of the influential LLSV anti-director index, taking the 
selection of rights as given, is examined. Secondly, this Chapter assesses the criticisms challenging 
the relevance of the selected rights in light of the differences of the legal and financial systems 
involved. Thirdly, the role of institutional complementarities and the LLSV approach towards 
functional equivalents of corporate law and governance are considered. Fourthly, the suitability of 
the at-the-time innovative LLSV index to measure the quality of investor protection and corporate 
governance is questioned.  
                                                          
21
 See for example Sofie Cools (2005) (p.755-762) arguing that ownership structures tilt towards dispersion or 
concentration according to the distribution of powers to the board or to the shareholders respectively. Cools S., (2005), 
The Real Difference in Corporate Law between the United States and Continental Europe: Distribution of Powers. 
Delaware Journal of Corporate Law, 30(3):697; Harvard Law and Economics Discussion Paper No. 490. Available at SSRN: 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=893941 
22
 Dyck A. and Zingales L., (2004), Private Benefits of Control: An International Comparison, Journal of Finance, 59:537; 
Licht A.N. et al, (2005),  Culture, Law, and Corporate Governance, International Review of Law and Economics, 25:229; 
Pagano M. and Volpin P., (2005), The Political Economy of Corporate Governance, American Economic Review 95:1005; 
further references in Spamann (2006) supra note20. 
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This discussion reinforces the caveats raised by comparative corporate governance scholars 
regarding the role of indices as indicators of the quality of corporate governance. In this respect, it 
is noted that 'governance indices are highly imperfect and unsatisfactory screens for determining 
how to vote corporate proxies, and that investors and policymakers should exercise utmost caution 
in attempting to draw inferences regarding a firm’s quality or future stock market performance 
from its ranking on any particular corporate governance measure'.23 According to this line of 
argument, there is no 'one best' measure of corporate governance because the most effective 
governance institution depends on the context and on the firms’ specific circumstances, which are 
difficult to be captured by an index or by any one variable. Although this criticism mostly involves 
the extensive use of commercial indices as proxies for corporate governance quality, it highlights 
the underlying problems and methodological limitations of academic indices as well.  
In the wider discussion about the adequacy of indices as corporate governance indicators, the 
ownership structures of the company emerge as a key factor. The differences in corporate 
ownership imply that the mechanisms that protect investors in a company without a controlling 
shareholder are often irrelevant or even harmful when applied to companies with a controlling 
shareholder, and vice versa. 24 Consequently, the adaptation of governance metrics to corporate 
ownership structures constitutes a prerequisite for any reliable assessment of investor protection. 
Such an approach is perfectly aligned with the underlying aim of this thesis, namely to shift focus 
on country-level or firm-level comparisons of investor protection, while using a methodology 
which distinguishes between companies of dispersed and concentrated ownership. 
                                                          
23
 Bhagat S., Bolton B.J. and Romano R., (2007), The Promise and Peril of Corporate Governance Indices, ECGI - Law 
Working Paper No. 89/2007; Yale Law & Economics Research Paper No. 367. Available at SSRN: 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1019921. 
24
 Bebchuk L.A. and Hamdani A., (2009), The Elusive Quest for Global Governance Standards, University of Pennsylvania 
Law Review, 157:1263; Harvard Law and Economics Discussion Paper No. 633. Available at SSRN: 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1374331 In particular, the authors show that the influential metrics used extensively by 
scholars and shareholder advisers to assess governance arrangements around the world, namely the Corporate 
Governance Quotient (CGQ), the Anti-Director Rights Index, and the Anti-Self-Dealing Index, are inadequate for this 
purpose. 
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2.1. The accuracy of the LLSV Anti-Director Rights Index 
Without questioning the relevance of the originally selected rights, Spamann re-compiled the 
indices originally designed by LLSV using a more refined methodology.25 The aim was to provide a 
more clearly defined and more reliably coded index. The importance of this specific study lies in its 
focus on the accuracy of the LLSV index while taking for granted its composition. Spamann 
criticises LLSV on the basis of their un-refined method of collecting their data and points out the 
difficulty in assessing the accuracy of the value of the law, as attributed to the countries of the 
original LSSV study, given the ambiguity of the definitions involved. This latter problem was further 
accentuated by the fact that LLSV did not specifically refer to the statutes and precedents 
underlying their index. In order to highlight the deficits in the accuracy and consistency of the LLSV 
index, Spamann presents many examples in which the rating awarded to countries by the index 
was different although the countries compared had the same laws in place.26  
The re-examination of the legal data used by LLSV led to surprising findings. More specifically, the 
thorough re-examination of the indices led to corrections of the original LLSV index for thirty three 
out of the forty six countries. The most important implication of this re-indexing is that the 
corrected index, despite being based on the same rights which comprised the LLSV anti-director 
index, fails to support the most influential claims presented by LLSV and originally supported by 
their findings. The empirical findings of Spamann do not confirm the claim that civil law countries 
have lower investor protection than common law countries. Furthermore, as a result of the 
examination of the empirical data provided by Spamann, the quality of investor protection is 
disassociated from the size of capital markets and the patterns of ownership dispersion. The 
implications of this research for the comparative corporate governance scholarship are crucial as it 
disproves LLSV directly and also indirectly the hypotheses of scholars relying on the LLSV study. In 
the context of this thesis, the findings support the proposition that the association of concentrated 
                                                          
25
 For example, instead of resorting to secondary sources as LLSV did, in his collection of the legal data he included the 
advice of local lawyers. This methodology is considered to be providing the most accurate description of the law to be 
used as a basis of the index. The latter approach was considered necessary in light of the high importance of local lawyers 
in providing an accurate description of the applicable law in the jurisdictions involved. Moreover, he considered various 
interpretations of the ambiguous definitions of the LLSV study and used the most sensible one as the basis for creating 
his new index. Spamann (2010, 2006) supra note20 focused on the transparency of his methodology by creating an 
appendix which documents the raw legal data of the new and old index. Finally, he used a coding protocol in order to 
convert the collected legal data into numerical index values consistently. 
26
 Spamann (2010) supra note20, Section 2.1, p.472-473.  
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ownership with low investor protection constitutes an oversimplification which misleads rather 
than enhances the understanding of different ownership structures in the context of corporate 
governance. 
2.2. The relevance and effectiveness of the rights comprising the LLSV Anti-Directors Rights Index  
A great part of the literature criticises LLSV on the basis of the rights used by the scholars to create 
the indices, namely by questioning how relevant27 the variables used by LLSV are for investor 
protection and whether the index weights these rights appropriately.28 For example, the existence 
of the right to vote by mail may be adding nothing to the effectiveness of the legal system in 
general, if this right is rarely used. As the selected rights are not equally relevant in all 49 
jurisdictions, it is problematic that they weight equally on the index.29 In this context, Braendle30, 
for example, reconsiders the LLSV Anti-Director Rights Index for Germany and the United States, 
two typical representatives of the civil and common law family. The thorough analysis of German 
law leads to a higher score for Germany. In this light, the difference between Common and Civil 
Law in terms of shareholder protection is far less significant than LLSV suggest.31  
Another ground for criticism against the LLSV study is the proposition that the LLSV index, reflects 
the allocation of powers in the corporation rather than measuring the quality of the corporate 
                                                          
27
 Graff M., (2006), Myths and Truths: The 'Law and Finance Theory' Revisited (January 2006). Swiss Institute for Business 
Cycle Research (KOF) Working Paper No. 122. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=881546. Graff demonstrates 
that a few minor, but sensible modifications in aggregating the original indicator set produce results that are different 
from those reported so far and contradictory to the theory's ranking of the four major legal families in terms of investor 
protection. Accordingly, the validity of the theory's investor protection measures for international comparisons, the 
supremacy of the common law legacy in protecting investors and, consequently, the validity of legal origin variables to 
instrument for financial development, have to be regarded as myths rather than truths. For further criticism of LLSV see 
Graff M., (2008), Legal Origin and Financial Development: New Evidence for Old Claims? The Creditor Rights Index 
Revisited. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1135595; Vagts D.F., (2002) Comparative Company Law - The New 
Wave in Festschrift fur Jean Nicolas Druey zum 65. Geburtstag 595 (R. Schweizer et al. eds., 2002). 
28
 Coffee (2000), supra note19. 
29
 For example, the provisions about pre-emption rights may be more important within systems in which concentrated 
ownership is prevalent, because it makes more sense to safeguard a 10% stake from dilution than a 1% stake. A 10% 
stake for example, has the right to call a meeting in most jurisdictions while the 1% stake does not give rise to any such 
special rights. Emphasising on the importance of pre-emption rights within jurisdictions in which dispersed ownership is 
prevalent, is hardly justifiable in this case. 
30
 Braendle U.C., (2005), Shareholder Protection in the USA and Germany - On the Fallacy of LLSV (May 2005). Available at 
SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=728403. 
31
 Similar studies exist for additional countries with similar outcomes. For Austria and the UK see Schmidbauer R., (2006), 
On the Fallacy of LLSV Revisited - Further Evidence About Shareholder Protection in Austria and the United Kingdom. 
Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=913968. 
For Germany, France and Belgium see further references provided by Sofie Cools footnotes 20,21,22. See Cools (2005) 
supra note21. 
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governance system.32 According to this argument, the fundamental choices of a legal system affect 
the respective roles of the various constituencies within U.S. and Continental European 
corporations.33 For example, in the US the centre of power lies with the board, while in Europe 
shareholders appear to have more rights and the power to act. This difference fundamentally 
shapes how the mechanisms of shareholder protection operate and how effective they are. 
Contrary to the LLSV approach, this line of criticism suggests that the same rights will not be as 
relevant and effective for the shareholders of a European and a US corporation alike. Similarly, the 
prevalence of different constituencies, the shareholders or the managers for example, leads to the 
genesis and use of different rights.   
LLSV are, therefore, criticised for selecting the sets of rights they considered as indicative of strong 
investor protection based on their perception on what constitutes effective investor protection, 
without providing any justification for their selection or an assessment of the importance of the 
selected rights in practice. In this light, the Anti-Director Rights Index only identifies certain 
investor protection rights rather than reflects the actual effectiveness of investor protection 
frameworks. Provided that investor protection mechanisms are not equally effective in all 
contexts, verifying whether certain rights of investors are present within a system only marginally 
contributes to a reliable comparative analysis. Ownership structures, in particular, determine the 
distinct type of corporate governance problems to arise and, therefore, set the context in which 
the investor protection rights operate.34 By disregarding this factor, the LLSV Index has therefore 
produced an unreliable, distorted perception of the quality of investor protection around the 
world. 
When viewed from this perspective, the methodology of LLSV is the projection of the checks and 
balances of their systems of reference, namely the dispersed ownership, market-based systems, on 
                                                          
32
 ibid Cools(2005), supra note21. 
33
 ibid As Cools states, in a U.S. corporation, the management can act autonomously in matters where a Continental 
European board or management would depend on its shareholders. It is also easier for shareholders to set the agenda of 
the shareholders' meeting in Continental Europe than it is in the United States. The board is also allowed to assume 
several powers of the shareholders' meeting. In contrast, in Continental Europe, the statutory allocation of powers is 
mandatory, and even with the permission of the shareholders, the board cannot appropriate most of their powers. In the 
United States, the board can act relatively independently from the shareholders. Conversely, in Continental Europe, the 
board needs the permission of the shareholders for a range of decisions, and it can be replaced at any moment if a simple 
majority of shareholders wishes to do so. 
34
 Bebchuk&Hamdani 2009 supra note24. 
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systems which are importantly different, such as the concentrated ownership, bank-based 
systems. Their study is, therefore, susceptible to the criticism that it is characterised by a US bias 
and perpetuates rather that bridges the lack of understanding between common and civil law 
scholars.35 As scholars argue, the ‘…proponents of the legal origin claim present a picture of a 
‘decentralised’, market-friendly common law, and a ‘centralised’, government-friendly civil law, 
which relies excessively upon a few stylized facts, and which modern comparative legal analysis has 
(rightly) rejected.’36 
2.3. Institutional complementarities and functional equivalents  
An important point against the LLSV methodology emerges from the theory of institutional 
complementarities. The theory of institutional complementarities states that ‘the understanding of 
the formal institutions, including the legal framework, must be complemented by the appreciation 
of how they interact with informal norms, social conventions and tacit understandings in shaping 
behaviour’.37 In this respect, institutions are defined as ‘the rules of the game whose purpose or 
function is to minimise transaction costs associated with market activity.’38 The starting point of 
the theory of institutional complementarities is the observation that financial and legal systems 
share many of the same legal institutions, ranging from the basic forms of protection of individual 
and collective property rights and recognition of the capacity to contract, to more specific types of 
support for the business enterprise (limited liability and corporate personality), regulation of the 
employment relationship (labour law) and the provision of a welfare state (taxation and social 
security law).  
The aforementioned concept of institutional complementarities is fundamental for the theory of 
comparative legal development. The diversity in the forms of the prevalent institutions across 
national systems only reflects the variations in the evolutionary path, as determined by factors 
                                                          
35
 Spamann (2010, 2006) supra note20. 
36
 Deakin S.F. and Ahlering B.A., (2005), Labour Regulation, Corporate Governance and Legal Origin: A Case of Institutional 
Complementarity?. University of Cambridge Centre for Business Research Working Paper No. 312; ECGI - Law Working 
Paper No. 72/2006. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=898184. 
37
 ibid 
38
 North D., (1990), Institutions, Institutional Change, and Economic Performance (Cambridge: CUP). 
The generation of such rules has also been a crucial issue and several hypotheses have been developed. For example see 
Aoki M., (2001), Towards a Comparative Institutional Analysis. Stanford University Press: Stanford; Streeck W., (2005), 
Requirements for a useful concept of complementarity, Socio-Economic Review, 3: 363. 
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such as the timing of industrialization, the structure of firms and of labour unions, the degree of 
liquidity of capital markets, and more generally the role of the state in regulating economic life.39 
In light of these considerations, a certain degree of diversity is inherent in the financial systems 
around the world and should be expected.40 Therefore, the concept of institutional 
complementarities is an important mechanism which explains the persistence of the diversity of 
the corporate governance systems around the world.41 More specifically, as scholars note ‘…such 
complementarities arise from the ‘coevolution’ of institutional forms’.42 Thus, ‘the way in which 
they (ie the institutions) relate to one another at a systemic level is the result of an evolutionary 
process whose outcome, to a significant degree, cannot be planned or predicted’.43 
While seeking to explain the differences in financial systems, the LLSV ‘legal origin’ hypothesis does 
not encompass the possibility that multiple pathways may lead to economic development, as 
theories of comparative legal development suggest. The path dependence theory, for example, 
explains the tendency of systems to become locked into specific historical trajectories despite the 
existence of inefficiency or the lack of optimality so long as a degree of functionality exists.44 Cross-
national diversity could then only be the rational result of the process of evolution. 
Notwithstanding the aforementioned proposition, the ‘legal origin’ theory does not encompass the 
‘alternative paths of development’ notion. Therefore, although the LLSV literature spells out the 
precise mechanisms through which diversity could have occurred, methodologically it is not as 
sound as it has been assumed to be. As the critics have noted, ‘this is in part because the legal 
origin literature relies upon an overly reductive understanding of the common law/civil law 
divide.’45 
                                                          
39
 Such factors which might be expected to influence the evolution of distinctive legal ‘varieties of capitalism’ 
Deakin&Ahlering (2005) supra note37 where further references. 
40
 Hall&Soskice (2001) also support that the diversity of legal form is to be expected just as it is for the institutions of 
governance more generally. See Hall P. and Soskice D., (2001), Varieties of Capitalism: The Institutional Foundations of 
Comparative Advantage, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2001. 
41
 Aoki (2001) supra note38. 
42
 Coevolution is the process by which adaptations in one institutional context or domain become adjusted or fitted, over 
time, to those in another. Deakin&Ahlering (2005), supra note37. 
43
 Deakin&Ahlering (2005), supra note37. 
44
Bebchuk L.A. and Roe M.J.A, (1999), Theory of Path Dependence in Corporate Ownership and Governance (October 1, 
1999). Stanford Law Review, 52:127; Columbia Law School, Center for Studies in Law & Economics Paper No. 131, 
November 1999. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=202748; Rajan R.G. and Zingales L., (2006), The Persistence 
of Underdevelopment: Institutions, Human Capital, or Constituencies? NBER Working Paper 12093. 
45
 Deakin&Ahlering (2005) supra note37. 
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This 'reductive understanding of the common law/civil law divide' is manifested in the omission of 
LLSV to take into account the functional equivalents to a given legal mechanism, which may be 
found in completely different areas of law, or outside the legal system altogether, at the level of 
social norms or commercial practices. In this respect, the theories of comparative law assert that it 
is a ‘basic rule of comparative law’ that ‘different legal systems give the same or very similar 
solutions, even as to detail, to the same problems of life, despite the great differences in their 
historical development, conceptual structure, and style of operation’.46 In general, they find that as 
a general rule developed nations answer the needs of legal business in the same or in a very similar 
way47, while there is a ‘common core of efficient principles hidden in the different technicalities of 
the legal systems’.48 When seen from this perspective, the assessment of ownership structures is a 
multifaceted task, which entails the comparison and consideration of a variety of institutions 
across the areas of the law.  
It is exactly on these grounds that the reliability and credibility of indices is problematic. LLSV have 
shaped the debate without taking into account the comparative law methodology, as they ‘… 
measure only the formal law; they take no account of functional equivalents to legal regulation 
beyond the law; and they are not weighted so as to take into account variations in the importance 
of particular legal measures in given jurisdictions, as comparative law theory suggests that they 
should be’.49 For example, although company law in many civil law jurisdictions does not provide 
remedies for the oppression of minorities such as the one provided under Article 994 of the 2006 
Companies Act in the UK, it is often the case that general legal principles exist in other bodies of 
legislation, such as the Civil Code, which prohibit the abusive exercise of one’s rights and offer 
protection against minority oppression.50  
The failure of the LLSV index to take into account the functional equivalents of company law 
compromises the credibility of their indexing methodology. Due to the lack of a pervasive 
comparative analysis of the alternatives and functional equivalents of the selected variables, the 
scholars fail to consider the overall context in which such factors operate. Their grasp of the very 
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 Zweigert K. and Kotz H., (1998), An Introduction to Comparative Law, Oxford University Press. 
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 Mattei U., (1997), Comparative Law and Economics, University of Michigan. 
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systems they are trying to explain is, therefore, fragmented and deficient. When the broad array of 
mechanisms that interfere with, or substitute for, the mechanisms of shareholder protection used 
to construct the LLSV index are also considered, the recoding of the index to include these sources 
yields no significant differences between common law and civil law jurisdictions.51 This finding 
casts further doubt on the proposition that common law jurisdictions offer better shareholder 
protection than civil law jurisdictions. It also disassociates civil law jurisdictions and concentrated 
ownership structures from bad law and low levels of investor protection. 
2.4. The suitability of indices as indicators of the quality of investor protection 
Criticism against LLSV is also targeted at the suitability of the index-based approach to assess the 
quality of the various systems of law and corporate governance. Doubts have been expressed 
regarding the extent to which indices guarantee the comparability of corporate governance 
mechanisms and systems. Siems52, for example, presents the various complexities which render 
indices a tool of questionable value in the context of comparative law and points out the problems 
of the methodology used. Regarding the future of comparative law, he specifically questions 
whether comparative law and numerical methods are compatible at all. The first argument against 
the numerical approach to comparative law refers to the reductionism of the methodology 
employed and the superficial analysis that is produced as a result.53 As the argument goes, 
‘(c)omplicated systems cannot be understood by breaking them into simpler parts.’54 Moreover, the 
chaotic and dynamic nature of legal systems can hardly be taken into account by the numerical 
approach to comparative law.   
The second argument presented against the numerical approach to comparative law stresses that 
‘(t)he law is special, complex and it cannot be reduced to numbers.’55 It is therefore pointed out 
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 Armour J., Deakin S.F., Sarkar P., Siems M.M. and Singh A., (2008), Shareholder Protection and Stock Market 
Development: An Empirical Test of the Legal Origins Hypothesia, University of Cambridge, CBR Working Paper; ECGI - Law 
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http://ssrn.com/abstract=514142M; Siems, Mathias M., (2008a), What Does Not Work in Comparing Securities Laws: A 
Critique on La Porta et al.'s Methodology. International Company and Commercial Law Review, 2005, 300; CPC-RPS No. 
0009. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=608644. 
53
 ibid. 
54
 ibid. 
55
 ibid. 
The complex relationship of concentrated ownership structures and corporate governance 
Chapter I: The 'inefficiency bias' of concentration and the 'legal effectiveness' argument 
 
 58 
that an attempt to reduce law to numbers by using statistical methods could produce inconsistent 
findings and amounts to the questionable practice of replicating the analysis of another discipline 
into legal scholarship. In this light, the quantification of the differences identified among legal 
systems is rendered almost impossible, especially given the fact that systems are 
incommensurable.56 An additional argument against the numerical approach points out that a 
methodology which relies on listing the legal similarities and differences is neither sufficient nor 
adequate.57 Instead, a test of functionality must also be applied to identify the mechanisms which 
have a similar function despite their different form. In the absence of an analysis of the 
functionally equivalent mechanisms, determining whether a rule exists or not and strictly applying 
the statistical methods is more likely than not to be inadequate for measuring the quality of the 
law.  
Although attributing and comparing legal differences by numbers is contrary to the traditional 
approach of comparative law, with a cautious approach, this method of comparing corporate 
governance and law has a high potential ‘to open new vistas of research in the area and as such 
should not be shunned’. 58 The arguments in favour of the numerical approach are its simplicity and 
its potential to produce easily comparable results. The wide enthusiasm with which LLSV has been 
accepted by legal scholars highlights the attractiveness of the underlying idea. Provided that the 
quantification of legal rules remains be a popular tool for comparing legal systems, it is vital that 
functional equivalents are incorporated into the methodology of the indices. In this context, 
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ownership structures constitute an additional factor which determines the selection of relevant 
rights of investor protection and the adaptation of new indexing methodologies to the varieties of 
ownership structures accordingly is a prerequisite for the reliability of an index.  
 
III. CORPORATE GOVERNANCE INDICES IN LIGHT OF THE VARIETIES OF CONCENTRATION 
1. Findings of alternative indices and implications 
The new studies of comparative corporate governance indices extensively discuss their choice of 
variables so as to best reflect the shareholder protection framework in the countries under 
comparison.59 Similarly, in order to address the different governance problems posed by different 
ownership structures, the variables of the index used as proxies for shareholder protection are 
divided into those which protect shareholders against directors and managers and those which 
protect minority shareholders against majorities. Having taken this into account, the empirical 
findings of the Lele and Siems re-codification of the law on shareholder protection disprove LLSV as 
they indicate that investor protection in the US is weaker than the law of the other four countries 
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 For an example of the evolution in the methodology of comparative analysis through indices see Lele&Siems supra 
note58. Their index has 60 (sub-)variables whose development has been coded for the five countries, therefore rendering 
their sample considerably representative. The scholars are aware of the limitations of their study as they state that ‘… we 
do not attempt here to include everything that matters for shareholder protection in the index, nor do we believe that 
everything should be considered. The effective protection of shareholders is linked with contract law, civil procedure and 
questions of legal effectiveness, as well as social, economic and cultural differences.’ 
With respect to the 'oppressed minority' variable, the scholars distinguish between substantive law for protection against 
mismanagement of the directors and managers and fraud on minority shareholders by majority (or controlling) 
shareholders for their own benefit. The scholars take account of the fact that different legal instruments can be used to 
achieve a similar function, namely the principle of ‘functionality’. In their study, they provide the example of the general 
meeting, in which a decision may be prevented from harming minority shareholders in various ways, namely by having in 
place mandatory rules of company law so that the majority shareholders cannot abuse their power in the general 
meeting in this respect; company law may require approval of a public authority so that the powers of the majority 
shareholders are restricted; quorum and supermajority requirements may ensure that a significant majority has approved 
the decision in question; fiduciary principles may control the voting of the majority shareholder; or appraisal rights may 
provide the minority shareholder with a way to exit the company for full compensation.  
In order to compile their indices, their points of reference are the shareholder rights provided within the frames of 
company law and securities law. The study also takes into account legal rules based on statutory law and/or case law. It, 
thus, looks beyond a doctrinal approach and recognises that in both common-law and in civil-law countries court 
decisions can bring about an effect which is as important as a statutory provision. Finally, Lele&Siems (supra note58) are 
aware of the ‘home bias’ problem and highlight the danger that comparative lawyers may impose their own conceptions 
on a foreign legal system. They address this ‘home bias’ by building their variables so as to take into account the OECD 
Principles on Corporate Governance and the comparative literature on company law, as well as the laws of the countries 
themselves.  
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selected, most of which are of civil law origin. As the authors claim, the ‘... results therefore 
suggest that, on diligent coding of shareholder protection law based on a meaningful shareholder 
protection index, in particular taking into account functional equivalents of legal instruments for 
protection, the claims that there are deep differences between shareholder protection in the civil-
law and common-law countries seem to wither away.’  One of the reasons for the low ranking of 
the US in the aforementioned study is that the protection of minority against majority 
shareholders is considerably stronger in the 'blockholder countries', because of the high risk that 
major shareholders exploit the minority shareholders. Similarly, given the fact that blockholders 
often dominate public companies in India, France and Germany, it comes as no surprise that these 
countries perform better in the Lele and Siems comparative study than the UK and the US, where 
dispersed shareholder ownership is more common.  
The abovementioned ‘leximetric’ study also shows that in all of the countries studied, namely the 
UK, the US, Germany, France and India, shareholder protection has been improving in the last 35 
years. In all the countries of reference the protection of shareholders against directors and 
managers has increased considerably, whereas the protection against other shareholders has not 
changed much. One possible explanation provided by the scholars is that the growing importance 
of capital markets leads to more dispersed shareholder ownership and this increased shareholder 
base may exert pressure to improve primarily the protection of shareholders against directors and 
managers.60 This tendency is also indicative of the important competitive forces in attracting 
investment which act among jurisdictions and the convergence that such competition gives rise 
to.61 However, the inverse tendency, namely enhancing the protection of minority shareholders, is 
not confirmed in the case of the UK, where the protection of minority shareholders has not been 
the subject of the new reforms introduced by the UK Corporate Governance Code and the 
Stewardship Code in 2010. The wider implications of this is that the low levels of protection from 
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 This tendency towards dispersed ownership may also be explained on the basis of the perceived prevalence of the 
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controlling shareholders offered to minority investors in common law jurisdictions fail to address 
the risks resulting from the listing of companies with concentrated ownership structures on the 
London Stock Exchange, most notably big natural resources companies such as Vallares and 
Glencore.62 
 
2. Corporate governance indices and the varieties of concentration 
Although the most recent attempts to assess the quality of investor protection law seek to address 
the methodological problems of LLSV by taking into account the differences in the ownership 
structures, important deficiencies still undermine the reliability of indices. For example, in the 
Siems and Lele study, the varieties of ownership are reflected in the division of the variables of the 
index into those which protect shareholders against directors and managers and those which 
protect minority shareholders against majorities. However, all variables have equal weightings, 
despite the fact that minority protection rights in the US are less relevant than in the case of other 
countries of their study. Although the authors genuinely seek to enhance the reliability of their 
study, the 'home bias' persists and probably partly explains the low score of the US.  
The failure of corporate governance indices so far to encompass the differences of ownership 
structures has been increasingly gaining attention in the past years. In this regard, scholars have 
highlighted that 'the quest for global governance standards should be replaced by an effort to 
develop and implement separate methodologies for assessing governance in companies with and 
without a controlling shareholder.'63 The development of separate methodologies is, therefore, 
necessary in order to facilitate reliable country- or firm-level comparisons.64 Building on the 
inherent limitations of the indices compiled so far to reflect the variety of ownership structures 
observed in the corporate reality, this thesis engages into a substantive analysis of investor 
protection mechanisms and demonstrates how profoundly the ownership structures affect 
corporate law and governance in practice. Therefore, it seeks to contribute to the comparative 
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corporate governance debate by highlighting important aspects of investor protection developed 
in the context of concentrated ownership structures, which indices do not cover.  
This thesis also extends the criticism of corporate governance indices further by highlighting their 
failure to differentiate among the various forms of concentrated ownership structures and the 
various shareholders' profiles and provide a credible assessment of investor protection in more 
specific contexts. It is argued that the indices developed so far do not take into account the 
different types of controlling shareholders and their implications on corporate law and 
governance. The variety in the forms of concentrated ownership suggests that the actual impact of 
concentration on corporate governance can vary substantially depending on the profile of the 
controlling shareholder, which sets out the determining parameters such as the controller’s 
incentives to actively monitor the management and the level of their engagement in corporate 
governance and their long-term perspective. Such characteristics ultimately determine the 
approach of the controlling shareholder to the company, its minority shareholders and the way 
they exercise control, therefore affecting the risk of expropriation and the overall impact of the 
ownership structure on minority shareholders.  
It is, therefore, argued that the various types of controlling shareholders also raise similar, yet 
distinct corporate governance inefficiencies and concerns. For example, family ownership gives 
rise to minority expropriation, while state ownership causes broader concerns associated with the 
efficiency of the state as a corporate actor within the financial system. The type of the private 
benefits to be extracted also varies substantially according to the type of the controller involved. 
Non-pecuniary private benefits, may, for instance, constitute an acute problem when a family is 
the controlling shareholder. In the case of state ownership, it is the prioritisation of public policy 
objectives over shareholder value maximisation which may be detrimental to the interests of 
minority shareholders in the company. Despite the importance of the aforementioned distinct 
characteristics of concentrated ownership which determine which investor protection mechanisms 
will actually be effective, such characteristics are not taken into account by indices. 
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3. Corporate governance indices and the 'legal effectiveness' argument of this thesis 
The 'legal effectiveness' thesis challenges the ‘imperative causality’ relationship between civil law 
systems, low investor protection and the concentration of ownership, as developed by LLSV. As 
legal effectiveness is closely linked to ownership structures, identifying the relationship of the 
varieties of concentrated corporate ownership with corporate governance is a prerequisite for 
assessing the quality of investor protection mechanisms employed by any given legal system. In 
this regard, the LLSV classification of the different types of controlling shareholders is used as the 
basis of the analysis.65 More specifically, in order to illustrate how the identity of the controller 
determines the type and the nature of the conflicts of interests to arise, this thesis is focused on 
family and state ownership. The selection of family and state ownership is not random but reflects 
the fact that families and the state are probably the most prevalent and representative types of 
controlling shareholders around the world.66 Additionally, the different characteristics of families 
and the state as corporate owners provide for a fruitful example of the distinct corporate 
governance issues arising within each structure. Furthermore, this thesis expands the LLSV 
categories of controlling owners so as to include ownership structures which involve multiple large 
shareholders. The analysis of the interactions among multiple large shareholders complements 
that of the more absolute forms of ownership by one controlling shareholder. The focus placed on 
multiple large shareholders enhances the understanding of concentrated ownership, which is 
often examined only on the basis of the model that there is one controller against a number of 
small, minority shareholders facing collective action problems and high risk of expropriation. 
 The comparative presentation of the risks and benefits of two different types of owners also sets 
the context for the assessment of the legal effectiveness of corporate governance mechanisms 
employed by the Greek legal system to address the corporate governance issues that the prevalent 
structures of state and family ownership give rise to.67 The analysis reveals the existence of 
important minority protection mechanisms within the narrow perimeter of family and state-owned 
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companies that indices fail to capture due to the ill-adapted methodology and sets the basis for 
the assessment of their effectiveness to mitigate the risk of private benefits extraction. Further to 
the analysis of state and family ownership, the benefits and problems associated with multiple 
large shareholders and their interactions are examined, especially if shareholders interaction is 
facilitated by shareholders agreements. This thesis also assesses the effectiveness of the legal 
framework which is designed to regulate shareholders interactions and agreements, as developed 
by two different legal systems, namely the UK and Greece. This assessment reveals a variety of 
effective legal mechanisms which filter beneficial shareholders agreements from expropriating 
coalitions and fall outside the DLLS and LLSV categories of investor protection rules. These 
concrete examples of minority protection mechanisms and techniques substantially reinforce the 
'legal effectiveness' argument of this thesis.  
 
IV. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
The findings of the LLSV indices measuring the quality of investor protection have been overturned 
by subsequent criticisms and alternative indices. This chapter has challenged the 'inefficiency bias' 
of concentration on the grounds that the corporate governance indices have failed to reflect the 
varieties of concentrated ownership structures when assessing the quality of investor protection. 
This failure to take into account the different types of controlling shareholders and their 
implications on corporate law and governance undermines the reliability of such indices as 
indicators of the quality of corporate governance. The thesis contributes to the comparative 
corporate governance debate by highlighting the importance of ownership structures as a factor of 
corporate governance and by identifying important, previously unexplored aspects of investor 
protection in the context of concentrated ownership. In doing so, this thesis restates the LLSV ‘law 
matters’ thesis by focusing on the legal effectiveness rather than the legal origin of a corporate 
governance mechanism or system. More specifically, the analysis revolves around family 
ownership, state ownership and multiple large shareholders and assesses the effectiveness of a 
variety of distinct legal mechanisms to protect investors in companies owned by families, by the 
state or by multiple large shareholders against expropriation. 
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Identifying the close relationship between the varieties of concentrated corporate ownership and 
corporate governance is a prerequisite of the reliable assessment of the quality of investor 
protection mechanisms employed by any given legal system. This relationship also dictates the 
methodology and structure of this thesis. More specifically, the different impact of the varieties of 
concentration is examined in Chapters II and IV, where it is shown how the identity and type of the 
controlling shareholder affect the corporate governance problems which arise. This analysis 
highlights the role of ownership structures as a factor of corporate governance, most notably by 
indicating the type of and the risk level of minority expropriation to be addressed. The type of 
corporate governance problems identified as prevalent within each of the various forms of 
concentration shape the overall context in which the assessment of the legal effectiveness of 
corporate governance mechanisms takes place. Chapters III, V and VI reinforce the ‘legal 
effectiveness’ argument by referring to a variety of legal mechanisms against minority 
expropriation and by assessing their impact. 
The analysis documents the existence of important investor protection provisions which are not 
included as variables in any of the indices compiled so far. More specifically, the assessment of the 
legal effectiveness of the regulation of shareholders agreements involves the examination of 
minority protection mechanisms and techniques which comparative studies such as the DLLS and 
the LLSV hardly consider. The role of the law as a mechanism which filters shareholders coalitions 
of an expropriating nature from the beneficial shareholders interactions, reinforces the ‘legal 
effectiveness’ proposition of this thesis. Legal effectiveness is defined as the extent to which an 
issue can be dealt with by the law and if so, how well it is dealt with in terms of consistency and 
predictability, on the one side, and the delivery of efficient and just outcomes, on the other. The 
concrete examples to be presented in this thesis illustrate that in the context of concentrated 
ownership, the variables measuring legal effectiveness differ according to the profile of the 
controlling shareholder involved. This argument, therefore, advocates for the development of a 
methodology of indices which will encompass the varieties of concentrated ownership structures 
in order to reliably reflect the effectiveness of the available investor protection mechanisms.
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CHAPTER II: FAMILY AND STATE OWNERSHIP AS KEY FACTORS OF CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE 
 
 
A. FAMILY OWNERSHIP 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Within concentrated ownership structures, families often exercise control over the corporation1 or 
compose the bulk of large, non-controlling shareholders present in companies.2 The high 
importance of family ownership around the world is confirmed by a variety of studies.3 
Nevertheless, while concentrated family ownership makes economic sense in the case of small 
firms4, its use within large companies has often been perceived as negative. In this respect, it is 
suggested5 that as firms grow larger concentrated family ownership will inevitably be replaced by 
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It is indicative that, using a 20% control threshold, 30% of large firms are family-controlled in the average country. This 
figure is higher when a sample of smaller firms is used, or when the threshold of control is 10%. See La Porta R., López De 
Silanes F., and Shleifer A., (1999), Corporate Ownership Around the World, Journal of Finance 54:471; Claessens S., 
Djankov S., and L. Lang, (2000), Separation of Ownership from Control of East Asian Firms, Journal of Financial Economics 
58:81; Faccio M. and  Lang L., (2002), The Ultimate Ownership of Western European Corporations, Journal of Financial 
Economics 65:365. 
2
 For example, a family is found to be the largest shareholder in 405 out of a sample of 553 firms with ownership 
structures involving two or more large shareholders with none holding a majority of the voting rights. Similarly, a family 
appears to be the second largest shareholder in 70 of these firms. This means that as a percentage, in 86% of the firms 
with complex ownership structures, a family is either the largest or second largest shareholder. See Laeven L. and Levine 
R., (2007), Complex Ownership Structures and Corporate Valuations; IMF Working Paper 07/140, available at 
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2007/wp07140.pdf. 
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 In fact, entire industries are dominated by family firms. The global beer industry is one example of this phenomenon. 
InBev, Anheuser-Busch, SABMiller, Heineken, FEMSA, Carlsberg, and many smaller companies are still controlled by their 
founding families or related foundations. In the U.S., six of the seven largest cable system operators, including Comcast, 
Cox, Cablevision, and Charter Communications, are controlled and actively managed by their founders or the founder’s 
heirs. See Gilson S. and Villalonga B., (2007), Adelphia Communications Corp.’s Bankruptcy, Harvard Business School Case 
208-071, Boston, MA, Harvard Business School Publishing. Eleven of the 12 largest publicly traded newspaper companies 
are also family controlled. See Villalonga B. and Hartman C., (2007), The New York Times Co., Harvard Business School 
Case 207-113, Boston, MA, Harvard Business School Publishing. 
4
 This is mainly so due to the resulting reduction of principal-agent conflicts and the more hands-on, less bureaucratic 
management , See Fama E.F. and Jensen M.C., (1983), Separation of Ownership and Control. M.C. Jensen, Foundations of 
Organisational Strategy, Harvard University Press, 1998, and Journal of Law and Economics, Vol. 26, June 1983. Available 
at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=94034. 
5
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more dispersed forms of ownership, separating ownership and control. The failure to separate 
ownership and control ‘tend(s) to penalize the organization in the competition for survival’6 due to 
the financial constraints of the owners and their lack of diversification resulting from tying up an 
important part of their capital in one single company.  These propositions create a bias against 
family ownership by assuming that concentrated ownership is incompatible or even problematic 
within large and developed corporations.  
However, the persistence of family ownership structures within some of the most prosperous, 
developed economies, such as in Continental European countries, indicates that family ownership 
has a positive effect on economic growth.7 This shakes the foundations of the theories supporting 
the inevitability of the separation of ownership and control within large corporations and 
advocates for family ownership as an efficient ownership structure. In this context, the analysis to 
follow outlines the beneficial and problematic characteristics of family ownership for corporate 
governance. The review of empirical studies reveals an important inconclusiveness of the evidence 
regarding the actual effect of family ownership. The ambiguous impact of family ownership implied 
by the inconclusiveness of the empirical findings is, according to this thesis, explained by external 
factors such as the effectiveness of the legal system. Legal effectiveness, therefore, constitutes the 
determinant of the nature of family ownership as a benign or malign form of ownership. Specific 
examples of the legal mechanisms which improve the effectiveness of the overall system are 
presented and assessed in Chapter III to follow. 
 
II. THE BENEFITS OF FAMILY OWNERSHIP 
The positive impact of family ownership on firm performance and corporate governance is 
attributable to a variety of quantitative and qualitative elements which affect the incentives of 
families as owners. The quantitative elements, such as the increased economic participation of 
families in the companies owned, minimise agency costs and enhance firm performance. Similarly, 
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the qualitative elements, such as the long-term investment strategy and the commitment of family 
owners to the success of the company, further explain their beneficial effect. 
1. Quantitative Factors: Economic participation and increased monitoring 
The increased participation of family owners in their investment companies implies that the high 
costs of monitoring are reduced. This suggests that families have an important monitoring role. 
Instead of constituting just another category of passive shareholders, families in many cases 
determine the identity, the culture and the profitability of the company through their involvement 
in the management and promote the alignment of shareholders and managers interests. Empirical 
evidence supports this effect, as family firms are found to outperform their competitors when they 
are run by their original founders.8 Through their important monitoring role, families as block-
holders substantially mitigate the owner-manager agency problem.9 The intense involvement of 
family owners in the management of their companies, therefore, constitutes one of the 
differentiating attributes of family ownership in the context of corporate governance.10  
When compared to other forms of concentrated ownership, the advantageous monitoring and 
disciplining effect on the family CEO derives from the close relationship of managers and owners.11 
The alignment of interests facilitated through the close family ties between principals (family 
owners) and agents (family CEOs) reduces conflicts of interests12 and improves firm performance, 
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See Anderson R.C., Mansi S.A. and Reeb D.M., (2002), Founding Family Ownership and the Agency Cost of Debt. 
Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=303864. However, empirical research assessing the impact of family 
ownership on firm performance provides a useful distinction between firms in which the founder is actively present and 
firms in which descendants have taken over or the founder is not actively involved in its management. For example, 
family-owned firms are broken down into three sub-categories: ‘founder-controlled’ if the founder still acts as the 
company’s CEO, ‘descendant-controlled’ if the founder is no longer active in the executive board or has passed away and 
one of his/her descendants is in the position of CEO, and last, a firm is ‘professionally managed’ if it is categorized as a 
family firm, but has hired a professional management team and the family is no longer present in the executive board
8
. 
Very importantly, it is suggested that such a distinction reflects the various levels of risk with regard to the expropriation 
of minority shareholders in the context of family ownership.  
9
 Jensen M. and Meckling W., (1976), Theory of the firm: managerial behavior, agency costs, and ownership structure. 
Journal of Financial Economics 3:305. 
10
 More specifically, one of the main ways through which family ownership and control is expressed is the participation of 
the family members in the management of the company through their representation at the board level, namely either 
by appointing a professional CEO, who they control, or through the direct appointment of family members as CEOs. Since 
the appointment of family members as CEOs is one of the most ordinary manifestations of family control, empirical 
research has sought to measure its impact on firm performance. 
11
 Fama&Jensen, (1983) supra note4. 
12
 Westphal J. D., (1999), Collaboration in the boardroom: Behavioral and value consequences of CEO-board social ties. 
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especially when compared to firms with non-family, professional CEOs.13 Evidently, families add 
value to a company in a way that differentiates them from all other types of block-holders. For 
example, a recent study comparing the impact of the various forms of concentrated ownership on 
firm performance14, has confirmed the positive impact of family ownership15, while privatized 
companies, in which the government is still a controlling shareholder, are documented to be less 
efficient or at least less profitable than widely-held firms.16 The findings suggest that the added 
value is mainly related to the way families use their control rights. For example, it has been found 
that it makes a difference whether families are represented in the firm, probably in at least one of 
the boards, and whether they use their control rights actively or not. By contrast, family firms 
without board representation of the founding-family do not exhibit a significantly better 
performance compared to firms without block-holders.17  
 
2. Qualitative Factors: ‘Familiness’ as a competitive advantage 
The long-term investment horizon of families constitutes an additional characteristic which affects 
their impact on corporate governance.18 More specifically, their long-term investment horizon 
increases their willingness to invest in long-term projects19 and has positive reputational effects 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
Academy of Management Journal, 42:7.  
13
 Durand R. and Vargas V. (2003). Ownership, organization, and private firms’ efficient use of resources. Strategic 
Management Journal, 24:667; Lee, K. S., Lim, G. H. and Lim, W. S. (2003), Family business succession: Appropriation risk 
and choice of succession, Academy of Management Review, 28:657. 
14
Andres C., (2007), Family Ownership as the Optimal Organizational Structure?. EFA 2006 Zurich Meetings, Forthcoming. 
Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=903710. 
In this study, for the purposes of identifying the impact of the type of the controller on firm performance, controlling 
shareholders have been subdivided into the following categories: government including all public authorities, financials 
such as banks and insurances, strategic investors including other companies, individuals, which include wealthy investors 
who invested part of their private wealth without being linked to the company, families involved in the management of 
their investees and others such as management teams and foundations. 
15
 ibid Andres (2007). The results show positive and significant coefficients for families who are present in the company. 
Such presence can also be expressed when families with large shareholdings have other means than a seat in the 
supervisory board to effectively control management. 
16
 ibid. 
17
 ibid. 
18
 Villalonga B. and Amit R.H., (2009b), Family Control of Firms and Industries, Financial Management, Forthcoming. 
Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1107466. 
19
 Stein J., (1989), Efficient Capital Markets, Inefficient Firms: A Model of Myopic Corporate Behavior, Quarterly Journal of 
Economics 103:655. 
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when dealing with external stakeholders.20 They also often have a long business background and 
high management skills. Their expertise makes them more effective when implementing their 
strategies. Compared with professional managers, family CEOs may also gain a competitive 
advantage if they have access to unique resources, especially in emerging economies with weak 
market-supporting institutional frameworks, where access to resources is often not through formal 
channels such as banks but often through informal, private networks such as business groups.21 In 
addition to this, resource-based theories22 highlight the importance of ‘familiness’ as a  valuable 
source of competitive advantage due to the existence of common interest and identity, goal 
congruence, trust, and reciprocity within the corporation.23  As a result, their focused investment 
strategies, their long-established supporting networks and the common interests underpinning 
their active monitoring efforts constitute a source of competitive advantage24, which explains the 
success of family-owned corporations around the world.  
                                                          
20
 Anderson R. C. and Reeb D.M., (2003a), Founding-Family Ownership and Firm Performance: Evidence from the S&P 
500. Journal of Finance 58(3):1301; Anderson R.C. and Reeb D.M., (2003b), Founding-Family Ownership, Corporate 
Diversification, and Firm Leverage, Journal of Law and Economics, 46(2):653.  
21
 Peng, M. W., (2003), Institutional transitions and strategic choices. Academy of Management Review, 28:275. 
22
 Barney, J. B., (2001), Resource-based theories of competitive advantage: A ten-year retrospective on the resource-
based view, Journal of Management, 27:643. 
23
 Sirmon D. G. and Hitt M. A., (2003), Managing resources: Linking unique resources, management, and wealth creation 
in family firms, Entrepreneurship: Theory & Practice, 27:339; Habbershon T. and Williams M., (1999), A resource-based 
framework for assessing the strategic advantage of family firms. Family Business Review, 12:1; Durand&Vargas (2003) 
supra note13. 
24
 The positive effect of family ownership on firm value is also documented by Anderson&Reeb (2003a) supra note20; 
Villalonga B. and Amit R., (2006), How Do Family  Ownership, Control, and Management Affect Firm Value?, Journal of 
Financial Economics, 80:385. For an earlier version of this paper see Villalonga B. and Amit R.H., (2004), How Do Family 
Ownership, Control, and Management Affect Firm Value?. AFA 2005 Philadelphia Meetings; EFA 2004 Maastricht 
Meetings Paper No. 3620; Fifteenth Annual Utah Winter Finance Conference. Available at SSRN: 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=556032; Fahlenbrach R., (2009), Founder-CEOs, Investment Decisions, and Stock Market 
Performance, Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 44:439; Sraer D. and Thesmar D., (2007), Performance and 
Behavior of Family Firms: Evidence from the French Stock Market, Journal of the European Economic Association 5:709. 
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III. THE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE PROBLEMS OF FAMILY OWNERSHIP 
1. Extraction of private benefits of control 
Although family ownership has important beneficial elements, its overall efficiency as an 
ownership structure is contested on several grounds.25 For example, despite the reduction of 
managerial agency costs, family CEOs as inside shareholders have higher incentives to adopt 
investment policies that benefit themselves and their families, while reducing the payout to 
outside shareholders.26 Moreover, even qualified and competent family CEOs may take excessive 
risk and deviate from the objective of shareholder wealth maximization.27 In this light, an 
important caveat regarding family ownership is the potential costs of family ownership mainly due 
to the extraction of private benefits in various forms.28 The private benefits to be extracted are not 
only of a pecuniary nature, in the form of excessive dividends or self-dealing transactions. Non-
pecuniary benefits may involve the reputational advantage of having a family member leading the 
company29 or using the firm to create jobs for their descendants through their appointment as 
                                                          
25
 La Porta R., Lopez-de-Silanes F., Shleifer A., and Vishny R. W., (1998), Law and Finance, Journal of Political Economy 
107:1113. 
26
 Fama&Jensen (1983) supra note4; McConnell J. J. and Servaes H., (1990), Additional evidence on equity ownership and 
corporate value, Journal of Financial Economics, 27:595. 
27
 Carpenter M. A., Pollock T. G. and Leary M. M., (2003), Testing a model of reasoned risk-taking: Governance, the 
experience of principals and agents, and global strategy in high-technology IPO firms, Strategic Management Journal, 
24:802; Gomez-Mejia L., Larraza-Kintana M. and Makri, M., (2003), The determinants of executive compensation in 
family-controlled public corporations, Academy of Management Journal, 46:226. 
28
Burkart M., Pannunzi F. and Shleifer A., (2003), Family firms, Journal of Finance, 58:2167; Nenova T., (2003), The Value 
of Corporate Votes and Control Benefits: A Cross–country Analysis, Journal of Financial Economics 68:325; Zingales L., 
(1995), What Determines the Value of Corporate Votes?, Quarterly Journal of Economics 110:1047;  
For tunnelling practices of family business groups in emerging markets see Mehta P., and Mullainathan S., (2002), 
Ferreting Out Tunnelling: An Application to Indian Business Groups, Quarterly Journal of Economics 117:121. 
For the premium of super voting shares in firms with dual-class stock, which are largely family-controlled see Lease R., 
McConnell J., and Mikkelson W., (1983). The market value of control in publicly traded corporations, Journal of Financial 
Economics, 11:439. 
For the negative effects on firm value of families’ excess control over ownership see Claessens S., Fan J. P. H., Djankov S. 
and Lang L.H.P., (1999), On Expropriation of Minority Shareholders: Evidence from East Asia (December 9, 1999). 
Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=202390; Villalonga&Amit (2004, 2006) supra note24,  
For more on the negative effects of the descendant CEOs see. Pérez-González F., (2006), Inherited Control and Firm 
Performance, American Economic Review, 96(1):559. 
29
 Demsetz H. and Kenneth L., (1985), The Structure of Corporate Ownership: Causes and Consequences, Journal of 
Political Economy, 93(6):1155; Demsetz&Lehn (1985) propose the term 'amenity potential;, standing for non-pecuniary 
income that does not (directly) come at the expense of profits. They name sports and media as two examples for 
industries with a particularly high amenity potential. 
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members of the management. Similarly, a founder who has rendered outstanding services to the 
company in the past might not be called on to retire by his family or other minority shareholders, 
even though he may no longer be competent.30  
 
2. ‘Familiness’ as a source of competitive disadvantage  
Additional costs for the company derive from sibling rivalry, generational envy, non-merit-based 
compensation, and irrational strategic decisions.31 For example, family CEOs may enter into power 
competition with other family members, using the company in order to enhance their own power 
and prestige as CEOs rather than to create profits.32 At this stage, the benefits deriving from strong 
family ties begin to decline as outside CEOs may be more focused on the company and less likely to 
get into family rivalries.33 In this regard, resource-based theories point out that appropriate 
resources, such as family ties, are necessary but insufficient to achieve a competitive advantage, 
and that ‘familiness’ must be managed effectively.34 Furthermore, the very concept of altruism, 
defined as the selfless regard for the well-being of other family members, threatens to negatively 
affect firm performance35 by leading to ineffective monitoring of the family CEO, rather than 
constituting the source of a competitive advantage for the family-run corporation.36 
A very important aspect of the problem is that altruism may also induce family CEOs to fail to 
adopt and enforce formal rules and procedures, thus rendering corporate governance for outside 
shareholders problematic. The potential for considerable conflicts of interest between the family 
and outside investors is evident. This problem is accentuated, as families are clearly oriented to 
                                                          
30
 According to Shleifer&Vishny (1997) supra note7 this is one of the greatest costs that large shareholders can impose. 
31
 Gomez-Mejia, L., Nunez-Nickel, M. and Gutierrez, I. (2001). ‘The role of family ties in agency contracts’. Academy of 
Management Journal, 44:81. 
32
 For a case of rivalry among family members, see the story of Hermès emerging in the context of the acquisition of the 
20% stake of the company by LVMH, below Part III.2. This is, particularly, the case when the founding generation passes 
away and  the firm becomes a sibling partnership, in which case each sibling partner is likely to be more concerned about 
his/her own welfare and that of his/her immediate family rather than other siblings’ welfare. See Stark O. and Falk I., 
(1998), Transfers, empathy formation, and reverse transfers, American Economic Review 88(2):271. 
33
 ibid (Hermès) 
34
 Sirmon&Hitt (2003) supra note23. 
35
 Schulze W. S., Lubatkin M. H. and Dino R., (2003), Toward a theory of agency and altruism in family firms, Journal of 
Business Venturing, 18:473. 
36
 Schulze W. S., Lubatkin M. H., Dino R. and Buchholtz A. K., (2001), Agency relationships in family firms: Theory and 
evidence, Organization Science, 12:99. 
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maintaining control of the companies they found or acquire, and often resort to control-enhancing 
devices, such as dual-class shares and pyramids, which are linked to lower value creation.37 In this 
light, agency problems within family-owned corporations are harder to resolve as relations 
between principals (family owners) and agents (family CEOs) are likely to be based on emotions, 
sentiments, and informal linkages rather than a formalised set of rules and principles. Moreover, 
as family CEOs are less exposed to the pressures exerted by the managerial labour market, there is 
a higher potential for the entrenchment of incompetent family members in managerial positions.38  
The lack of competent successors or family disagreements with a negative impact on corporate 
governance and firm performance are hardly rare.39 More specifically, the example of Ford40 
illustrates how family control negatively affects the competitiveness and performance of the 
corporation, especially if control is in the hands of the generations succeeding the founders. In the 
case of Ford, family involvement in the management of the company has led to bad decisions, 
reflected in the value of the shares, which in 2007 has plummeted to $584 million from $2.3 billion 
since 1999, when Bill Ford, great-grandson of the founder, became chairman of the company. On 
the contrary, the French company Hermès41 provides an example of positive impact of family 
commitment. During the LVMH acquisition of an important 17% stake in Hermès, family owners 
appeared united when they sought to eliminate the potential of the company becoming a target, 
most notably through setting up a complex ownership structure involving a family-owned private 
                                                          
37
 Claessens et al. (2002) supra note28; Lins K.V., (2003), Equity ownership and firm value in emerging markets, Journal of 
Financial and Quantitative Analysis 38:159;
 
Gompers P. A., Ishii J. L. and Metrick A., (2008), Extreme Governance: An 
Analysis of Dual-Class Companies in the United States, AFA 2005 Philadelphia Meetings; Rodney L. White Center for 
Financial Research Working Paper No. 12-04; Rock Center for Corporate Governance Working Paper No. 39. Available at 
SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=562511. 
38
 Morck R., Wolfenzon D., and Yeung B., (2005), Corporate Governance, Economic Entrenchment and Growth, Journal of 
Economic Literature 43:657. 
39
 Francesco Guerrera, Out of the picture, FT, 23.07.2007 available at http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/6f1c011c-38b4-11dc-
bca9-0000779fd2ac.html#axzz1Q6apFVW8 (last accessed 29.09.2011). 
Famous families, Charles Batchelor, FT, 08.07.2007, available at http://www.ft.com/cms/s/2/ad831aba-2d49-11dc-939b-
0000779fd2ac.html#axzz1Q6apFVW8 (last accessed 29.09.2011). 
40
 John Lippert and Bill Koenig, ‘Ford family members weigh sale of shares, people say’, Bloomberg, May 14, 2007, 
available at http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=a5CO3otNRW0Y&refer=home (last accessed 
29.09.2011). 
41
 Paul Betts, Family members in tune for some harmony, FT, 9.12.2010, available at 
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/47f7147a-03bb-11e0-8c3f-00144feabdc0.html#axzz1Q6apFVW8 (last accessed 29.09.2011). 
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holding company.42 The strong financial performance of the company and the competent 
leadership by family owners justify this reaction. However, even in the example of Hermès the 
willingness of some family members to cash out on their positions indicates the lack of 
commitment of subsequent generations to the company, which has an impact of the company's 
performance and increases its vulnerability to takeovers. 43 
 
3. Families and control-enhancing mechanisms 
Probably one of the most problematic aspects of family ownership is their unwillingness to part 
with control often expressed through the use of control-enhancing devices. Results of empirical 
research verify that families are the type of owners who mostly use control-enhancing devices 
associated with lower firm performance.44 The use of such mechanisms is predicted to increase the 
scope and incentive for the extraction of private benefits at the expense of minority shareholders. 
Indeed, the use of control mechanisms like multiple share classes, pyramids, cross-holdings or 
voting agreements has been found to have a negative effect on firm value, particularly in founder-
led companies.45  
However, in Continental Europe in particular, there is no evidence that disproportionate family 
control is negative for firm value and operating performance.46 Families are actually found to 
outperform other types of controlling shareholders47, even if the control and ownership structures 
chosen by the family distort the principle of proportionality.  Therefore, as the scholars point out 
                                                          
42
 Lex Column, Hermès, FT, 6.12.2010, available at http://www.ft.com/cms/s/3/0d94e256-011f-11e0-8894-
00144feab49a.html#axzz1Q6apFVW8 (last accessed 29.09.2011). 
Scheherazade Daneshkhu, Hermès clan fights for control, FT, 10.12.2010, available at 
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/6319a918-048b-11e0-a99c-00144feabdc0.html#axzz1Q6apFVW8 (last accessed 29.09.2011). 
43
 Scheherazade Daneshkhu, Hermès to create holding company, FT, December 5, 2010, available at 
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/f3306ec2-00b9-11e0-aa29-00144feab49a,s01=1.html#axzz1Q6apFVW8 (last accessed 
29.09.2011). 
44
 Andres (2007) supra note14. 
45
 Villalonga&Amit (2004, 2006) supra note24. 
46
 Barontini R. and Lorenzo C., (2006), The Effect of Family Control on Firm Value and Performance: Evidence from 
Continental Europe, European Financial Management, 12(5):689. 
47
 Ibid ‘… we consider both family affiliation and the percentage of cash-flow and voting rights held by the largest 
shareholder as explanatory variables of market valuation and operating performance, the effect of family control is neatly 
positive, meaning that for any given cash-flow/voting rights combination, families tend to be better than other types of 
controlling shareholders.’ 
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‘…although a part of the positive effect is wasted by the high use of wealth-reducing control-
enhancing devices by families, a residual positive effect is clearly still there.’ The evidence on family 
ownership in Continental Europe indicates that the general effect of family control may still be 
positive, notwithstanding the frequent preference of family corporations for apparently inefficient 
ownership structures. The findings also suggest that families make optimal use of control-
enhancing devices in order to maintain control, while the liquidity generated enables them to 
invest further.48  
 
IV. THE DETERMINANTS OF THE BENEFICIAL EFFECT OF FAMILY OWNERSHIP 
1. Family ownership and firm performance: The inconclusiveness of empirical research  
Despite the attempts of researchers to solve the family ownership conundrum, empirical evidence 
remains inconclusive. In the US, for example, family ownership appears to be an effective 
organizational structure. Studies on majority-owned firms show that, although most of them are 
characterized by family involvement, they do not exhibit specific inefficiency features.49 Recent 
empirical evidence also demonstrates that founding-family ownership is associated with superior 
firm performance when compared to widely-held companies, both in terms of accounting 
performance and market valuation.50 For instance, in a panel study on S&P 500 firms it is found 
that family firms perform better than non-family firms, both in terms of market and accounting 
measures.51 The closer observation of family firm performance reveals a so-called ‘founder effect’. 
The presence of founders, either as CEOs or as non-executive directors, is associated with 
                                                          
48
 Barontini&Caprio (2006) supra note46. 
49
 Holderness C. G., (2003), A survey of blockholders and corporate control, Economic Policy Review, 9:51; Shleifer A. and 
Vishny R., (1986), Large Shareholders and Corporate Control, Journal of Political Economy, 94:461; Denis D.J. and Denis 
D.K., (1994), Majority owner-managers and organizational efficiency, Journal of Corporate Finance 1:91. 
50
 Anderson&Reeb (2003a) supra note20; Barontini&Caprio (2006) supra note46; Villalonga&Amit (2004, 2006) supra 
note24. 
51
 Anderson&Reeb (2003a) supra note20 in line with older research conducted by McConnaughy D., Walker M., 
Henderson G. and Chandra M., (1998), Founding family controlled firms: Efficiency and value, Review of Financial 
Economics 7:1. 
The complex relationship of concentrated ownership structures and corporate governance 
Chapter II: Family and state ownership as key factors of corporate governance 
 
 
 
76 
 
outstandingly high market valuation and operating performance, explained by close monitoring 
and the unique value-adding skills that improve performance.52  
Recent research on the impact of family ownership on corporate value creation in Europe53 also 
finds that market valuation and operating performance are higher in founder-controlled 
corporations and at least not worse in descendant-controlled firms.54 In terms of single-country 
European evidence, French stock-market listed companies owned by families are found to 
outperform widely-held corporations.55 These results hold for founder-CEO firms as well as for 
heir-managed firms. Turning the focus to Germany, family businesses are also found to outperform 
non-family firms in terms of operating performance.56 Again, the positive effect of family 
                                                          
52
 Other studies that highlight that founder-CEOs have a positive effect on corporate performance include Fahlenbrach R., 
(2003), Founder-CEOs and stock market performance, Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 44:439; Adams R., 
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54
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(McConnaughy et al. (1998) supra note51; Pérez-González (2006) supra note28). Finally, Villalonga&Amit (2004, 2006) 
supra note24 also remark that family control exhibits specific weaknesses when descendants are involved in top 
management. 
The presence of founders, either as CEO or as non-executive director, is thus associated with outstandingly high market 
valuation and operating performance. Moreover, there is no evidence at all that descendants-controlled corporations 
under-perform non-family firms. On the contrary, family firms remain better than non-family ones, when descendants 
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takes the helm of CEO. The findings could be interpreted as providing for an efficiency defence for family ownership by 
revealing a positive association of family control with market valuation and operating performance throughout 
Continental Europe. 
55
 Sraer&Thesmar (2007) supra note24. 
56
 Nowak E., Ehrhardt O. and Weber F. M., (2006), 'Running in the Family': The Evolution of Ownership, Control, and 
Performance in German Family-Owned Firms, 1903-2003. Swiss Finance Institute Research Paper No. 06-13. Available at 
SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=891255. The authors investigate a sample of 62 family and 62 non-family firms.  
Also see Andres C., (2008), Large shareholders and firm performance-An empirical examination of founding-family 
ownership. Journal of Corporate Finance, 14(4):431, finding that in a single-country research using panel data on 275 
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companies, the founding family remains the largest shareholder over the entire sample period. The results show no 
The complex relationship of concentrated ownership structures and corporate governance 
Chapter II: Family and state ownership as key factors of corporate governance 
 
 
 
77 
 
involvement is stronger when the founder serves as CEO.57 Several other single-country studies58 
complete the picture about the effect of family control in European corporations and provide 
similar results.  
Outside the U.S. and Europe, recent theoretical analysis highlights the role families can be 
expected to play, especially when the financial markets are underdeveloped and the legal 
protection of investors is poor.59 The empirical evidence about the effect of family control 
introduces a new perspective into the debate. Contrary to the positive findings mentioned so far, 
family ownership is found to have negative implications on the efficiency of Canadian firms.60 
Family ownership in East Asia is also found to lead to severe conflicts and hamper firm 
performance.61 However, it is very difficult to identify the extent to which the negative correlation 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
statistically significant difference of past-IPO performance between firms under family control and widely-held 
corporations. See Goergen M., (1997), Does Ownership Matter? A Study Of German And UK IPOS. Available at SSRN: 
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of family ownership and firm performance can be attributed to the presence of the family as a 
controlling shareholder or to the possible deficiencies of the institutional framework developed in 
the countries involved. 
 
2. Explaining the inconclusiveness of empirical research on the efficiency of family 
ownership: Complementarity and the Law 
An extreme example of the lack of alignment of empirical research and the ambivalent nature of 
family ownership is offered by a recent empirical research covering eight Asian countries.62 
According to the findings, within Asia, family ownership and control in large firms are good in some 
countries, where the benefits outweigh the costs. They are bad in some other countries and 
irrelevant in the remaining countries. The findings could, therefore, provide support for both the 
‘good’ and ‘bad’ hypotheses across different countries. The aforementioned inconclusiveness of 
the evidence demonstrates that the effect of family ownership is not determined by the form of 
the ownership structure as such. Family ownership is not per se inefficient. Instead, the 
explanation for its ambivalence can be found if the focus is shifted from the type of ownership as 
such to other external factors, such as the financial and legal system of the countries in which 
family companies operate. 63 
For example, the theories of institutional complementarity provide an explanation of the 
difference in the levels of efficiency of family ownership around the world. More specifically, 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
Their results are supported by Claessens et al. (2002), supra note28 who find that the negative effect of separation 
between ownership and control is largely driven by family control. 
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large firms, Journal of Management Studies, 47:2. 
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other determinants. In support of this latter theory, recent research investigating the behaviour and performance of 
listed Spanish family and non-family firms finds that family firms, despite being more efficient in production, have the 
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institutional differences between the two countries, in particular higher technological capital and better protection of 
minority shareholders in U.S. than in Spain. 
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family ownership is the market’s response to the underdevelopment of essential institutions and 
compensates for the lack of resources for corporations. 64 Family ownership and control, often 
facilitated through the use of CEMs, are therefore considered to be the functional equivalent or 
substitute for the lacking or underdeveloped institutions, such as the financial markets, which are 
necessary to support investment and growth. However, the weak investor protection framework 
also implies that families may expropriate their control. This hypothesis explains why the empirical 
evidence about the effect of family control tends to be less benign outside the U.K. and the U.S., 
given that corporate activity in the latter countries benefits from the existence of deep and liquid 
capital markets. It also aligns with recent theoretical analysis outside the U.S. regarding the role 
families are expected to play within systems of underdeveloped financial markets and weak legal 
protection of investors.65  
The complex interrelation between family ownership, the legal environment and corporate 
performance is further affected by the dynamic nature of the firm throughout its development. 
More specifically, at certain points within the firm’s life circle the founder will have to decide on 
the ownership structure and the governance of the firm.66 The characteristics of the surrounding 
legal environment then become the main factor determining the outcome of this choice. In a firm 
originally owned and managed by its founder, the age of the founder or the growth and success of 
the company require that a choice be made between hiring a professional manager or leaving 
management to his heir. Similarly, the founder needs to decide how much, if any, of the shares to 
float on the stock exchange. The protection offered to the founder within the given legal 
environment shapes the founder's decisions. For example, weak investor protection will lead the 
founder to choose a manager they can control, probably a member of the family, rather than a 
professional manager.  
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Indeed, in confirmation of the aforementioned hypothesis, it has been shown that the widely-held, 
professionally-managed corporation emerges as the equilibrium outcome in legal regimes which 
successfully limit the expropriation of minority shareholders.67 In legal regimes with intermediate 
protection, management is delegated to a professional, but the family stays on as a large 
shareholder to monitor the manager. In legal regimes with the weakest protection, the founder 
designates his heir to manage and ownership remains inside the family. When viewed from this 
perspective, the inconclusiveness of the evidence is not a problematic contradiction between 
different empirical studies but actually confirms the important role of legal and regulatory 
institutions in determining the efficiency of ownership structures.  
 
V. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
The foregoing analysis indicates the ambiguous potential of family ownership as a corporate 
governance factor. It is demonstrated that the impact of family ownership as a corporate structure 
is clearly determined by parameters such as the firm’s size and stage of development, the 
surrounding economic environment, the existence and development of institutions supporting 
economic activity and the quality of the legal framework. As the ‘inefficiency bias’ against family 
ownership is not supported by conclusive empirical data, it is subject to the criticism that it derives 
from the over-simplification of the complex interrelations of the ownership structures and the 
overall financial and legal system surrounding corporations. This supports the proposition that the 
effectiveness of the corporate law and governance mechanisms embedded within each system 
determines the impact of family ownership by mitigating its risks or promoting its benefits. The 
legal effectiveness of such mechanisms is extensively assessed in Chapter III of this thesis through a 
case study of the Greek framework for the protection of investors in family-owned companies.    
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B. STATE OWNERSHIP 
I. INTRODUCTION 
State ownership experienced a period of popularity among developed nations in the 1930’s, 1940’s 
and 1950’s, and in developing nations throughout the post-war period.68 The rationale for state 
ownership in industrialized nations is that it remedies market failures such as externalities and 
monopoly, which at that time were considered widespread. In developing nations, state-owned 
enterprises (hereafter SOEs) were also considered to facilitate 'economic independence' and 
planned development.69 Despite the extensive privatisations, the state remains a key player in the 
economy of many countries70 around the world, with the examples of China71 and Russia72 being 
the most obvious ones. Contrary to what might be expected, the important role of the state as a 
corporate owner is not limited to emerging economies only. Throughout the developed world and 
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despite the extensive privatisations of the 1980's and the 1990’s, the state preserves its important 
role in the economy by retaining a controlling or substantial stake in major companies.73 Even in 
cases where the level of direct ownership of corporations has dropped as a result of extensive 
privatisations, the state has managed to retain the ultimate control by employing control-
enhancing mechanisms (CEMs) such as pyramidal ownership, dual-class shares and golden 
shares.74 The case of Italy constitutes the most cited example in this regard.75 
State ownership in developed economies has also increased as a result of the 2007-2008 financial 
crisis. During the crisis, even countries such as the UK, with a long history in the privatisation of 
corporations and reliance on private ownership, have acquired substantial stakes in corporations, 
notably banks, in order to safeguard the stability of the financial system. The most important 
examples are the nationalisation of Northern Rock and the case of the Royal Bank of Scotland 
which received considerable attention in the U.K recently.76 In addition to this, the bail out of 
General Motors through the acquisition of a majority stake of the company by the US Government 
indicates that the potential role of the state is not limited to the corporate governance of financial 
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institutions only.77 Even if state ownership as a result of the crisis constitutes an exceptional case 
with limited impact, still the participation of the state in business activity through ownership of 
enterprises indicates the inevitability of state intervention in the economy either in economic 
sectors of strategic importance or as a corrective and stabilizing factor in times of crises. The re-
emergence of state ownership in many developed countries as a result of the 2008 economic crisis 
has even given rise to several analyses predicting a much less damaging impact of state ownership 
on the corporations and the wider economy this time.78 In light of the increasing prevalence of the 
state in economic activity, its role as a controlling shareholder gives rise to important challenges 
for corporate governance. 
 
                                                          
77
 GM collapses into government's arms, The Wall Street Journal, 02.06.2009, available at 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB124385428627671889.html (last accessed 16.09.2011) 
As a result of the restructuring process, GM has been turned into a private company and the US Government owned 
more that 60% of the GM Company. In December 2010, GM consummated a public offering and listed securities on the 
NYSE and on the Toronto Stock Exchange. See Bernard Simon and Telis Demos, GM listing marks successful turnround, FT, 
18.11. 2010 available at http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/0efddc18-f325-11df-9514-00144feab49a,dwp_uuid=0e73f8e0-
a2b8-11de-ae7e-00144feabdc0.html#axzz1Xdsfv72I (last accessed 16.09.2011) 
Following the listing, the US Government owns 33% of the company. For further information see the 2010 Annual Report 
which provides a comprehensive view of the company in the past years, available at 
https://materials.proxyvote.com/Approved/37045V/20110408/AR_87685/images/General_Motors-AR2010.pdf (last 
accessed 16.09.2011); Megginson W.L., (2011), Privatization Trends and Major Deals in 2010. Available at SSRN: 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1886009. 
78
Wong S. C. Y., (2009), Government Ownership: Why This Time It should Work, The McKinsey Quarterly, June 2009. 
The paper suggests that five structural characteristics should reassure the public that government intervention today will 
be far less damaging than past experience would indicate. These include: 1) Western governments have been forced into 
equity ownership and are 'reluctant' shareholders, 2) governments insist that they will seek to sell their holdings as soon 
as possible, 3) the limited number of capital injections has made it is easier for the public to measure the value created or 
lost, 4) looming budget deficits should constrain governments from engaging in wasteful spending at bailed-out firms, 
and 5) governments have kept a portion of companies' ownership in private hands, thus preserving a high level of 
transparency and compelling governments to consider the impact of their actions on other shareholders.  
Furthermore, government can put in place certain safeguards to instill the public with greater confidence that they are 
acting not only to insulate government-held firms from inappropriate political influence but also with the companies' best 
commercial interests in mind. These include: 1) clearly stating the objectives for their holdings, 2) defining and 
announcing their 'rules of engagement,' 3) establishing an intermediary body to hold the government's stakes in private 
companies, 4) ensuring that public policy objectives pursued are separately funded or underpinned by commercial 
principles, and 5) maintaining a high level of transparency, including by announcing a preliminary timetable for exit. 
The complex relationship of concentrated ownership structures and corporate governance 
Chapter II: Family and state ownership as key factors of corporate governance 
 
 
 
84 
 
II. THE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE PROBLEMS OF STATE OWNERSHIP 
1. Empirical findings 
Empirical findings widely support that state ownership has a negative impact on firm performance, 
when compared with private ownership.79 When seeking to balance the benefits and the costs of 
state ownership, an important part of empirical literature documents the superiority of private 
ownership in terms of efficiency.80 Private ownership has an advantage in both industrialized and 
developing nations, the lead being more pronounced in the latter.81 This result contradicts the 
argument that market failures and under-developed supporting institutions in developing nations 
make SOEs more viable in relation to private firms. 
In one of the most comprehensive reviews of the impact of state ownership, scholars compared 52 
empirical studies on the issue.82 Of the 52 studies of their sample, 32 conclude that the 
performance of private and privatized firms is significantly superior to that of public firms. 15 
studies find either that there is no significant relationship between ownership and performance, or 
that the relationship is ambiguous (different evidence supports both public and private 
superiority). Five studies conclude that publicly-owned firms perform better than private firms. 
The dominance of studies finding superior private performance is robust across all sub-categories. 
Of the 31 studies that compare private and public firms operating in the same industry, 18 
conclude that private firms have higher performance, while 8 report mixed results and five find 
superior public performance. Among the 21 studies that examine the performance of a firm before 
and after privatization, 14 find that performance improves, while seven find no significant change. 
The overwhelming conclusions that can be drawn from the empirical evidence in favour of private 
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ownership are illustrated in the comments of scholars that ‘the ambiguity about the merits of 
private ownership and privatization is greater in theory than in the empirical literature’.83 
 
2. The corporate governance problems of SOEs 
The poor performance of SOEs is generally attributed to unclear objectives, political interference, 
lack of discipline, and poor transparency.84 The main corporate governance problem arising within 
SOEs are the conflicts of interests between minority shareholders and the state. The conflicts 
derive from the divergent objectives, given that social welfare maximisation is often the underlying 
objective of SOEs, contrary to the objectives of other types of owners to maximise shareholder 
value.85 In this respect, even in fully competitive environments, SOEs will be inefficient because 
politicians use them to pursue political goals such as over-employment.86 These arguments are 
backed up by research documenting political use and abuse of SOEs.87 This aspect of state-owned 
enterprises remains a source of conflicts of interest, even under the assumption that the state 
complies with the highest standards of corporate governance.  
Whatever the government’s goals and political objectives, the internal corporate governance of 
SOEs is less efficient than private companies, due to a variety of factors.88 More specifically, the 
average private sector monitoring is superior due to the presence of owner-operated private firms 
and the disciplining role of takeovers.89 The advantages of private monitoring also include a more 
healthy market for managers and profit-oriented monitors.90 In the context of state ownership, the 
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failures in the political market, the presence of government officials or appointees with self-serving 
interests and a highly distorted market for public managers negatively affect the quality of 
monitoring by the state.91 Similarly, the accountability and transparency issues of SOEs increase 
the risk of exploitation by self-interested politicians, who either seek to fulfil their political aims or 
to extract direct pecuniary benefits while running or monitoring SOEs. The aforementioned 
problem appears even more pervasive in light of the high levels of corruption across several states, 
the SOEs often being the field where such corruption is manifested. In this light, the state appears 
to be ill-equipped to monitor managers and to tackle managerial opportunism. Provided that state 
monitoring is deficient, the main source of the comparative advantage of concentrated structures 
becomes irrelevant. Additionally, the limited market for the shares in SOEs implies that minority 
shareholders are more exposed to loss as a result of their participation in the SOE. 
The sub-optimal levels of monitoring in the public sector are exacerbated due to a wide variety of 
characteristics of state ownership. For example, as there is a limited market for the shares of SOEs, 
information on firm performance is scarce and non-comparable.92 While both public and private 
systems of ownership suffer from collective-action problems in monitoring, the ability of markets 
to generate information gives private ownership a crucial advantage in the monitoring process.93 
This combination of information and monitoring failures in the public sector results in higher 
management discretion and worse public performance. Moreover, state ownership is associated 
with important accountability issues. More specifically, if all voters are considered to be the owner 
of public firms, the ownership of SOE’s is more widely distributed than a private firm’s ever could 
be.94 Monitoring is particularly weak when ownership is diffuse and information is poor. Both 
situations arise in public ownership.95  
Furthermore, state-owned corporations are also not subject to the disciplining effect of product 
markets, because their presence in the markets often has a negative effect on competition, as 
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empirical evidence suggests.96 More specifically, because SOEs rarely seek to maximize profits, 
they actually have greater incentives and the ability to engage in anti-competitive behaviour.97 In 
particular, SOEs are more likely than private firms to set prices below marginal cost, therefore 
raising their competitors’ costs through market or political methods.98 In addition to this, the state, 
who is also the controlling shareholder of SOEs, may affect competition through the regulation of 
the market of reference or by raising high barriers of entry for competitors.99 The disciplining 
impact of product market competition on SOEs is also less pervasive because many SOEs operate 
in market monopolies. 
 
III. BUILDING AN EFFICIENCY DEFENCE FOR STATE OWNERSHIP 
1. Legal effectiveness as a determinant of the beneficial effect of state ownership 
Although the majority of empirical evidence and theoretical studies highlights the problematic 
aspects of corporate governance within SOEs, a more positive dimension of state ownership is 
provided by OECD in its Survey on the Governance of State-owned Enterprises.100 In the context of 
investor protection, the Survey highlights a variety of legal mechanisms employed by the state to 
improve corporate governance within SOEs. As a starting point, it is found that in most OECD 
countries, minority shareholders in SOEs enjoy at least the same level of protection as the 
shareholders of private companies.101 However, some OECD countries establish strengthened 
decision-making powers for minority shareholders within general shareholders meetings or 
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boards.102 Italy, for example has established a cumulative voting-type system applying to the 
election of the board which protects minority shareholders in SOEs. The Italian cumulative voting-
type system ('voto di lista') assigns disproportional voting rights to the minority shareholders, 
which fact may help to rebalance the dominant position of the state and allow for the private 
minority shareholders to exercise more influence over the company. Similarly, minority 
shareholders are granted stronger board representation rights.103 
 
By identifying the variety of mechanisms104 employed by SOEs in order to enhance minority 
shareholders protection, the OECD Survey on SOEs sheds light on the role of the state in corporate 
governance in multiple ways. Firstly, it documents the importance of SOEs around the world, both 
in developed and in developing economies. The recent example of UK state ownership of financial 
institutions adds to the list of important SOEs around the world. Secondly, it presents the minority 
(shareholders)-friendly approach adopted by many states aiming to attract investors. Such 
minority (shareholders)-friendly approach is manifested in the various mechanisms established by 
many OECD states for the protection of minorities, ranging from consultation processes ahead of 
                                                          
102
 ibid OECD Survey (2005), p.74. “Italy, for example has established a cumulative voting-type system applying to the 
election of the board which protects SOE’s minority shareholders who, apart from this, do not enjoy any specific rights 
beyond what is mandated in Company Law.” 
103
 ibid OECD Survey (2005), p.72-73. “In Denmark and Spain, for example, SOEs’ minority shareholders are granted board 
representation.” 
104
 ibid OECD Survey (2005), p.69-77. 
“Additional minority rights and mechanisms for minority protection include the adoption of specific mechanisms at the 
company level, including facilitating voting in absentia or developing the use of electronic means as a way to reduce 
participation costs, in order to actively encourage minority shareholders to participate in general shareholder meetings.  
The Survey also documents the effectiveness of granting minority shareholders specific ex ante rights. Such rights are 
usually granted by the general legal framework and are not specific to minority shareholders in SOEs. For example, in a 
number of OECD countries, pre-emptive rights are established under the general company law framework, serving the 
purpose of protecting minority shareholders from the dilution of their stakes.  
Equally important are the general company law provisions setting out qualified majorities for certain shareholder 
decisions. Such qualified majorities requirements may also be granted by specific SOE bylaws.(pages 73-74) In Austria, for 
example, minority shareholders enjoy significant rights at GSMs via threshold arrangements. In the Slovak Republic and 
for votes on fundamental matters, the approval of two third of shareholders is required, and it is possible to extend 
further this requirement to more than two third of present shareholders.  
Finally, qualified majorities for some board decisions might also be made mandatory in the case of some SOEs. This is the 
case in Belgium, where special majorities have been stipulated in shareholders' agreements in the decision making 
powers of the boards of the telecommunications and airport companies, where a significant part of the shares is held by 
private investors.” 
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important corporate decisions to the cumulative voting processes for the election of the board and 
even provisions regarding minority representation at the board level.  
Thirdly, the abovementioned mechanisms indicate that state ownership does not inevitably give 
rise to minority expropriation and corporate underperformance. Contrary to common perceptions, 
the set of corporate governance provisions described in the OECD Survey facilitate the cooperation 
between the state and private investors based on equality and suggest that state participation in 
the economy does not necessarily destroy the value of the SOEs as previously assumed. Fourthly, 
the Survey confirms the crucial role of the law and the various governance mechanisms in 
mitigating the minority-majority conflicts within the frames of state ownership through an array of 
minority protection mechanisms particularly adapted to this type of ownership, thus improving the 
effectiveness of the overall legal framework. These special minority protection mechanisms 
support the proposition that legal effectiveness is the determinant of the nature of state 
ownership as a harmful or beneficial ownership structure for minority shareholders.  
 
2. State ownership as a driver of good corporate governance 
The underlying proposition of the OECD Guidelines of best practices in the corporate governance 
of SOEs,105 is that it is in the state’s own interest that other shareholders do not perceive it as an 
opaque and unpredictable owner and that they do not feel that they are treated unfairly. In this 
respect, the state’s track record in terms of respecting minority rights is found to have a significant 
impact on the shares’ value and the future capacity of the company to raise further funds on the 
market.’106 Furthermore, the participation of other blockholders in SOEs introduces market 
pressures which have a disciplining effect on the management of SOEs.107 In this respect, the OECD 
Survey finds that around 40 percent of SOEs involve other shareholders, while the state is a 
majority shareholder in half of them. In this light, the proposition underlying the OECD Survey and 
                                                          
105
 OECD Principles of Corporate Governance, 2004. OECD (2005); OECD Guidelines on Corporate Governance of State-
Owned Enterprises, available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/46/51/34803211.pdf (last accessed 27.09.2011). 
106
Privatising State-Owned Enterprise, An Overview of Policies and Practices in OECD Countries, OECD, 2003. 
107
 Cole R.A., Berkman H. and Fu, J.L., (2002), From State to State: Improving Corporate Governance Where the 
Government is the Controlling Block Holder. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=370140 
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the OECD General Principles and Recommendations of Good Corporate Governance of SOEs 
suggests that the state has the potential to become a pioneer in promoting good corporate 
governance practices by applying them to the companies it owns first.  
The list of SOE-specific minority protection arrangements confirms the theoretical predictions 
regarding the role of the state as a driver of progress in international corporate governance. This 
beneficial aspect of state ownership is particularly important in the case of emerging economies, 
where improving investor confidence in the marketplace and attracting capital are the 
prerequisites of development and growth. Provided that the surrounding environment and 
supporting institutions are often insufficient to hinder the expropriation of minority shareholders, 
it is often the role of the state to bring in change and apply a model of good corporate governance. 
The findings of the OECD Survey demonstrate the key role of the state as a driver of good 
corporate governance while the concrete examples of corporate governance reforms in emerging 
economies illustrate that this is a possible development.108 In this context, the general principles 
provided by the OECD and the special provisions for minority protection which already apply in 
many developed countries provide an indicative list of practices and legal mechanisms that 
emerging economies can employ to this effect.  
 
                                                          
108
 Geoff Dyer and Richard McGregor, China's champions: Why state ownership is no longer proving a dead head, FT, 
16.03.2008, available at http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/979f69c8-f35b-11dc-b6bc-0000779fd2ac.html#axzz1ZbCWGn84 
(last accessed 27.09.2011). ‘A decade ago, China’s state-owned sector looked like an economic disaster waiting to 
happen.... Fast-forward 10 years and the situation is almost unrecognisable. In 2007, the combined profit of the 150 or so 
companies controlled by the central government is expected to have reached Rmb1,000bn (£70bn, $140bn, €90bn). In the 
five years to 2008, this figure rose by 223 per cent. At the end of last year, the list of the world’s 10 most valuable 
companies contained four groups controlled by the Chinese state….What we are witnessing, in other words, is an 
experiment in capitalism that could challenge much of the conventional wisdom about state ownership. Plenty of 
countries have strong state-owned companies in semi-monopolies such as telecommunications or heavily regulated 
sectors such as energy and mining. Yet China is trying to create a series of leading public companies in industries exposed 
to cut-throat competition, where technology, design and marketing are crucial features – just the sort in which state-
owned companies have typically suffered at the hands of private rivals…. Some of the sector’s improvements reflect 
reforms the government has pushed on the state sector. Many SOEs have listed at least part of their shares, exposing 
them to at least some shareholder influence. Executives’ compensation is linked ever more to performance rather than 
bureaucratic formulas….SOEs are increasingly competitive in attracting top executive talent.’  
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IV. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
Empirical evidence suggests that state ownership is a problematic ownership structure due to a 
variety of factors ranging from sub-optimal monitoring to corruption. In this respect, when 
compared to family ownership, state ownership provides a useful example of the distinct 
corporate governance issues arising within the varieties of concentrated ownership structures. The 
findings of the OECD Survey on the Governance of SOEs also demonstrate how the law can 
mitigate the governance problems associated with state ownership. This thesis extensively draws 
on the aforementioned OECD Survey, as it explores the minority protection mechanisms and 
governance arrangements emerging within Greek SOEs and assesses their effectiveness in the 
Chapter to follow. Having identified the distinct corporate governance problems that family and 
state ownership give rise to, Chapter III contributes to the understanding of the complex 
relationship of ownership structures and corporate governance through a case study indicating the 
profound links between the forms of ownership, particularly state ownership, and the distinct legal 
mechanisms for the protection of minority shareholders emerging within SOEs as a response.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
CHAPTER III: RESTATING THE 'LAW MATTERS' THESIS:  MINORITY PROTECTION 
BEYOND THE COMPARATIVE LAW INDICES 
 
Having established the distinct characteristics of state and family ownership and the different 
corporate governance problems they give rise to, this Chapter assesses the effectiveness of the 
Greek legal system to protect minority shareholders in state and family-owned corporations. This 
assessment outlines and considers the impact of rules and principles that have not been taken into 
account by LLSV as variables for the compilation of their indices, although they substantially 
improve the quality of investor protection. The substantive analysis of minority protection 
provisions in Greece further supports the ‘legal effectiveness’ argument presented in this thesis. 
The Greek legal system has been chosen as a case study because of its civil law origin. Greece is 
also a jurisdiction characterised by concentrated ownership structures and the presence of families 
and the state as the main corporate owners. It, therefore, fits well into the category of the 
jurisdictions of civil law and concentrated ownership, to which the ‘inefficiency bias’ would apply.  
This Chapter reveals a variety of alternative legal techniques which have so far received limited 
credit for their role in protecting minority shareholders. Such mechanisms derive from two 
sources: Firstly, within Greek SOEs the articles of association provide for a variety of distinctive 
rights conferred to minority shareholders, such as their representation at the board level or 
employee codetermination arrangements. Although such rights are not mandatory or even default 
provisions of the law on the Societes Anonymes1, they are widely used by state-owned enterprises 
(hereafter SOEs) and can only be identified through a review of the articles of association and 
founding laws of Greek SOEs. Effectively, such provisions act as minority protection mechanisms. 
Secondly, the Greek Civil Code also provides for a set of general rules and principles which have 
the effect to protect minority shareholders within corporations of concentrated ownership. In this 
                                                          
1
 See Law 2190/1920, which establishes the form of Societe Anonyme, which is the prevalent form under which all listed 
SOEs are incorporated. 
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regard, limits to minority expropriation are, for example, set by the general rule established in 
Article 281 of the Greek Civil Law, which prohibits the abusive exercise of one’s rights.  
In particular, the example of Greek minority protection mechanisms reinforces the criticisms 
against the LLSV study in a particularly revealing manner, as LLSV awarded Greece with a score of 0 
in the category of minority oppression remedies, which is the category of reference in this Chapter. 
The low score of Greece in this category is awarded only on the basis of the oppression remedies 
made available to minority shareholders by the main body of company law, Law 2190/1920 which 
applies to companies incorporated under the form of a Societe Anonyme. This is the prevalent 
form under which most medium- or big-sized Greek companies are incorporated. This score is 
inaccurate, because it fails to consider the impact of provisions included in the Greek Civil Code, 
such as Articles 281, 914 and 919, which provide minority shareholders with an alternative legal 
basis against the abusive exercise of the rights of the majority shareholders.2 The low score of 
Greece in the category of minority oppression is not aligned with the wide use of the 
aforementioned legal mechanisms and, therefore, reflects a distorted assessment of the quality of 
corporate governance in Greece. 
 
 
A. MINORITY PROTECTION IN GREEK STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISES 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The case study of corporate governance of Greek SOEs is in alignment with the defence of 
corporate governance practices in SOEs as presented in a recent Survey conducted by OECD.3 
Despite the traditionally controversial role of the state as a corporate governance actor, state 
ownership does not always imply a high risk of minority expropriation. Firstly, in almost all 
countries ‘SOEs follow the regulatory provisions fixed in their commercial company code, Company 
                                                          
2
 See below part B of this Chapter. 
3
 Corporate Governance of State-Owned Enterprises: A Survey of OECD Countries, OECD, 2005 
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Law, listing requirements or in the corporate governance principles and codes’.4 Some OECD 
countries, however, have established strengthened decision-making powers for minority 
shareholders within General Shareholders Meetings or the Board of Directors in order to mitigate 
the shareholders conflicts of interests and promote minority protection. In this regard, the study 
by the OECD on the corporate governance of SOEs reveals a variety of SOE-specific mechanisms 
providing for minority protection.5 These declared rights may involve representation of minority 
shareholders on the board of directors, enhanced decision making power of minorities at the level 
of shareholders meetings and minority shareholders rights to receive information about the 
company’s situation.6 
In this context, the presentation of the special minority protection mechanisms within SOEs 
improves the understanding of the relationship of concentrated ownership, more specifically, state 
ownership, and corporate governance. The minority protection provisions within SOEs are often 
not found in the general legal framework concerning companies, such as the company law 
legislation, the commercial company code or even corporate governance codes. Instead they are 
rather established by the articles of association or in specific founding laws of an SOE. This means 
that the general minority protection mechanisms within a legal system do not always reflect the 
quality of investor protection. This latter example shows that the fragmentation of the legal 
framework of investor protection and company regulation exacerbates the inherent difficulty of 
producing accurate and all-inclusive investor protection indices comparing the various corporate 
governance systems around the world. 
This omission substantially distorts the score of countries where the state constitutes a key player 
of the economy, such as within emerging economies or within developed economies in which the 
privatisations of SOEs have not been extensive. Greece constitutes such a case where SOEs 
constitute an important part of the economy. As of the 27th September 2011, for example, SOEs 
                                                          
4
 OECD Principles of Corporate Governance, (2004); Privatising State-Owned Enterprise, An Overview of Policies and 
Practices in OECD Countries, OECD, 2003. 
5
 OECD Survey 2005, supra note3, “In most OECD countries, minority shareholders in SOEs have no more rights than they 
usually have in privately owned companies. Most countries do refer to the general legal framework as, for example, 
among others Finland, Germany, Sweden, the UK and Switzerland.” 
6
 OECD Survey 2005, supra note3; For Greece, also see Law 2190/1920, providing for these rights. 
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represented 28,3% of the total capitalisation of the companies listed on the Athens Stock 
Exchange.7 Therefore, the omission to include variables for assessing the corporate governance of 
SOEs in Greece highlights the lack of representativeness of the LLSV methodology and overall 
index-based assessment of investor protection. The distorted assessment of investor protection 
downplays the potential of several SOEs as investments. For example, neither state ownership nor 
the civil law system has hindered Greek state-owned companies from competing at a European 
level or becoming a success story. OPAP SA, the Greek Organisation of Football Prognostics, for 
example, is one of the leading gambling companies in Europe.8 Similarly, OTE SA, the Hellenic 
Telecommunications Organisation, has been a successful state-owned company with activities 
spreading across Greece and several countries of Eastern Europe.9 Finally, OLP SA, the Piraeus Port 
Authority has been one of the most profitable Greek SOEs, competing at a global level. 10 
 
II. A CASE STUDY OF MINORITY PROTECTION IN GREEK STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISES 
Building on the OECD Survey, the assessment of the minority protection tools to be found within 
SOEs takes the form of a case study of Greek SOEs. In addition to the mechanisms generally 
explored by the OECD study, the focus is shifted to alternative forms of minority protection, often 
offered through mechanisms such as employee representation, which have the potential to 
complement the imperfect state monitoring within SOEs. Since the aforementioned minority 
                                                          
7
 The participation of SOEs at the Athens Stock exchange is 21,4% if the Hellenic Telecom Organisation is excluded from 
the group of SOEs. See Athens Stock Exchange, Shares Market Data fro 27.09.2011, available at  
http://www.ase.gr/content/en/MarketData/Stocks/Prices/ (last accessed 27.09.2011). 
8
 See Paul Betts, Greece must sell family silver to bolster asset ragbag, Financial Times, June 16,2010, available at 
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/96e5d846-78dd-11df-a312-00144feabdc0.html#axzz1NqD7nnnM 
'OPAP is Europe's biggest betting company and a cash cow that earned €594m last year on sales of €5.4bn. It is poised to 
expand in online betting and the government would have no problem in finding enthusiastic takers for its stake.' 
9
 See http://www.ote.gr/portal/page/portal/InvestorRelation/BusinessOverview/WhatWeDo/Mobile_Telephony (last 
accessed 16.09.2011). 
10
 For example, under a 35-year concession agreement with COSCO, China’s state-controlled shipping and ports group, its 
strategic importance as a container terminal will be enhanced as the port of Piraeus is planned to develop into a hub for 
container trade between Asia, the Mediterranean and the Black Sea. See Kerin Hope, China in deal to build Piraeus 
terminal, Financial Times, 26.11.2008, available at  http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/66d4b7fc-bb5c-11dd-bc6c-
0000779fd18c.html#ixzz1NqN38nn9 (last accessed 16.09.2011) 
Also see Annual Report 2010 available at http://www.olp.gr/el/investor-information/annual-
reports/view.download/13/433 (last accessed 16.09.2011). 
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protection mechanisms have not been part of the indices designed to measure the quality of the 
legal framework, their importance and role in the systems where they are present has not been 
assessed so far. 
 
1. The methodology and sample of SOEs  
In Greece, state-owned corporations operate in many sectors of the economy of strategic 
importance, such as power and energy, transport, telecommunications and infrastructures. Their 
central role in the financial system is illustrated in the Athens Capital Market Index where the 
eleven state-owned listed companies represent 28,3% of the Index in terms of market 
capitalisation.11 In several industries such as energy (PPC SA, ELPE SA) and infrastructures (OLP SA, 
OLTH SA), SOEs represent the largest listed companies in the category. In the late 1990s, within the 
frames of the part privatisation and modernisation process12, Greek SOEs took the form of the 
Societe Anonyme and in 2001 a number13 of them were also listed on the Athens Stock Exchange or 
other stock exchanges around the world.14 Law 3429/2005 distinguishes SOEs into two broad 
categories. One category comprises companies of strategic importance or of national interest, 
which are controlled by an Inter-ministerial Committee of Public Corporations and Organisations.15 
The other category involves SOEs with a limited impact on national interest. The legal framework 
of minority protection in Greek SOEs is similar to the general provisions applicable to companies 
                                                          
11
 Supra note3. 
12
 State-owned private legal entities, under the article 2 par. 1 of L. 2414/1996 'Modernization of Public Companies and 
Organizations and other provisions' in addition to the C.L. 2190/1920 'about Societe Anonyme', have been converted into 
Societe Anonyme companies and their Articles of Association are published in the Official Legal Notice. 
13
 Public Power Corporation SA, Hellenic Petroleum SA, Hellenic Postbank SA, OPAP SA, Agricultural Bank of  Greece ATE 
SA, Hellenic Telecommunications Organisation SA,  EYPAD SA, Piraeus Port Authority SA, Thessaloniki Port Authority SA 
14
 The Hellenic Telecommunications Organisation, for example, is also listed on the London Stock Exchange and the New 
York Stock Exchange. Similarly PPC SA is listed both on the Athens Stock Exchange and the London Stock Exchange since 
2001. 
15
 See Article 15 of Law 3429/2005, stating that the Societes Anonymes of Article 1, par.5, which include PPC SA, are 
outside the narrow public sector. More specifically, PPC SA is not under the responsibility of the Inter-ministerial 
Committee of State-owned Companies and Organisations (Διυπουργική Επιτροπή Δημοσίων Επιχειρήσεων και 
Οργανισμών, Δ.Ε.Δ.Ε.Κ.Ο.), which oversees the public companies. Moreover, according to Article 16 of Law 3429/2005, 
the provisions of company law, namely Law 2190/1920, as updated by Law 3016/2002, Law 3604/2007 and Law 
3884/2010, apply to PPC SA. The company is also subject to the Athens Stock Exchanges Listing Rules which apply to all 
listed companies. Finally, the oversight of the state is restricted to the oversight exercised on the activity and operations 
of all Societes Anonymes incorporated in Greece. 
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incorporated as Societes Anonymes and is set out in Law 2190/1920 as amended by Law 
3604/2007.16 Additional, company-specific minority protection rights are included in the articles of 
association and the founding laws of several Greek state-owned companies. The sources of 
corporate governance best practices and principles for Greek SOEs are provided by relevant laws, 
namely by Law 2190/1920, 3016/2002, 3693/2008, 3873/2010 and 3884/2010 and the Corporate 
Governance Code of the Hellenic Federation of Enterprises – SEV. 17 
The methodology of this analysis involves the study of the annual reports, the articles of 
association and the founding laws of nine out of the eleven listed SOEs in Greece. The companies 
to be examined are the nine listed companies, in which the Greek state is a majority or a large 
shareholder18, as follows: Public Power Corporation SA (ΔΗΜΟΣΙΑ ΕΠΙΧΕΙΡΗΣΗ ΗΛΕΚΤΡΙΣΜΟΥ ΑΕ-
ΔΕΗ ΑΕ), Hellenic Petroleum SA (ΕΛΛΗΝΙΚΑ ΠΕΤΡΕΛΑΙΑ ΑΕ-ΕΛΠΕ ΑΕ), TT Hellenic Postbank SA 
(ΕΛΛΗΝΙΚΟ ΤΑΧΥΔΡΟΜΙΚΟ ΤΑΜΙΕΥΤΗΡΙΟ ΑΕ), Greek Organisation of Football Prognostics SA-OPAP 
SA (ΟΡΓΑΝΙΣΜΟΣ ΠΡΟΓΝΩΣΤΙΚΩΝ ΑΓΩΝΩΝ ΠΟΔΟΣΦΑΙΡΟΥ ΑΕ-ΟΠΑΠ ΑΕ), Agricultural Bank of 
Greece SA (ΑΓΡΟΤΙΚΗ ΤΡΑΠΕΖΑ ΤΗΣ ΕΛΛΑΔΟΣ ΑΕ-ΑΤΕ ΑΕ), Athens Water Supply and Sewage SA-
EYDAP SA (ΕΤΑΙΡΕΙΑ ΥΔΡΕΥΣΗΣ ΚΑΙ ΑΠΟΧΕΤΕΥΣΗΣ ΠΡΩΤΕΥΟΥΣΗΣ), Thessaloniki Water Supply and 
Sewage SA-EYATH SA (ΕΤΑΙΡΕΙΑ ΥΔΡΕΥΣΗΣ και ΑΠΟΧΕΤΕΥΣΗΣ ΘΕΣΣΑΛΟΝΙΚΗΣ ΑΕ-ΕΥΑΘ ΑΕ), Piraeus 
Port Authority SA (ΟΡΓΑΝΙΣΜΟΣ ΛΙΜΕΝΟΣ ΠΕΙΡΑΙΑ ΑΕ-ΟΛΠ ΑΕ) and Thessaloniki Port Authority SA 
(ΟΡΓΑΝΙΣΜΟΣ ΛΙΜΕΝΟΣ ΘΕΣΣΑΛΟΝΙΚΗΣ ΑΕ-ΟΛΘ ΑΕ). Hellenic Telecommunications Organisation 
SA (ΟΡΓΑΝΙΣΜΟΣ ΤΗΛΕΠΙΚΟΙΝΩΝΙΩΝ ΕΛΛΑΔΟΣ ΑΕ-ΟΤΕ ΑΕ) is not part of the analysis because the 
stake of the Greek state is 20% and the controlling shareholder is Deutsche Telecom.19 Similarly, 
                                                          
16
 Minority shareholders rights provisions and the main control, pre-emption and information rights of the shareholders 
of the company are set out in Articles 13, 27A, 31, 35A, 35B, 39, 40, 49A and 49B of Law 2190/1920, as amended by Law 
3604/2007and Law 3884/2010. 
17
 Corporate Governance Code of the Hellenic Federation of Enterprises – SEV, available at 
www.sev.org.gr/Uploads/pdf/KED_TELIKO_JAN2011.pdf (last accessed 01.05.2011). 
18
 For a report on the ownership structures and the largest shareholders of Greek listed companies as of 03/01/2011 jsee 
Archive/History of changes of ownership stakes for the year 2010 (Ιστορικό Αρχείων Μεταβολών Ποσοστών Έτους 2010) 
available at http://www.ase.gr/content/gr/ann.asp?annId=111058 (last accessed 01.05.2011). 
19
 Shareholder structure as of 06.05.2011: Hellenic Republic 20%, Deutsche Telecom 30%, International Institutional 
Shareholders 30,3%, Greek Institutional Shareholders 10,1%, Other shareholders 9,6%. Information on the shareholder 
structure is available at http://www.ote.gr/portal/page/portal/InvestorRelation/TheShare/ShareholderStructureThe 
shareholders' agreement between the Greek state and Deutsche Telecom is available at 
http://www.ote.gr/portal/page/portal/InvestorRelation/IRKit/IR_Files_basket/sharehldrsagrmnt.pdf (last accessed 
17.09.2011). 
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Hellenic Sugar Industry (ΕΛΛΗΝΙΚΗ ΒΙΟΜΗΧΑΝΙΑ ΖΑΧΑΡΗΣ ΑΕ) is excluded from the analysis as it is 
82,33% owned by Agricultural Bank of Greece and effectively forms part of the same group of 
companies. 20  
In the context of this case study, the various minority protection rights and mechanisms have been 
identified and classified into categories. All companies comply with the general minority protection 
rights as set out by Law 2190/1920. The first category, therefore, includes the special rights 
awarded to minority shareholders such as the right to be represented at the board level by 
appointing directors on the board. The second category involves the mechanisms of employee 
representation at the board level, which constitutes a complementary institution with the 
potential to effectively limit private benefit extraction, especially when used in conjunction with 
the right of minority shareholders to appoint members on the board. The third category includes 
special rights deriving from the company’s different classes of shares, the existence of 
shareholders agreements and the limitations or special arrangements which have an impact on the 
voting and control rights of shareholders in SOEs. 
 
2. The findings 
2.1 Special rights of minority representation at the board level 
Of the nine companies examined, five have been found to be subject to provisions regarding the 
representation of minority shareholders at the board level as a means of enhancing minority 
protection. More specifically, in the case of Hellenic Petroleum S.A.21, in addition to the general 
minority protection rights22, minority shareholders appoint 223 out of the 13 members of the board 
                                                          
20
 See Annual Report 2010 of Hellenic Sugar Industry, available at http://ebz.smartin.gr/272864399/2009%2010.pdf (last 
accessed 17.09.2011). 
21
 Ownership Structure as of 31.12.2010: Greek State: 35,48%, Paneuropean Oil and Industrial Holdings S.A: 41,25%, Free 
Float: 23,27% available at http://www.hellenic-petroleum.gr/online/generic.aspx?mid=210 (last accessed 17.09.2011). 
22
 Article 18 of the Articles of Association provides for minority rights which coincide with the rights provided by Law 
2190/1920. See more information regarding the corporate governance of ELPE SA available at http://www.hellenic-
petroleum.gr/online/generic.aspx?mid=153 (last accessed 17.09.2011) and regarding the board of directors of the 
company available at http://www.hellenic-petroleum.gr/online/generic.aspx?mid=162. (last accessed 17.09.2011). 
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of directors (hereafter BoD), elected by the Special Minority Shareholders’ Meeting according to 
Article 22 of the articles of association (hereafter AoA), comprising all the shareholders, except for 
the state and Paneuropean Oil and Industrial Holdings S.A..24 Similarly, according to Article 21 of 
the AoA, Paneuropean Oil and Industrial Holdings S.A., a large minority shareholder of the 
company, has the right to directly appoint two representatives at the board level. Moreover, 
within the Public Power Corporation S.A. 25, 2 out of the 11 members of the BoD are elected by the 
Special Minority Shareholders’ Meeting, which comprises all the shareholders, excluding the state 
as a majority shareholder.26 According to Article 20 of the Company’s AoA currently in force, 
whenever an election of a minority representative to the BoD is required, a Special Assembly is 
convened, which only the minority shareholders are entitled to attend, excluding the Greek state 
as a majority shareholder. Shareholders of EYDAP SA27 also enjoy distinct rights, according to which 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
23
 According to Article 21c of the AoA, one member is elected if the minority shareholders represent less than 15% of the 
paid-up share capital of the company and two members are elected if the minority shareholders represent more than 
15% of the paid-up share capital of the company. 
24
 Article 21c of the AoA. 
25
 Ownership Structure as of 31.12.2010: Greek State: 51.12%, General investing public & institutional investors: 40.08%, 
of whom Blackrock Inc holds 4,99%, Silchester International Investors Limited holds 6.37% of PPC's voting rights, PPC 
Personnel Insurance Organization (PIO): 3,81%. Information available at  
http://www.dei.gr/Documents2/ENG%20REPORT%202010%20FINAL.pdf (last accessed 27.09.2011). 
26
 Article 10 of the AoA. 
27
 Ownership Structure as of 31.12.2010: Greek State: 61,033%, Agricultural Bank of Greece: 9.999 %, Other 
Shareholders: 28.968% See 2010 Annual Report available at 
http://www.eydap.gr/media/FinancialData/isologismoi_en/ANNUAL_ECONOMIC_REPORT_2010.pdf (last accessed 
17.09.2011) 
The provisions concerning the appointment and replacement of the Members of the Board of Directors are set forth in 
Article 11 of the Company’s Articles of Incorporation, which state the following: 
'Article 11: Composition and Term of the Board of Directors 
1. The Company is managed by the Board of Directors; the number of members (Directors) is an odd number which may 
not exceed thirteen (13) or be less than seven (7). The General Meeting of shareholders has the authority to specify the 
number of Directors, as well as to increase or reduce such number, always in accordance with the provisions set forth in 
this paragraph. 
2. The Board of Directors consists of: (a) Two (2) representatives of the Company’s employees, elected (along with their 
alternate members) by direct universal suffrage, in accordance with article 17, par.1, of Law 2469/1997 (Government 
Gazette A’ 38), as in force from time to time. (b) Two (2) members representing minority shareholders, in accordance with 
the provisions of article 18, paragraphs 3 and 5 of Codified Law 2190/1920, elected as per the provisions of article 36 
hereof. (c) Representatives of the shareholders, elected by the General Meeting; shareholders who participated in the 
Special Meeting provided for in article 36 hereof (concerning the election of the remaining members of the Board) may not 
participate in the said General Meeting. 3. The Board of Directors consists of executive, non-executive and independent 
non-executive members, in accordance with the provisions of articles 3 and 4 of Law 3016/2002, as in force from time to 
time. 4. The two (2) members elected by the Company’s employees are appointed within two months of their election. 
Until their appointment, the Board of Directors convenes and resolves validly without these members. As of their 
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2 out of the 1328 members of the BoD are elected by the Special Minority Shareholders’ Meeting, 
which again comprises all the shareholders, excluding the state.29 Minority shareholders in EYATH 
SA30 have no special representation rights. For all other companies, namely OPAP SA31, Hellenic 
Postbank S.A. 32 and Agricultural Bank of Greece-ATE SA33 no special minority protection rights 
apply as well.34 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
appointment, the said members are included ipso jure in the Board of Directors. If the Board of Directors has already held 
its inaugural meeting, it convenes again to include the said members.  
4. (a) Non-election, non-appointment or neglect on behalf of minority shareholders, for any reason whatsoever, to 
nominate their representatives may not prevent the Board of Directors from holding its inaugural meeting, nor from 
validly convening and resolving; the number of the said representatives is not taken into account in the calculation of 
majority and quorum.  
5. In any event, the Board of Directors may convene and resolve validly without the representatives of employees, if the 
deadline specified in article 11, par. 4 hereof expires. In such case, their number is not taken into account in the calculation 
of majority and quorum.  
6. Members of the Board of Directors are elected to a five-year term; this term is extended ipso jure until the nomination 
or election of new members (Directors), in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 2 of this article. Such extension 
may not exceed one (1) year. 
7. Members of the Board of Directors may be freely recalled. Recall and replacement procedures are carried out by those 
who had the right to elect or nominate the members, in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 2 of this article. The 
General Meeting may replace any of the members (Directors) it had elected, as per paragraph 2, sub-paragraph (c) of this 
article, before their term expires. 
8. The Directors may be re-appointed, re-elected or recalled for an unlimited amount of times. 
9. The members of the Board of Directors may not be related with each other, by blood or marriage, up to the third 
degree, and may not be contractors or suppliers of the Company under any form, nor members of other Boards of 
Directors or employees of other companies that do business with the Company. Nevertheless, members of the Board of 
Directors or employees of an affiliate to the Company, as defined in article 42e of Codified Law 2190/1920, may be 
members of the Board of Directors of the Company.' 
28
 This is the maximum number of members. According to the 2010 Annual Report, the BoD comprises of 10 members.   
29
 Article 11 of the AoA. Moreover, according to article 36 of the Company’s Articles of Association in force, whenever an 
election of a minority representative to the Board of Directors is required a Special Assembly is convened, which only the 
minority shareholders and not the Greek State-majority shareholder- are entitled to attend. 
30
 Ownership Structure as of 31.03.2011: Greek State: 74,02%, Legal Entities: 15,40%, Natural Persons: 9,34%, Other 
Shareholders: 0,94%. Among the Legal Entities «SUEZ ENVIROMENT COMPANY» holds voting rights corresponding to 
5,19393664% through its wholly-owned subsidiaries as follows: a) SUEZ ENVIROMENT which holds 1.348.753 votes, 
namely voting rights corresponding to 3,715573% and b) CALIGE which holds 536.646 votes, namely voting rights 
corresponding to 1,4784%. See shareholders ownership structure available at 
http://www.eyath.gr/misc/METOXIKI_SINTHESI_31-03-2011.pdf. Also see Annual Report 2010 available at 
http://www.eyath.gr/misc/ETISIA_EKTHESI_2010.pdf (last accessed 01.05.2011). 
31
 There is no provision of the representation of minority shareholders at the board level. Minority shareholders 
participate in the General Shareholders Meeting to elect the members of the BoD. According to Article 35 of the Articles 
of Association, Minority Shareholders of the Company have the rights provided by the Codified Law 2190/1920 as in 
force. There is no employee representation. 
32
 The breakdown of the Hellenic Post Bank SA shareholder structure, as of March 3rd, 2011, was as follows: Greek State: 
34.043%, Hellenic Post: 10.0%, Own Shares: 1.207%, Free Float: 54.750% available at 
http://www.irwebpage.com/ttbank/english/shareholder_structure.php (last accessed May 1st, 2011). 
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2.2 Employee representation at the board level 
Another important disciplining corporate governance mechanism included in the AoA of several 
SOEs is employee representation. Five out of the nine companies examined include such a 
mechanism. More specifically, Article 21 of the AoA of Hellenic Petroleum S.A. gives the right to 
employees to appoint two members of the thirteen-member board.35 Similarly, the AoA of EYDAP 
SA36 provide that the BoD consists of two representatives of the company’s employees, as elected 
directly by the employees of the company. The maximum number of Board Members is nine. In 
the case of Public Power Corporation SA, two board members, representing the Company’s 
employees, are elected by the members of the most representative trade union of the company.37 
In the case of Piraeus Port Authority S.A. 38, in accordance with Article 7 of the AoA, two out of the 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
33
 Ownership Structure as of 30.04.2010: Greek State: Government holds: 77.3120%, Other Shareholders: 22,6880% 
available at http://www.ase.gr/content/gr/ann.asp?annId=111058. (last accessed May 1st, 2011). 
34
 There are no special provisions for the representation of minority shareholders at the board level. Minority 
Shareholders of the Company have the rights provided by the Codified Law 2190/1920 as in force. The rules provided for 
in both Bank’s Articles of Incorporation on the appointment and replacement of BoD members and the amendment to 
the Articles of Incorporation are not different from those provided for in Codified Law 2190/1920, as in effect. 
35
 According to Article 21 of the Articles of Association, the Board of Directors consists of:  
- Six or seven members are appointed by the Greek State. 
- Two members are appointed by shareholder Paneuropean Oil and Industrial Holdings S.A. 
- Two or one members are elected by the Special Minority Shareholders’ Meeting. 
- Two members are elected by the Company’s employees, as their representatives 
Its term of office is five years. (Art.21). 
36
 Article 11 of the AoA. 
37
 According to article 10 of the Company’s Articles of Association in force, the Company’s Board of Directors is composed 
of eleven (11) members, among which : 
-Six (6) members, including the Managing Director, are elected by the General Assembly of the majority shareholder (the 
Greek State) in which the minority shareholders are not entitled to participate. Thus, the procedure of election of the 
members of the Board of Directors takes is conducted through two General Shareholders’ Assemblies. Only the majority 
shareholder – the Greek State – participates in one, while the minority shareholders participate in the other. 
-Two (2) members representing the Company’s employees, are elected by the members of the Most Representative 
Trade Union of the Company. 
-Two (2) members are elected by a Special Assembly of the minority shareholders, in which the Greek State is not entitled 
to participate. 
-One (1) member is designated by the Economic and Social Committee and comes from agencies performing activities 
similar to those of the Company. 
38
 Ownership Structure as of 31.12.2010: Greek State: 74.14%, Other Shareholders: 25,86%, of whom Company 
Lansdowne Partners Limited Partnership, is entitled to exercise on a discretionary basis the voting rights attached to the 
1,289,796 shares in Piraeus Port Authority S.A (percentage of indirect voting rights: 5.159 %), held by the following funds: 
Lansdowne European Equity Fund Limited, Lansdowne European Long Only Fund Limited, Lansdowne European Long 
Only Fund LP, Lansdowne European Strategic Equity Fund LP. None of these funds holds more than 5% of the voting 
rights in Piraeus Port Authority S.A. 
See 2010 Annual Report, available at http://www.olp.gr/en/investor-information/annual-reports/viewdownload/71-
annual-reports/508-annual-report-2010 (last accessed 27.09.2011). 
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thirteen members of the board are appointed to represent the company’s employees39 and one 
member represents the Municipality of the company’s headquarters and is elected by the 
company’s General Assembly after being nominated by the Piraeus City Council. 40 Similarly, in the 
case of Thessaloniki Port Authority S.A.41, according to Article 9 of the AoA, two out of eleven 
members of the BoD are appointed by the employees and one member represents the 
Municipality of Thessaloniki, where the company is established. 42  
2.3 Special corporate governance rights 
The third category of special governance rights involves rights deriving from multiple classes of 
shares, the existence of shareholders agreements and other rights or arrangements affecting the 
exercise of control. The findings document that the state, rather than minority shareholders, 
carries a variety of such special rights. For example, in the case of Hellenic Postbank S.A. and 
Agricultural Bank of Greece-ATE SA43, the Greek state holds preference shares44 to which a variety 
of control and information rights45 are attached.  The aforementioned rights are only attached to 
                                                          
39
 These representatives are drawn from the two most representative trade unions, one being an administrative 
employee and the other a port worker. They must be company employees. (Article 7 of the AoA). 
40
 In accordance with article 7, par 1 of the company’s articles of association, the Board of Directors consists of thirteen 
members whose term in office is 5 years. Of the thirteen members, ten are elected by the General Shareholders Meeting, 
two members are appointed to represent Company employees and one member represents the Municipality of the 
Company’s headquarters and is elected by the Company’s General Assembly as nominated by the City Council. (Article 7 
of the AoA). 
41
 Ownership Structure as of 29.03.2010: Greek State: 74,27%. Other Investors: 25,73%. See 2009 Annual Report, 
available at http://www.thpa.gr/files/financial/aok31122009gr.pdf (last accessed 27.09.2011) 
On 31.3.2008 the Company had 2,384 shareholders of which Natural persons: 2.290 representing 13,34% of paid-up 
share capital, Jointly held stock: 18 representing 0,11% of paid-up share capital, Legal persons: 74 representing 86,55% of 
paid-up share capital, Joint owners: 2 representing 0,01% of paid-up share capital. (More information is available at the 
company's website, www.thpa.gr). 
42
 The role of the Board of Directors is set out in Article 12 of the company’s Articles of Association. It consists of eleven 
members whose term in office is 5 years. Of the eleven members, five are appointed by the Greek State, two are elected 
by the General Meeting of Shareholders, two members may be appointed to represent Company employees one member 
is nominated by the Economic & Social Committee (ESC) and is drawn from bodies related to company operations, and 
one member represents the Municipality of Thessaloniki. (Article 9 of the Articles of Association) The employee 
representatives are drawn from the two most representative trade unions, one being an administrative employee and 
the other a port worker. They must be company employees. (Article 7 of the AoA). 
43
 For Hellenic Postbank S.A. see Annual Report 2010, pages 18-19, available at 
http://www.irwebpage.com/ttbank/english/pdf/12M2010EN.pdf (last accessed 01.05.2011), For Agricultural Bank of 
Greece S.A. see http://www.atebank.gr/NR/rdonlyres/46BB070D-19CD-4D9A-813B-
F8B1742D01D1/0/ETISIAEKTHESI31122010.pdf (last accessed 01.05.2011). 
44
 Preference Shares have been issued according to Law 3723/2008 'For the enhancement of liquidity of the economy in 
response to the impact of the international financial crisis'.   
45
 Such rights include: 
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the shares held by the Greek state as a result of the injection of liquidity into Greek banks 
following the financial crisis of 2008. Such practice applies to all banks receiving liquidity assistance 
by the Greek state, not only state-owned financial institutions. Similarly, the aforementioned 
liquidity injection forms part of the measures adopted at the EU level and apply to all Member 
States. The aforementioned rights of the Greek state, therefore, need to be considered in the 
context of the 2008 financial crisis. Although they are problematic because they grant additional 
control and governance rights to the state, they are only temporary in duration and their nature is 
that of emergency financial assistance in order to safeguard the survival of banks following the 
crisis. Consequently, the aforementioned special governance rights of the state are not an 
indicative example of the mechanisms used by the state to expropriate minority shareholders.  
Another important point emerging from the examination of the special corporate governance 
arrangements within Greek SOEs relates to the minimum levels of the participation of the state in 
the SOEs. This category of restrictions affects the transferability of shares, the issuance of new 
shares and other related issues with an impact on control. More specifically, in Public Power 
Corporation (PPC SA), the state’s share capital cannot be less than 51%, according to the provisions 
in Article 43 paragraph 3 of Law 2773/1999. Moreover, under Presidential Decree 333/2000, the 
voting rights of non-state shareholders in PPC are capped to 5%. This voting cap applies to all 
corporate resolutions. The decree also confirms that 51% of the company is to remain in the hands 
of the state. Similarly, in the case of EYDAP SA, Article 1 paragraph 10 of Law 2744/1999 provides 
that the Greek state may only offer to investors and the public up to 49% of the company’s share 
capital, as at the time of the offer. Moreover, the purchase of shares providing voting rights equal 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
-the right to vote at the General Privileged Shareholders Meeting in the specific occasions defined in Law 2190/1920;  
-the right to participate in the BoD meetings of the Bank via a representative, appointed as an extra member of the BoD;  
-the right of the Greek State’s representative, appointed as an extra member of the BoD, to veto any decision related to 
dividend distribution and any payment policies to the Chairman, the Chief Executive, the remaining members of the BoD 
and the General Directors and their deputies, under the decision of the Greek Minister of Economics and Finance or if the 
Greek State’s representative judges that the BoD decision could set in danger the depositors interests or substantially 
affect the credibility and the smooth functioning of the Bank;  
-the right of appearance of the appointed by the Greek State, extra member of the BoD, in the General Meeting of the 
Ordinary Shareholders and the right to veto on the issues stated above;  
-the right of the representative of the Greek State of free access to the account books and data of the Bank for the 
purposes of Law 3723/2008. 
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to 20% or more of the total share capital of the company shall require prior approval from an Inter-
ministerial Privatisation Committee.46  
The provisions which apply to PPC SA are problematic from a corporate governance perspective 
because they promote the disproportionality between ownership and control by preventing large 
shareholders with a participation of over 5% to exercise the voting rights proportionate to their 
stake in the company. The structural implication of this provision is the prevention of opposing 
blocks to emerge, therefore resulting in the entrenchment of the Greek state as a controlling 
shareholder. In this respect, according to the EU Commission, the 5% voting cap constitutes a 
special right which acts as a barrier to investors from other Member States, as direct investors are 
hindered from effectively participating in the management and control of the PPC SA. Additionally, 
portfolio investors, who invest for the purpose of gaining financial returns, are also deprived of the 
full minority protection rights provided by general company law.  
Despite Greek contentions that the cap is justified on the grounds of public interest and security, 
on May 8, 2010, the EU Commission acted to ensure compliance with the EU Treaty rules on free 
movement of capital, more specifically Article 56 of the EU Treaty, by referring Greece to the 
European Court of Justice over the 5% voting cap in PPC SA, according to Article 258 of the Treaty 
on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU).47 In response to the referral, Law 3851/2010 
abolished the 5% voting cap, making a valuable step towards enhancing corporate governance to 
the benefit of minority shareholders.48 The abolishment of voting restrictions is aimed to attract 
                                                          
46
 Article 11 of Law 3631/2008 states that: 
'1. The purchase of shares providing voting rights in private limited companies of national strategic importance that hold 
or held a monopoly in their field, and particularly companies that own, operate or manage national infrastructure 
networks, by a party other than the Greek State, or by companies linked to that party within the meaning of Article 42(e) 
of Law 2190/1920, or by parties acting in a coordinated manner, equal to 20% or more of the total share capital of the 
companies concerned shall require prior approval from the Inter-ministerial Committee on Privatisation established by 
Law 3049/2002 and in accordance with the procedure laid down therein.' 
47
 Also see Press Release by the Commission 05.05.2010, available at 
http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/10/503&format=HTML&aged=0&language=EN&guiLangua
ge=en. (last accessed 27.09.2011). 
48
 Article 8 par.2 and par.3 of the Presidential Decree 333/2000 providing for the 5% voting cap was abolished by Article 
12 par 18 of Law 3851/2010. Law 3851/2010 was published on 4.6.2010 at the Greek National Gazette, Paper No 85 
available at http://www.cres.gr/kape/neos%20nomos%20RES_N3851_2010.pdf (last accessed 01.05.2011). 
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new investment and facilitate the creation of large blocks, which are likely to contest and challenge 
the role of the state as a controlling shareholder. 
Additionally, an important limitation is found in the case of Piraeus Port Authority SA, where 
Article 4 paragraph 2 of the company’s AoA provide that the minimum participation of the Greek 
state to the equity capital cannot be less than 51%, while any purchase of shares providing voting 
rights equal to 20% or more of the total share capital of the company is subject to the prior 
approval from an Inter-ministerial Committee.49 OPAP SA constitutes another example where the 
transfer of shares of the Company is subject to the condition that the minimum ownership stake 
held by the Greek public sector cannot fall below the 34% of the company’s share capital. 50 The 
same rules apply to Thessaloniki Port Authority SA, in which the Greek state has been the sole 
initial shareholder and has the right to retain a majority holding in the company statutorily 
enshrined in Articles 6(2) and 7 of the company’s AoA.51 In addition to the limits imposed on the 
transfer of ThPA SA shares beyond the 51% level,52 any purchase of shares providing voting rights 
equal to 20% or more of the total share capital of the company is subject to the prior approval 
from an Inter-ministerial Committee.53 Therefore, five out of the nine companies examined contain 
provisions requiring a minimum stake of state ownership. Similarly, in three out of the nine 
companies, a special approval by the Inter-ministerial Committee is required, before voting rights 
above 20% are transferred to an investor. The restrictive impact of these arrangements on the free 
transferability of shares is justified by the strategic importance of the enterprises concerned. From 
a corporate governance perspective, this type of restrictions is less problematic than voting caps, 
because no disproportionality between voting and cash flow rights emerges.   
 
                                                          
49
 Ibid. Article 11 of Law 3631/2008 The purchase of shares providing voting rights in equal to 20% or more of the total 
share capital of the company, shall also require prior approval from an Inter-ministerial Privatisation Committee. 
50
 Article 5 par 3 of the Articles of Association and par.1 of article 14 of Law 3336/2005. 
51
 Article 6(2) and Article 7 of the Company’s Articles of Association provide that the minimum holding of the Greek State 
in the Company’s share capital may not drop below 51% even after listing of the company of the Athens Exchange. 
52
 Law 2688/1999, which specifically governs the organisation and operation of ThPA S.A., includes Article 11(3) which 
states that the Ministers of Economy, Competitiveness and Marine may issue a joint decision setting limits on the transfer 
of ThPA shares for each investor for any percentage of the capital other than the 51% which belongs to the Greek State. 
53
 Ibid. Article 11 of Law 3631/2008. 
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III. CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN GREEK SOEs: THE ENHANCED THE ROLE OF THE BOARD 
OF DIRECTORS 
The protection of the controlling stake of the Greek state within SOEs through the variety of the 
aforementioned special rights reflects the nature of most SOEs as enterprises of public interest or 
a state monopoly. In this context, effective minority protection mechanisms are vital in order to 
counterbalance the dominant role of the state and attract investment. 54 The study of the minority 
protection mechanisms in Greek SOEs reveals important rights of minority and employee 
representation on the BoD. Both categories of rights, therefore, shift focus on the board of 
directors as a vital corporate governance mechanism within concentrated ownership structures. 
For instance, the provision of board representation rights to minorities empowers minority 
shareholders and enables them to monitor the acts, decisions or omissions of the members of an 
otherwise state-controlled board. This practice strengthens the independence of the board, which 
is developed into the most important corporate governance mechanism for balancing the interests 
of minority and majority shareholders.   
Moreover, in five out of the nine companies examined, there is representation of employees in the 
BoD. The role of employee representation in corporate governance has been a controversial one. 
According to one line of argument, employee representation has a negative impact on firm 
performance because employee representatives on the board can alter a firm’s objective function 
away from maximizing shareholder value and towards maximizing payroll. 55 Codetermination is 
also considered to limit the managerial power of control over the assets of the company, which 
constitutes an intervention in the management of the company and may risk causing adverse 
                                                          
54
 It is reminded that an important finding deriving from the Greek case study is that, in addition to the generally 
applicable rights, minority shareholders within SOEs (3 out of 10 of the cases) have the right to directly elect their 
representatives on the BoD through a separate minority shareholders meeting, to which the majority shareholder, 
namely the state, cannot be present. 
55
Gorton G. and Schmid F., (2004), Capital, Labor, and the Firm: A Study of German Codetermination. Journal of the 
European Economic Association, 2:863. Gorton and Schmid (2004) analyze the effects of codetermination on the 250 
largest German stock corporations. That research compares firms with one-third employee representation to firms with 
one-half representation and shows that the equity of firms with equal representation trades at a substantial relative 
discount on average.  
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efficiency effects.56 Viewed from this perspective, employee representation constitutes another 
source of agency costs.  
However, according to the proponents of employee representation, its benefits exceed its costs for 
a variety of reasons. For example, ‘the representatives of employees facilitate the flow of important 
production-specific information to the superior levels of the management, therefore contributing to 
the efficiency of their decisions’. 57 Similarly, employee representatives at the board level have the 
potential to protect the company from the short-termism of shareholders and managers. 58 
Moreover, because of their knowledge of the business they are better positioned to monitor 
management efficiently59, thus, limiting managerial misbehaviour and, in overall, minimising the 
                                                          
56
 Jensen M.C. and Meckling W.H., (1979), Rights and productions functions: an application to labor-managed firms and 
codetermination. Journal of Business 52(10):469. In this regard, Jensen and Meckling (1979) point out that 'If co-
determination is beneficial to both stockholders and labor, why do we need laws which force firms to engage in it? Surely, 
they would do so voluntarily. The fact that stockholders must be forced by laws to accept co-determination is the best 
evidence we have that they are adversely affected by it.' 
57
 Fauver L. and Fuerst M.E., (2004), Does Good Corporate Governance Include Employee Representation? Evidence from 
German Corporate Boards. EFA 2004 Maastricht Meetings Paper No. 1171. Available at SSRN: 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=534422. They show that employee representatives on a firm’s board, through their knowledge 
of operational detail, provide a channel for the flow of valuable information. This is particularly relevant for firms in 
industries that demand intense coordination or involve specially skilled and knowledgeable workers should benefit most 
from employee representation. For these industries the higher degree of information flow that board representation 
provides should be more valuable.  
Freeman R.B. and Lazear E., (1995), An Economic Analysis of Works Councils in Joel Rogers and Wolfgang Streeck, eds., 
Works Councils: Consultation, Representation, and Cooperation in Industrial Relations. Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, p.27–52. Freeman and Lazear (1995) also argue that codetermination provides a mechanism for the credible 
exchange of information between the board and the workers. The flow of credible information to the board enhances the 
efficiency of their decisions. 
58
 This effect is particularly important in countries with deep and liquid capital markets, where corporations are more 
vulnerable to pressures exerted by short-term shareholders, who have the power to influence the stock price of the 
company. Recent reports document the negative effects of shareholders' short-termism on corporate valuations. See 
Andrew Haldane and Richard Davies, The short long, May 2011, Bank of England, available at 
http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/news/2011/043.htm (last accessed 27.09.2011); Speech by Andrew 
Haldane, 11,05.2011 available at http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/speeches/2011/speech495.pdf (last 
accessed 27.09.2011) 
Commentators have suggested that capital markets are increasingly focused on the short-term and that this may be 
having a detrimental effect on their efficiency, and therefore on the return on investment. On the issue see also 
Consultation Paper Department for Business Innovation and Skills, October 2010, available at 
http://www.bis.gov.uk/assets/biscore/business-law/docs/l/10-1225-long-term-focus-corporate-britain (last accessed 
27.09.2011); BIS, Summary of Responses, A long-term focus for corporate Britain, March 2011 available at 
http://www.bis.gov.uk/assets/biscore/business-law/docs/s/11-797-summary-responses-long-term-focus-corporate-
britain.pdf (last accessed 27.09.2011). 
59
 Fauver&Fuerst, (2004), supra note57, for example, argue that labour representation introduces a highly informed 
monitor to the board. They claim that the flow of information from the board to the employees also contributes to the 
better monitoring of the management, while the incentives of the large shareholders to choose one investment over the 
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agency costs to the benefit of minority shareholders and the various stakeholder constituencies of 
the company. Although employee representation appears to have the potential to be both a 
beneficial and a detrimental element of corporate governance, scholars argue that the prudent use 
of this mechanism is bound to increase value and efficiency.60 In light of the important benefits 
involved, a string of recent studies advocates for the application of the model of codetermination 
as a means of limiting agency costs and conflicts of interests in the corporation. 61  
In the context of this study, employee representation is a functional equivalent to company law 
mechanisms of minority protection, which has the potential to mitigate the conflicts of interests 
between majority and minority shareholders. Under the assumption that employee 
representatives indirectly protect the interests of minority shareholders, while seeking to govern 
the firm in a manner that protects their own interests, the presence of employee representation 
arrangements in five out of nine Greek SOEs suggests that such arrangements act as an additional 
mechanism of minority protection. In this light, the independence of the BoD as an organ of the 
company enhanced through employee representation constitutes a manifestation of the 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
other is subject to the control by employees who are better positioned to assess the long-term impact of the investment 
on the company. Viewed from this perspective employee representation also mitigates the conflicts of interests arising at 
the level of the relationship of minority and majority shareholders. 
60
 Fauver&Fuerst (2004) supra note57 claim that, if excessively used, employee representation may become a new source 
of agency costs as employees seek their own perks, exert their influence to maximize payroll rather than increase value. 
They show that prudent levels of employee representation on corporate boards can increase firm efficiency and market 
value. At first sight, their results appear to contrast with those of Gorton&Schmid (2004) supra note55 who show 
increasing labour representation (from one-third to one-half of total board seats) decreases firm value. However, 
Fauver&Fuerst (2004) supra note57 interpret their results to imply that there is an inverted U-shaped relationship 
between firm value and employee representation on corporate boards: for low levels of employee representation, firm 
value rises as representation increases. For sufficiently high levels of employee representation, firm value falls as 
representation increases. In this light, the negative impact of employee representation documented by the study of 
Gorton&Schmid (2004) supra note52 can be explained on the basis that 50% employee representation is excessive and 
suboptimal when compared to 1/3 employee representation. 
61
 Muthusamy S.K., Bobinski P.A. and Jawahar D., (2009), Toward a Strategic Role for Employees in Corporate 
Governance. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1330140; Windbichler C., (2005), Cheers and Boos for 
Employee Involvement: Co-Determination as Corporate Governance Conundrum, European Business Organization Law 
Review (EBOR), Vol.6, 2005. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=963287; Megginson W.L., Ginglinger E. and 
Waxin T., (2009), Employee Ownership, Board Representation, and Corporate Financial Policies, 21st Australasian Finance 
and Banking Conference 2008 Paper. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1259609; Jackson G., (2005), Employee 
Representation in the Board Compared: A Fuzzy Sets Analysis of Corporate Governance, Unionism, and Political 
Institutions. Industrielle Beziehungen, 12(3):1. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=800525. 
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importance of complementarities in comparative corporate law.62 In this respect, it is argued that 
'(c)orporate law and employment law may therefore sometimes be substitutes; employees may benefit from 
better corporate law intended to protect minority shareholder, and vice versa.' Aligning the interests of 
minority shareholders and employees, therefore, facilitates the cooperation of the two different 
constituencies in order to monitor the controller and limit the scope for the extraction of private 
benefits or the inefficiencies of state ownership. 
The aforementioned propositions also explain the higher efficiency levels of German and 
Scandinavian legal systems in limiting private benefit extraction among civil law systems 
characterised by concentrated ownership models.63 Provided that employee representation is 
particularly common in German and Scandinavian legal systems, it could be interpreted as one of 
the factors contributing to their effectiveness to tackle with private benefit extraction. 
Consequently, employee representation at the level of the board constitutes a complementary 
institution, which enhances corporate governance and could potentially form part of the 
institutions promoting economic growth within a concentrated ownership model. As scholars 
argue, 'laws aiming at the protection of stakeholders (such as codetermination or restrictive 
employment law) are therefore normatively more desirable in the presence of stronger shareholder 
influence, particularly under concentrated ownership'. 64  In this context, the laws providing for 
employee representation further support the ‘legal effectiveness’ argument as they illustrate how 
legal rules and arrangements shape the impact of concentrated ownership structures on corporate 
governance. 
 
                                                          
62
 See Ecchia G., Gelter M. and Pasotti P., (2009), Corporate Governance, Corporate and Employment Law, and the Costs 
of Expropriation. Harvard Olin Fellows' Discussion Paper No. 29, 5/2009; ECGI - Law Working Paper No. 128/2009; 
Fordham Law Legal Studies Research Paper No. 1430623. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1430623. 
63
 La Porta R., Lopez-de-Silanes F., Shleifer A., and Vishny R.W., (1998), Law and Finance. Journal of Political Economy 
107:1113; La Porta R., Lopez-de-Silanes F., Shleifer A., and Vishny R.W., (2000b), Investor Protection and Corporate 
Governance, Journal of Financial Economics 58:3; La Porta R., Lopez-de-Silanes F., Shleifer A., and Vishny R.W., (2002), 
Investor Protection and Corporate Valuation, Journal of Finance 57:1147. 
64
 Gelter M., (2008), The Dark Side of Shareholder Influence: Toward a Hold-up Theory of Stakeholders in Comparative 
Corporate Governance. ECGI - Law Working Paper No. 096/2008; CLEA 2008 Meetings Paper; Harvard Olin Fellows' 
Discussion Paper No. 17/2008. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1106008, arguing that employment 
protection in Continental Europe counterbalances the increased influence of shareholders, therefore creating a local 
optimum in terms of the efficiency of concentrated ownership systems. 
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IV. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
The foregoing analysis highlights the important mechanisms for the protection of minority 
shareholders in Greek SOEs, which have not been incorporated in the corporate governance 
indices developed so far. Although the extensive review of minority and employee representation 
as a corporate governance mechanism is beyond the scope of this thesis, the foregoing analysis 
illustrates its potential to act as a factor regulating private benefits extraction in closely-held 
companies due to the enhanced role of the board. Board independence from the controlling 
shareholder enables minority and employee representatives to exercise an important role 
monitoring the actions of the board. The better information of employee representatives also 
implies that they are better positioned to challenge management decisions and they have the 
potential to add value to the corporate decision-making process. Although the collusion of 
employee representatives with the controlling shareholder remains probable, minority and 
employee representation at the board level at least increases the probability that they will 
collaborate to contest the decisions made by the controlling shareholders.  
When viewed from this perspective, strengthening the board through codetermination and 
minority representation clearly complements the existing techniques for minority protection and 
constitutes a well-adapted response to the special characteristics of state ownership. In this 
respect, the findings of the Greek case study manifest and reinforce the argument that legal 
effectiveness rather than legal origin is the determinant of good corporate governance. Employee 
representation, in particular, also illustrates the importance of functional equivalents to company 
law in the context of the comparative corporate governance analysis. Although the extensive use 
and effectiveness of the aforementioned legal mechanisms could substantially improve the quality 
of investor protection within SOEs, the combined effect of minority and employee board 
representation has only limitedly been considered by LLSV65 and the subsequent studies which 
measure the quality of investor protection in countries of concentrated ownership. 
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 LaPorta et al. (1998,2000b)  supra note63 
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When assessing the effectiveness of the aforementioned corporate governance mechanisms, the 
analysis takes into account the definition of legal effectiveness used in this thesis, according to 
which legal effectiveness refers to the extent to which an issue can be dealt with by the law and if 
so, how well it is dealt with in terms of consistency and predictability, on the one side, and the 
delivery of efficient and just outcomes, on the other. In this Chapter, legal effectiveness is assessed 
according to the type of concentrated ownership involved. In the case of state ownership, for 
example, legal effectiveness refers to the capacity of the rules and complementary institutions to 
enhance the incentives of the state to monitor effectively the managers, while mitigating the risk 
of corruption and the risk that the interests of the SOEs are secondary and subservient to political 
considerations. This part, in fact, demonstrates that the legal framework which applies to Greek 
SOEs reflects the best practices and high standards of corporate governance and employs a variety 
of effective legal mechanisms to limit minority expropriation. The analysis corroborates the main 
proposition of this thesis that effective regulation is determined by and must be adapted to the 
type of concentrated ownership. 
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B. MINORITY PROTECTION IN GREEK FAMILY-OWNED COMPANIES 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
This part adds to the discussion on minority protection within concentrated ownership systems by 
as it is focused on the minority protection mechanisms which apply in the context of family-owned 
corporations in Greece. The analysis is built around specific situations of minority expropriation 
and shows how the rules and principles available within the Greek legal framework, which 
comprises both Law 2190/1920 and the Civil Code, protect minority shareholders in the selected 
contexts. The list of the situations66 presented is certainly not exhaustive. However, they constitute 
a representative sample of the most typical cases of expropriation arising within closely-held 
companies and outline how a variety of available mechanisms within the Greek legal system 
protect investors in the context of family-owned corporations.  
The substantive analysis of Greek company law points out that a variety of rules and principles of 
the Greek Civil Code provide minority shareholders with alternative legal bases against minority 
oppression beyond Law 2190/1920, which is the most obvious source. To this effect, Articles 281, 
914 and 919 of the Greek Civil Code, which prohibit the abusive exercise of one’s rights and 
establish the right to sue for damages in tort respectively, are the most important. More 
specifically, minority shareholders can resort to the principle set out in Article 281 GCC as the legal 
basis in order to invalidate or repeal the actions and decisions of the board of directors or the 
resolutions passed at a shareholders meeting by the majority to the extent that such resolutions 
are abusive. Article 281 GCC even applies to resolutions passed in compliance with the provisions 
of the articles of association in terms of the process and the formalities involved, but which are 
detrimental to the minority shareholders and cannot be justified by the ‘company’s interest’. 
                                                          
66
 Such cases include the variation of special rights of minority shareholders by the general meeting, the increase in the 
capital of the company in order to dilute the stakes of minority shareholders, the excessive remuneration of majority 
shareholders sitting on the board and the extraction of direct private benefits such as the expropriation of an important 
corporate asset. 
The complex relationship of concentrated ownership structures and corporate governance 
Chapter III: Restating the 'law matters' thesis: Minority protection beyond the comparative law 
indices 
 
 
 
113 
 
Although the provisions fall within the scope of the LLSV67 variables, most notably the minority 
oppression variable, their important role is disregarded. As a result, in their famous anti-director 
rights index, LLSV mistakenly rate Greece with 0 in the category of minority oppression remedies. 
This finding reinforces the criticisms of the reliability of the LLSV anti-director index.  
The analysis also supports the criticisms of the LLSV study regarding the relevance of the rights 
forming their variables. Provided that the concentrated ownership structures which are prevalent 
within civil law systems necessitate enhanced investor protection to apply to the interactions 
between minority and majority shareholders, the most important variable included in the LLSV 
index is the one referring to minority oppression remedies. With the exception of the oppression 
remedies variable, the rights which compile the anti-director index of LLSV are of little relevance in 
the context of a situation where members of the board are controlled by or in fact are themselves 
also the controlling shareholder. For instance, the rights used by LLSV do not address some of the 
most common issues regarding minority expropriation, such as a) the role of the law where there 
is an abusive increase of capital which dilutes the stake of minorities in the company, b) the role of 
company law in the case of the variation of special minority rights through an amendment of the 
articles of association by the majority, and c) the availability of a personal claim for minority 
shareholders to be compensated for the loss they suffered as a result of minority expropriation.  
In this respect, the analysis of the Greek law illustrates that Civil Code rules and principles have the 
effect of protecting minority shareholders, thus acting as functional equivalents to company law. In 
terms of the legal effectiveness of the mechanisms concerned, it is shown that the principle-based 
approach embedded in civil law systems such as the Greek one is particularly well-suited to 
address the conflicts of interest inherent within concentrated ownership structures because it 
allows for several, probably atypical manifestations of minority expropriation to be captured by 
the case law provided that the rules and principles of the law are interpreted accordingly. Aligned 
with the 'legal effectiveness' argument, this is a concrete example of the effective responses to the 
corporate governance problems of concentrated ownership to be found within a civil law system. 
                                                          
67
 On the main hypotheses of LaPorta et al (LLSV) and criticisms of LLSV see Chapter I. 
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II. THE GENERAL RULES AND PRINCIPLES OF THE GREEK CIVIL CODE AS FUNCTIONAL 
EQUIVALENTS OF COMPANY LAW 
 
1. The approach and methodology of the analysis 
The restated ‘law matters’ hypothesis is premised on the actual effectiveness rather that the ‘legal 
origin’ of the legal system under assessment. Of course, measuring such effectiveness is not a 
straightforward exercise. In light of the scepticism expressed with regard to the suitability of the 
index-based approach to comparative corporate law and governance, this thesis employs a 
different methodology of assessment.68 More specifically, the analysis involves the identification, 
interpretation and application of traditional black letter rules and principles which form part of the 
minority protection framework. It is based on two pillars. Firstly, it identifies the relevant rules and 
seeks to highlight important aspects of the legal framework that the LLSV indexing methodology 
misses. Secondly, instead of only outlining the rules, the analysis is structured around certain 
typical situations of minority expropriation and assesses how effectively the rules and principles 
available within the Greek law both, Law 2190/1920 and the Civil Code, protect minority 
shareholders in the selected contexts.  
Examining how the Greek legal system deals with a set of situations is the preferred approach 
because it clearly illustrates how minority protection mechanisms operate and establishes a 
reliable basis for their true comparability. Additionally, it has the important benefit of allowing for 
functional equivalents to be identified. As a result, the focus is placed on whether expropriation is 
effectively limited, rather than the means through which such limitations take effect. The types of 
expropriation were selected on the basis of their probability to actually occur. Given that family 
ownership is prevalent in Greece, there is higher probability that a situation or problem involving 
family owners might occur. Furthermore, within a jurisdiction characterised by concentrated 
ownership structures such as Greece, the main corporate governance problems will involve the 
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 For criticisms against the reliability of indices see Chapter I. 
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conflicts of interests between minority and majority shareholders. The emphasis is, therefore, 
placed on the identification of the rules, principles and institutions that have been developed by 
the legal system as a response to the conflicts between minority and majority shareholder and the 
effectiveness of the legal framework in meeting its objective. Taking into account the correlation 
between ownership structures and the corporate governance problems likely to arise, leads to a 
more robust analysis. 
 
2. Minority shareholders protection in Greece in light of Law 2190/1920 
Within Greek Company Law and in particular Law 2190/1920 which applies to companies 
incorporated under the Societe Anonyme form, there are no general, overarching legal principles 
which address cases of minority expropriation. This fact is viewed by scholars as being a substantial 
omission of Law 2190/1920 because it provides minority shareholders with limited means of 
protection against the majority besides the minority rights specifically provided by the provisions 
of the Law.69 This omission becomes particularly important in light of the narrow interpretation of 
minority rights due to their special nature. This special nature derives from the fact that they are 
the exception to the majority principle70 underlying Law 2190/1920, according to which corporate 
actions and decisions taken by the majority must be respected and any rights of minority 
shareholders are strictly provided by the Law only.71 The lack of a general principle providing for 
the protection of minorities has even been interpreted as amounting to a breach of the Greek 
                                                          
69
 For an extensive criticism on the absence of a general principle of investor protection in Law 2190/1920 see Spyridonos 
A., (2001), The rights of minority shareholders in Societes Anonymes (Τα δικαιώματα της μειοψηφίας στο δικαιο της ΑΕ), 
(2001), Nomiki Vivliothiki Publishers, p.563 
70
 The majority principle is not absolute and there are several exceptions to it. For example, for certain resolutions and 
corporate decisions, the Law imposes supermajority requirements (See Law 2190/1920 Articles 3 par.5, 22α par.4, 23α 
par.2, 24 par.226.) Alternatively, the element of corporate interest is taken into account and informs the application of 
Article 281 of the Greek Civil Code. The effect of the latter alternative is that majority shareholders cannot pass 
resolutions which harm the interests of the company and its minority shareholders. 
71
 On the rights of minority shareholders see for example Sinanioti-Mauroudi Ar., (2010), Emporikes Etairies (Εμπορικές 
Εταιρείες), Athens, Antonis Sakkoulas Publishers, p.407-420; The majority principle in the Societe Anonyme, Myth and 
Reality (Η αρχή της πλειοψηφίας στην ανώνυμη εταιρία, Μύθος και πραγματικότητα). 4th Panhellenic Conference on 
Commercial Law, Nayplion, November 1994, Vol.1, Publications of the Macedonian Society of Commercial Law, Antonis 
Sakkoulas Publishers; Perakis E., (2002), The Law of the Societe Anonyme-Auditors and Minority Rights (Το δίκαιο της 
Ανώνυμης Εταιρίας – Ελεγκτές και δικαιώματα μειοψηφίας), 2nd Edition, Nomiki Vivliothiki. 
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Constitution, because it effectively deprives minority shareholders of access to the judicial system 
when seeking to protect their legal rights. This constitutes an important deficiency in the 
protection offered by the judiciary and legal system and is therefore considered to be 
unconstitutional.72  
As an example to illustrate the latter point, scholars refer to the lack of an available remedy for the 
minority shareholders who suffer loss as a result of the resolutions, actions or omissions of the 
Board of Directors (hereafter BoD), the acts of which are often determined by the controlling 
shareholder.73 In this case, only the company could potentially suffer a direct loss, in which case 
the general meeting of the shareholders has the right to initiate a claim against the BoD on behalf 
of the company by a simple majority vote according to Article 22b of Law 2190/1920.74 Given the 
presence of a controlling shareholder, the effectiveness of this provision as a minority protection 
mechanism is evidently very limited. Alternatively, the shareholders representing 1/3 of the capital 
of the company may request from the BoD to bring the claim against its members.75  Upon such a 
request, the BoD is under the obligation to bring the claim within six months.76 The shareholders 
representing 1/3 of the capital also have the right to request the court to appoint representatives 
who will bring the claim against the members of the BoD who have caused damage to the 
company.77 If none of the aforementioned rights is exercised within the period of six months 
provided, then any shareholder, regardless of their stake in the company, has the right to request 
the court to appoint representatives who will then bring the claim against the members of the BoD 
who have caused damage to the company.78    
The aforementioned description indicates the procedural complexities attached to the exercise of 
the right of the minority shareholders to bring a claim against the BoD for mismanagement. The 
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 Spyridonos (2001) supra note69, p.565 
73
 Spyridonos (2001) supra note69, p.563 
74
 Rokas N., (1996), Commercial Companies (Εμπορικές Εταιρίες), Athens, Antonis Sakkoulas Publishers, p.224; 
Papadimitriou G., (1980), The liability of the members of the Board of the Societe Anonyme to the company and third 
parties (Η ευθύνη των μελών του διοικητικού συμβουλίου ΑΕ έναντι αυτής και τρίτων), Nomiko Vima, 1980, 962. 
75
 See Article 22b of Law 2190/1920 and Rokas (1996) supra note74, p.225-226 
76
 See par.2 of Article 22b of Law 2190/1920. 
77
 See par.3 of Article 22b of Law 2190/1920. 
78
 See Rokas (1996) supra note74, page 226. This interpretation of the applicable provisions is the equivalent to the 
derivative claim established under Section 260 of CA2006 in the UK. 
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position of Law 2190/1920, therefore, is that the minority shareholders have no direct personal 
claim against either the company or the BoD, despite the fact that they may have suffered a 
substantial loss. This loss may be caused by the reduction in the price of the shares in the 
company, the reduction in the amount of dividend to be distributed or simply because the minority 
shareholder was forced to exit the company by selling their shares to the majority at a low price. 
Although such situations constitute the typical manifestation of minority oppression within closely-
held companies, most of which in practice are incorporated under the form of the Societe 
Anonyme, Law 2190/1920 fails to provide minority shareholders with effective protective 
mechanisms. 
Despite the deficiencies of Law 2190/1920, minority shareholders in Greece are protected by an 
elaborate system of provisions, setting out general legal principles and rules, to be found not only 
within Law 2190/1920 but also within the Greek Civil Code. These provisions establish the 
overarching legal principles which prohibit the abusive exercise of one’s rights.79 With regard to 
minority protection, the provisions of the Greek Civil Code are often used to resolve the conflicts 
between minority and majority shareholders at the level of the corporation. By filling in the gap 
deriving from the lack of an overarching principle for the protection of minority shareholders 
within Law 2190/1920, the rules and principles of the Greek Civil Code play an important role as 
they are an integral part of the minority protection framework in Greece.  
 
3. General principles of Civil Law and their impact on Company Law: The relationship 
between Article 281 of the Greek Civil Code and Law 2190/1920 
Article 281 of the Greek Civil Code  sets out one of the main general principles of the Greek Civil 
Code, which provides for the general prohibition of the abusive exercise of one’s rights and also 
covers cases of minority expropriation by the majority. The role of Article 281 in company law is 
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 Article 281 of the Greek Civil Code prohibits the abusive exercise of one’s rights. Articles 914 and 919 of the Greek Civil 
Code provide for the right to compensation for damages in tort. 
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set out in Article 35a’ of Law 2190/1920 as replaced by article 42 of Law 3604/2007.80 According to 
this provision, a resolution of the general meeting of the shareholders is void under article 281 of 
the Greek Civil Code, if adopted in abuse of the rights of the majority. Any shareholder 
representing the 2/100 of the capital of the company can bring a claim to court requesting the 
recognition that such resolution is void, provided that they did not participate in the meeting or 
that they objected to the resolution. The claim can be made against the company within three 
months after the resolution was adopted. Greek case law provides ample examples where the 
breach of Article 281 is set out as a special reason for the invalidation of a corporate resolution. 81 
Resolutions are subject to the control of Article 281 GCC even when the procedure for adopting 
the resolutions of the general meeting of the SA complies with the majority principle and the 
procedure set out by the provisions of the articles of association of the company. 
With regard to what constitutes a breach of Article 281, Greek case law provides useful insights. 
The starting point is the general statement that a resolution will be void as abusive when its 
adoption is 'beyond the limits set by good faith, good morals and the social and economic aim for 
                                                          
80
 According to the provisions of Article 35a' par. 1-2 of Law 2190/ 1920 on the Societe Anonyme the resolutions of the 
general meeting of the SA are void not only under the conditions of Article 35a and b but also in any other case which 
involves that a resolution is contrary to the Articles of Association, to the mandatory provisions of Law 2190/1920 or to 
Articles of the Civil Code such as Articles 174 and 180 of the Greek Civil Code. 
See Case 94/99 Supreme Court of Greece (Άρειος Πάγος), published in Commercial Law Review, 1999, 324; Case 
459/1989 Supreme Court of Greece (Άρειος Πάγος), published in Commercial Law Review, 1990, 428; Case 546/85 
Supreme Court of Greece (Άρειος Πάγος), published in Commercial Law Review, 1987, 66; Case 155/1985 Supreme Court 
of Greece (Άρειος Πάγος), published in Elliniki Dikaiosini, 26:458; Case 2401/1998 Thessaloniki Court of Appeal (Εφετείο 
Θεσσαλονίκης), published in Elliniki Dikaiosini, 40:420; Case 3566/97 Thessaloniki Court of Appeal (Εφετείο 
Θεσσαλονίκης), published in Law of Enterprises and Companies, 1998, 471; Case 130/1997 Patra Court of Appeal 
(Εφετείο Πατρών), published in Law of Enterprises and Companies, 1997, 712; Case 14292/1988 Athens Court of Appeal 
(Εφετείο Αθηνών), published in Commercial Law Review, 1989, 238; Case 1136/1985 Athens Court of Appeal (Εφετείο 
Αθηνών), published in Elliniki Dikaiosini 26:271. 
A claim against the aforementioned resolutions must be brought within 2 years from the filing of the official copy of the 
resolution to the Ministry of Commerce. After the two years period, the invalidity of the void resolution is remedied. (See 
Article 35a' par. 2 of Law 2190/1920 and Case 94/99 Supreme Court of Greece (Άρειος Πάγος), published in Commercial 
Law Review, 1999, 324; Case 2401/1998 Thessaloniki Court of Appeal (Εφετείο Θεσσαλονίκης), published in Elliniki 
Dikaiosini, 40:420. 
Levantis E., Societes Anonymes, 7th Ed., p.287; Kintis S. in The Law of the Societe Anonyme, Collection of law 
commentary overseen by E. Perakis, (2000), Vol.4, Article 35 a', p.257-261; Rokas (1996) supra note74, p.193-195. 
81
 Supreme Court of Greece (Άρειος Πάγος), Case 982/80, published in Nomiko Vima 29:321; Thessaloniki Court of Appeal 
(Εφετείο Θεσσαλονίκης) Case 249/1991, published in Incorporate and Limited Liability Company Bulletin, 1992, p.446. 
Georgiadis A. and Stathopoulos M., Commentary on Civil Code, Article 281, No.12; V. Kotsovilis in The Law of the Societe 
Anonyme, Collection of law commentary overseen by E. Perakis, (1992), Article 35 a', No33-35, p.856-858; Kotsiris L., 
Legal opinion, published in Commercial Law Review, 1997, 849. 
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which the rights have been conferred' in the first place.82 Resolutions are found to be abusive, if, 
for example, they do not align with the interests of the company and/or are prejudicial against the 
minority shareholders or disproportionately harm the interests of minority shareholders compared 
to the alleged benefit accruing to the company.  On the contrary, there is no abuse if the 
resolution benefits the company, even if this also implies a benefit for the majority shareholders, 
and provided that the detriment for the minorities is not disproportionate. The objective and 
intention of the majority shareholders and the benefit for the company are, therefore, the 
determining factors and the legally important elements to be considered.83 
The standard applied in the context of Article 281 amounts to more than a rationality review. More 
specifically, the content of the actual decision or resolution is reviewed for the purposes of 
identifying its implications for minority shareholders as determined by the factual background of 
the particular case. The court will, therefore, examine the totality of circumstances and facts 
associated with the resolution, the majority's objective and intention and the means used in 
relation to the interests of the company and the personal interests of individual shareholders.84 
Viewed from this perspective, Greek courts have applied Article 281 GCC to review not only the 
rationality of the resolution but also its intrinsic value and impact on minority shareholders and the 
company. This fact justifies the claim that Article 281 GCC provides for a substantive and effective 
tool against minority oppression. For the purposes of illustrating the function of Article 281 GCC in 
practice, two cases which fall into the broader category of minority oppression have been included 
in the analysis to follow. One involves the increase of capital which results in diluting the stake of 
minority shareholders and the other involves an amendment of the articles of association so as to 
remove distinctive rights held by minority shareholders. 
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 Leading cases which support this interpretation include Case 11/1972 Multi-member First Instance Court of Corinth, 
Case 139/78 Crete Court of Appeal, Case 6299/79 Multi-member First Instance Court of Athens. 
Also see Rokas N., (1971), The limits of the powers of the majority shareholders in the Law of Societes Anonymes (Τα όρια 
της εξουσίας της πλειοψηφίας εις το δίκαιον των Α.Ε.), Nomiko Vima, 1971. 
83
Case 155/1985 Supreme Court of Greece (Άρειος Πάγος), published in Elliniki Dikaiosini, 1985, p.458;  Case 832/1976 
Supreme Court of Greece (Άρειος Πάγος) published in Nomiko Vima 1977, 190; Case 14292/1988 Athens Court of Appeal 
(Εφετείο Αθηνών), published in Commercial Law Review, 1989, 238. 
84
 I.Passias, The Law of the Societe Anonyme, 1969, Vol II, p.355-360; Rokas, 1971, supra note82, p.59, p.72; 
L.Georgakopoulos, The Law of Societes Anonymes, Vol.II, par.43, p.341; Deloukas N. , Legal opinion published in Nomiko 
Vima, 29:468-472. 
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3.1 The increase of capital as an abuse under Article 281 of the Greek Civil Code  
Greek case law provides that the resolution of the general meeting providing for a capital increase 
is abusive, if it ultimately aims to reinforce the position of the majority in the company through the 
dilution of the minority stake.85 Article 281 of GCC requires an analysis of the objective underlying 
the resolution and of the actual motives of the majority shareholders. This indicates that the 
analysis of the resolution is not limited to a rationality review. More specifically, it is not sufficient 
for the controlling shareholders to provide some plausible justification that the resolution brings 
some benefit for the company. The justification to be provided by the majority is commensurate 
with the principle of proportionality which is also applicable. Therefore, the detriment inflicted 
upon the minority shareholders must be proportionate to the alleged benefit for the company and 
the loss inflicted upon minority shareholders deriving from the resolution must only be a measure 
of last resort.  
In this regard, in Case 521/2001 (Single-member First Instance Court of Karditsa) it was held that a 
resolution which involved the increase in the capital voted by the general meeting of the 
shareholders, while the transfer of shares to a new shareholder was pending, was abusive. This 
practice resulted in the dilution of the stake of the new shareholder who could not have 
participated in the general meeting because the formalities associated with the sale of the shares 
had not been completed. According to the judgment, the decision of the general meeting was 
abusive because it was contradicting the content and aim of the voting rights held by the 
shareholders and because it was beyond the limits set by good faith, given that it aimed exclusively 
at the dilution of the stake of the new shareholder in the company.86 Similarly, it was held to be 
                                                          
85
 See, for example, Case 6907/2009 First Instance Multi-Member Court of Athens (Πολυμελές Πρωτοδικείο Αθηνών) 
stating that the resolution providing for the increase of capital can be abusive if it has been adopted with the exclusive 
objective of diluting the stake of minority shareholders in the company and cannot be justified as being in the interests of 
the company. 
The fundamental approach of case law to this issue is also expressed in Case 7120/2004 Athens Court of Appeal (Εφετείο 
Αθηνών), published in Law of Enterprises and Companies, 2005, 300; Multi-member First Instance Court of Athens 
(Πολυμελές Πρωτοδικείο Αθηνών) Case 5182/2007 published in Law of Enterprises and Companies, 2008, 323. 
Also see Rokas, (1996) supra note74, p.295 where further references are provided. Also, further support is provided that 
the resolution which unjustifiably varies the special rights of shareholders will also be void as abusive according to Article 
281 GCC.   
86
 See Case 521/2001 Single-Member First Instance Court of Karditsa (Μονομελές Πρωτοδικείο Καρδίτσας). The following 
extract has been translated from the original in Greek for the purpose of this thesis. 
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lawful the decision of the general shareholders meeting which resulted in the benefit of the 
company deriving from an effected merger, although the claimant argued that the motives for the 
merger have been of a personal nature, namely the revenge against her. More specifically, in Case 
6907/2009 (Multi-member First Instance Court of Athens), the court rejected the claim that the 
decision approving the merger was unlawful on the grounds that Article 281 has been breached, 
because the claimant showed no damage caused or loss suffered by her in her capacity as a 
shareholder of the company.87 The aforementioned reasoning, therefore, indicates that the 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
The facts of the case involved the injunction brought by one of the shareholders of the company against the resolution of 
the shareholders meeting for an increase of capital. The content of the injunction was to hinder the exercise of the voting 
rights attached to the shares which have been issued as a result of the resolution. In the context of the injunction, the 
claimant argued that the resolution is void because it was passed in breach of Article 281GCC with the exclusive aim to 
dilute the stake of the claimant in the company.  
In 22.12.1999 the defendants sold to the claimant 150.000 shares of the company. The transaction was concluded and 
the legal ownership was transferred to the claimant on 16.11.2000. Shortly before the transfer of the shares to the 
claimant, on 10.11.2000, the defendants called a shareholders meeting, in the context of which an increase in the capital 
of the company has been decided.  
In light of the aforementioned factual background, the Court held that ' ...the aforementioned resolution of the general 
meeting providing for the increase in the capital of the company was not passed in order to cover the losses incurred by 
the company during its activities, as stated in the minutes of the general meeting. Instead the resolution was passed with 
a view to dilute the stake of the claimant in the company shortly before the transfer of shares was completed and, 
consequently, it is held by reasonable probability that it infringed Article 281GCC. The Court is led to this judgment 1) 
because it was not found that the company was unprofitable at the time and 2) the board of directors hurriedly called the 
shareholders meeting, although they were aware of the judicial conflict among the shareholders regarding the completion 
of the transfer of the shares to the claimant, which (transfer) was scheduled be completed in the following days...' 
87
 For an interpretation of Article 281GCC, see Case 6907/2009 Multi-member First Instance Court of Athens (Πολυμελές 
Πρωτοδικείο Αθήνας). The following extracts have been translated from the original in Greek for the purpose of this 
thesis. 
The pre-requisites for a resolution to be void in breach of Article 281GCC  are that '...the resolution must not be dictated 
by the interests of the company but it must be passed with the exclusive aim to serve the personal interests of the majority 
shareholders or to the detriment of the minority shareholders. 
... 
In order for the resolution of the shareholders meeting regarding the increase of the capital of the Societe Anonyme to 
infringe the general prohibition to abuse one's rights according to Article 281 GCC, it is, therefore, required to serve the 
exclusive aim of the majority shareholders to reinforce their position in the company and to dilute the position of minority 
shareholders respectively.' 
The facts of the case involved a claim brought by a minority shareholder holding 3,33% of company A (the majority 
shareholder was the ex-husband of the claimant and held 96,67% of the company) to invalidate the resolution of the 
shareholders meeting approving the merger of company A with company B, which was owned by the majority 
shareholder and ex-husband of the claimant. Company A did not carry out any commercial activity in the years before the 
merger and the asset of the company involved the house were the couple lived. After the divorce the claimant continued 
to live in the house owned by the company A. The claimant argued that the merger was decided by the majority 
shareholder in abuse of his rights, with the exclusive aim to evict the claimant from the house and for revenge against 
her. The claimant also argued that there was no commercial motive for the merger, provided that company A was 
inactive for many years while company B was financially sound and profitable. 
In light of the aforementioned factual background, it was held that the resolution approving the merger was not abusive 
because '...according to the facts of the case, company A, which is financially weak, benefits from the merger in light of 
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claimant will need to prove the actual loss or the diminution in the value to accrue to them as 
shareholders caused by the abusive resolution. Such loss may be in the form of the reduction of 
the value of his shares or the interference with his rights as a shareholder. The failure to refer to 
and substantiate such a loss as part of the claim negates the finding of abuse according to Article 
281 GCC.  
3.2 The variation of special minority rights as an abuse under Article 281 of the Greek Civil Code 
Law 2190/1920 allows for the provision of special rights to shareholders. For example, the articles 
of association of the company may provide for the special right of a shareholder to appoint a 
certain number of members on the Board of Directors88 or for special pre-emption rights. Such 
special rights can be repealed by a resolution of the general meeting but this is subject to strict 
conditions.89 More specifically, the resolution of the general meeting of the company which 
repeals the special right conferred to a minority shareholder constitutes a breach of article 281, if 
it is not dictated by the interests of the company and if it is not the least detrimental option for the 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
the financial strength of the merging company (B), because of the consolidation of their assets into the pool of assets of 
the new legal entity. Furthermore, it must be noted that the claimant is not threatened to incur any loss in her capacity as 
a shareholder of the company concerned, namely in the sense that the value of her shares in the company is reduced or 
her rights as a shareholder are negatively affected, provided that in her capacity as shareholder of the company the 
claimant derives actual benefit from the merger for the aforementioned reasons. Instead, the claimant seeks to establish 
the abusiveness of the resolution on her personal relationship with the majority shareholder, which does not constitute an 
important element for determining her benefit or loss as a shareholder. ' 
88
 This right is subject to the limitations set out by Article 18 par. 3 of Law 2190/1920 which provides that the articles of 
association may provide that a shareholder may appoint members of the Board of Directors but this may not amount to 
them being able to appoint more than 1/3 of the total number. This right may be referring to a specific shareholder or a 
specific holder of a type of shares specified by the Articles of Association. Unless otherwise stated in the articles of 
association, the special right cannot be varied without the consent of the shareholder to be affected. Thus, the variation 
or limitation of the right cannot be valid without the consent of the shareholder to the benefit of whom the right is 
conferred.  
See Case 459/89 Supreme Court of Greece (Άρειος Πάγος),  published in Commercial Law Review 1990, 428; Case 
14292/1988 Athens Court of Appeal (Εφετείο Αθηνών), published in Commercial Law Review, 1989, 238; Passias I., The 
law of the Societe Anonyme II, p.515; Rokas (1996) supra note74, p.13; Rokas  (1971) supra note82, p.58-59; Mouzoulas 
S. in Company law commentary collection overseen by E. Perakis , (1992), Vol.A, p.694-696. 
89
 Case 9181/2002 First Instance, Multi-Member Court of Thessaloniki (Πολυμελές Πρωτοδικείο Θεσσαλονίκης) and Case 
7119/2004 Athens Court of Appeal (Εφετείο Αθηνών), in their interpretation of Article 281 of the Greek Civil Code, held 
that the resolution of the general meeting of the company which varies the special right conferred to a minority 
shareholder constitutes a breach of Article 281 GCC if it is not dictated by the interests of the company and if it is not the 
least detrimental option for the shareholders, if it is beyond the extent necessitated by the facts and if it is in breach of 
the principle of proportionality. 
The particular element of Case 7119/2004 Athens Court of Appeal (Εφετείο Αθηνών) is that it establishes as abusive the 
variation of Special Minority Rights conferred to the shareholder through the shareholders' agreement. 
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shareholders, if it is beyond the extent necessitated by the facts and if it is not aligned with the 
principle of proportionality.90 The detriment to the shareholder must, therefore, be such that 
when balanced with the benefit to the company, it is proportionate.  
In order for the resolution to be invalidated it is important for the minority shareholder to prove 
that the repeal of the special right is not only detrimental to their interests but to the interests of 
the company as well. In this regard, the claim must contain and prove all the material facts, which 
enable the court to balance the interests of the parties involved. It is therefore a legally important 
element of the claim to refer to the way in which the variation of the special right constitutes a 
detriment to the interests of the company, what specific interests are harmed and what the 
objective aimed at by the majority shareholders is. All these elements are necessary in order to 
facilitate the judgment of whether this objective is irrelevant to the interests of the company, and 
whether the resolution constitutes an unjustified harm to the personal interests of the minority 
shareholder.91 The absence of specific reference to the factual background and the specific context 
indicating the abusive nature of the resolution will cause the claim to fail.  
In addition to the variation of special rights of shareholders, it has been held to be abusive and 
void, the resolution with which the general meeting appointed a new BoD without any particular 
reason but only in order to remove or limit the authority of a shareholder who was also a member 
of the BoD and whose right to be a member of the BoD derived from a shareholders agreement.92 
In this case, the two resolutions of the majority shareholders, one involving the election of the new 
members of the BoD and the other involving the limitation of the authority of the shareholder-
member of the BoD, have been held to be closely interrelated. The objective of the first resolution 
was held to be the facilitation of the second. This mechanism effectively resulted in a breach of the 
                                                          
90
 An example of special right is the pre-emption rights of Article 13 of Law 2190/1920  and the right to appoint the 
members of the Board of Directors within the frames of Article 18 of Law 2190/1920. (No more than a third of the 
members can be appointed through the exercise of such a right). 
Regarding the validity of the resolution providing for the variation of these rights see Nisiraios E. in The Law of the Societe 
Anonyme, in Collection of law commentary overseen by E. Perakis, (1992), Articles 13-13a', No. 251-252, p.603-604; Telli 
N., (1991), Pre-requisites for the variation of old shareholders' pre-emption rights (Προϋποθέσεις για τη κατάργηση του 
δικαιώματος προτίμησης των παλαιών μετόχων), Commercial Law Review, 1991, 209. 
91
 The absence of specific reference to the facts which indicate the abusive nature of the resolution will lead to the 
rejection of the claim. See Case 1298/2006 Supreme Court of Greece (Άρειος Πάγος). 
92
 Case 7119/2004 Athens Court of Appeal (Εφετείο Αθηνών). 
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shareholders agreement, which provided for the distribution of management powers among the 
shareholders, and both resolutions were, therefore, found to be abusive.  
 
4. The function of Articles 914 and 919 of the Greek Civil Code in limiting private benefits 
of control: Direct personal claims in light of Case 1298/2006 
In Case 1298/2006 (Supreme Court of Greece)93, the minority shareholder was able to bring a 
direct claim against members of the BoD because of the loss suffered. The facts of the case 
involved a significant loss caused to one of the minority shareholders of company X, when the 
majority shareholders, who were also the members of the BoD of company X (the claimant owned 
almost 16%, while the majority shareholders jointly held almost 43% of company X), transferred an 
important asset of the company, namely its 40% stake in company Y, to company Z which was 
established only for this purpose and which the controlling shareholders of company X owned 
100%. The transfer took place before the listing of the company Y, so that the minority shareholder 
would not benefit from the increase in the value of the company, deriving from its listing and 
accruing to him due to his participation in the holding company. The sale of the 40% stake in 
company Y, which was about to be listed, was at a significant discount compared to the market 
value of the company. 
Before looking into the specific legal issue in the aforementioned case, some elements of Greek 
Company Law need to be presented as the legal framework required to understand the 
judgment.94 More specifically, under Greek Law, an important characteristic of incorporation is the 
                                                          
93
 Judgment by ' Άρειος Πάγος ', the Supreme Court of Greece, whish is the highest appeal court in almost all cases and is 
the equivalent to the Supreme Court in England and Wales, which replaced the House of Lords following the 
Constitutional Reform Act 2005. 
94
 Under Greek Law 2190/1920 the company has a separate legal personality which is distinct from that of its 
shareholders. The company has rights and obligations in its capacity as a separate legal person. The assets of the 
company are ring-fenced against the rights of its shareholders, therefore providing to the shareholders and their 
creditors no ownership rights on the assets of the company. Instead, shareholders only have a specified set of rights 
provided to them by the law as a manifestation of their legal relationship with the company. Among these rights is their 
right to theoretically ‘co-own the assets of the company’, which is floating over all the assets of the company as a whole. 
See Case 1298/2006 Supreme Court of Greece (Άρειος Πάγος). 
Their shares in the company, as securities, also constitute an asset. Of course, the actual value of their shares does not 
correspond to the nominal value of the shares, which only reflects the registered capital of the company. The true, 
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separation of ownership from the management of the company through the use of specialized 
management in a board structure. Law 2190/1920 includes several provisions aiming to protect 
the company against the risks and conflicts of interests between the company and its directors. For 
example, in the case of managerial misconduct, the members of the BoD of a Societe Anonyme are 
liable towards the company for the loss caused to the company by their gross negligence.95 The 
absence of a legal basis enabling the minority shareholders to personally claim compensation for 
the loss suffered has been criticized even as amounting to lack of judicial protection.96 Given the 
narrow scope of the applicable provisions of Law 2190/1920, this lack could be interpreted as 
constituting a breach of Article 20 par. 1 of the Greek Constitution.97  
However, an alternative legal basis for the liability of the members of the BoD for mismanagement 
could be established upon Articles 914 and 919 of the Greek Civil Code. More specifically, an action 
which results in a loss for the company may also give rise to the liability of the members of the BoD 
in tort. This second legal basis is of general scope and only applies when the special provisions 
included in Law 2190/1920 are inapplicable, in line with the general principle that the specific rule 
precedes the general rule. A precondition for the application of the general provisions of Article 
914 and 919 GCC is that the loss suffered by the claimant must not be too remote.98 Therefore, it is 
only the company that can bring a claim against the members of the BoD. The shareholders of the 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
commercial value of their shares is determined by the evaluation of the company as a going concern, after taking into 
account its assets and liabilities. As a result, the value which the share incorporates constitutes the reflection of the value 
of the corporation and the shares in a company only establish a form of indirect ownership over the assets of the 
company. See Case 14/1999 Supreme Court of Greece (Άρειος Πάγος) in Plenary Session (Απόφαση Ολομέλειας) 
95
 See Articles 18, 22, 22b of Law 2190/1920, Articles 31 and 32 of the Greek Commercial Law and 68, 714, 297, 298 of 
the Greek Civil Code. 
96
 See Spyridonos, (2001), supra note68. 
97
 This situation necessitates that the gap in the provision of judicial protection is filled through the general principles 
applying to companies and are to be found within the Greek Civil Code. In terms of proof, to the extent that the loss 
suffered can be proven through an independent, subjective assessment minority shareholders should be protected. The 
criticism that the abovementioned limitations imposed on the ability of minority shareholders to bring a personal claim 
and be compensated for the loss suffered as a result of the actions and behaviours of the BoD amount to a breach of the 
Greek Constitution is made redundant in light of the interpretation provided by courts within Case 1298/2006 Supreme 
Court of Greece (Άρειος Πάγος) regarding the ability of minority shareholders to resort to the general principles in law of 
tort as their legal basis. Also see below page 113, Section 2. 
98
 Through the cumulative and combined application of Articles 914, 928 b, 929 b, 297 και 298 of the Greek Civil CodeΑΚ,  
the right to compensation is only established in favour of the person who has suffered a direct loss because of the 
tortuous action involved and not the person who suffered indirect loss. See Case 18/2004 Supreme Court of Greece 
(Άρειος Πάγος) in Plenary Session (Απόφαση Ολομέλειας) 
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company do not have the personal right to bring such a claim against the BoD because they are 
considered to be third parties, their loss therefore being indirect. 99 Examples of such indirect or 
reflective loss include the loss suffered by the shareholders in the value of the shares of the 
company traded on the stock exchange or the loss due to the distribution of reduced dividends.100  
However, a closer look into Case 1298/2006 indicates the existence of an important exception to 
the ‘direct loss’ rule, which applies in order to fill the gap and allow the personal claims of 
shareholders against the members of the BoD, even if the loss is indirect or reflective in nature, 
such as in the case of reduced dividends or reduced value of shares. This exception is facilitated 
through the combined application of Articles 914, 919 of the Greek Civil Code in light of Law 
2190/1920.101 In this case, the aforementioned articles have been interpreted broadly so as to 
allow minority shareholders to bring a personal claim against the members of the BoD, if their 
action, omission or behaviour could be interpreted as giving rise to liability in tort or as 
constituting a self-standing breach of any rule which gives rise to a claim for compensation. 
In Case 1298/2006 of the Greek Supreme Court, the rule to have been breached was 919 GCC, 
which is a self-standing legal rule of general application. Article 919 GCC applies to situations in 
which a person intentionally and contrary to good morals102 defies the expectation of another 
person to gain a good or a right. The intentional transfer of the asset of the company by the 
majority shareholders who were also the members of the BoD reduced the value of the shares of 
the minority shareholder, bringing about a loss. In order to assess whether an action is unlawful as 
contrary to good morals, the motives, the aim and the means employed by the person in order to 
achieve this goal and the general circumstances of the surrounding environment in which the 
                                                          
99
 The notion of 'indirect loss' is the equivalent to the term 'reflective of the company's loss' developed under the UK 
company law. 
100
 Case 1285/1980 Supreme Court of Greece (Άρειος Πάγος). 
101
 For example, according to Article 919 of the Greek Civil Code, the person who caused a loss intentionally in a way 
contrary to 'good morals' (χρηστά ήθη) is under the obligation to compensate them. Article 919 complements and is 
interpreted in combination with Article 914 which establishes liability in tort. Good morals (χρηστά ήθη) constitutes a 
legal concept the breach of which is judged on a subjective standard, namely according to the prudent average person 
(See Case 10/1991 Supreme Court of Greece (Άρειος Πάγος) in Plenary Session (Απόφαση Ολομέλειας)) 
 In the context of business and commercial transactions, the practices and principles applicable in this category of 
transactions may be taken into account, to the extent that they are not incompatible with social ethics according to the 
standards of the average prudent person. 
102
 Case 398/75 Supreme Court of Greece (Άρειος Πάγος) in Plenary Session (Απόφαση Ολομέλειας). 
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action took place are taken into account. 103 With regard to intention, wilful misconduct is required 
but it is sufficient for the person to have foreseen the possibility of loss but to have chosen to act 
nevertheless. In the specific case examined, the factual background provided conclusive evidence 
of the intention of the controlling shareholder to cause damage to the minority shareholder.  
In the context of Greek company law, the aforementioned case and its interpretation of the law 
have been groundbreaking. Firstly, this interpretation fills the gap of minority protection emerging 
when abusive acts, which give rise to liability in tort, are facilitated by the use of the majority 
principle applying to companies incorporated under the Societe Anonyme form. In the case 
examined, for example, minority shareholder protection is provided despite the fact that the 
resolution of the BoD to transfer the asset to the new company, created for this purpose only, 
complied with the procedural requirements of Law 2190/1920 and the articles of association. 
Secondly, the right to be compensated is awarded to the person, against which the tort took 
place.104 As a result, the shareholders of the Societe Anonyme can bring a personal rather than a 
derivative claim against the members of the BoD, when the acts of the latter are contrary to good 
morals and give rise to their liability in tort. 105 
 
III. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
The assessment of Greek company law, as interpreted and applied by the courts, reveals a variety 
of provisions which have not been included as variables in the initial LLSV index, although they play 
an important role in protecting minority shareholders. Provided that a variety of legal provisions 
for minority protection in concentrated ownership structures within civil law systems have not 
been considered, the ratings of the indices cannot reflect their effectiveness. In this light, the 
findings of both case studies included in this Chapter support the main proposition of this thesis 
that the ‘inefficiency bias’ against concentrated ownership structures is partly the result of the 
deficient analysis and the overgeneralization manifested in the LLSV index and the associated 
                                                          
103
 Case 398/75 Supreme Court of Greece (Άρειος Πάγος) in Plenary Session (Απόφαση Ολομέλειας).  
104
 Case 1298/2006 Supreme Court of Greece (Άρειος Πάγος) in Plenary Session (Απόφαση Ολομέλειας).  
105
 Case 1298/2006 Supreme Court of Greece (Άρειος Πάγος) in Plenary Session (Απόφαση Ολομέλειας).  
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studies and literature. The Greek example also highlights the availability of mechanisms for 
minority protection outside the strict boundaries of company law and shows that taking into 
account the complementary institutions or the functionally equivalent rules constitutes a 
precondition for a methodologically sound assessment. It has, therefore, been shown that the 
index-based approach to comparative corporate law is unlikely to accurately reflect the quality of 
the law, unless underpinned by extensive substantive analysis of legal provisions within a 
perimeter which is wider than that set by company law only.  
The various concrete examples presented in this Chapter also confirm the ‘legal effectiveness' 
argument of this thesis. Legal effectiveness refers to the extent to which an issue can be dealt with 
by the law and if so, how well it is dealt with in terms of consistency and predictability, on the one 
side, and the delivery of efficient and just outcomes, on the other. More specifically, for example, 
in the case of family ownership legal effectiveness refers to the capacity of the rules to limit the 
extraction of private benefits of control by the controlling family. The Greek case study indicates 
that legal effectiveness, defined as the delivery of consistent, just and fair outcomes by the law, is 
achieved through the use of general principles and standards. This demonstrates that effective 
legal rules may be part of any legal system, independently of its legal origin. Legal effectiveness is 
assessed on the basis of the type of concentrated ownership involved. In this Chapter, the 
examination of the special rules and responses of Greek law to the problem of minority 
expropriation has been driven by the presence of SOEs and family-owned companies, which are 
the prevalent forms of ownership in Greece. In this regard, the Greek minority protection 
mechanisms presented are indicative of a legal framework which is well-adapted to the identity of 
the controlling shareholders and the distinct corporate governance problems each type gives rise 
to. The adaptation of the legal framework to the ownership structures clearly manifests the strong 
interactions between ownership structures and corporate governance. 
  
 
 
CHAPTER IV: THE IMPACT OF MULTIPLE LARGE SHAREHOLDERS ON 
CORPORATE LAW AND GOVERNANCE 
 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
This Chapter extends the assessment of the categories of controlling owners to multiple large 
shareholders. Contrary to the absolute forms of concentrated ownership, the presence of multiple 
large shareholders significantly alters the context and governance problems arising within the 
company. For example, the model of one controller against a number of small minority 
shareholders implies that the latter face collective action problems, increased monitoring costs 
and free-rider concerns, all of which reduce their monitoring incentives and increase the risk of 
expropriation. Instead, the presence of multiple large shareholders (hereafter MLS) mitigates 
collective action problems and reduces monitoring costs, thus rendering control internally 
contestable and mitigating the risk of minority expropriation.  
In addition to the analysis of state and family ownership presented in the previous part of the 
thesis, this Chapter examines the benefits and problems of MLS and evaluates the main possible 
outcomes of their interactions. Shareholders interactions are legally expressed in the form of 
shareholders agreements. An effective regulatory framework should, therefore, promote 
beneficial shareholders agreements and limit the ones in which the enhanced control achieved by 
the shareholders coalition is used for minority expropriation. Aligned with the 'legal effectiveness' 
argument of the thesis, this Chapter, therefore, sets the general context for the subsequent 
assessment of how the regulation of shareholders agreements affects their nature as benign or 
malign corporate governance mechanisms.     
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II. THE BENEFITS OF MULTIPLE LARGE SHAREHOLDERS IN THE CONTEXT OF CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE 
One of the main grounds for the criticism against concentration revolves around the argument that 
it increases the cost of capital. The cost of external finance is driven by the extent of firm’s agency1 
and information problems2, which in the case of concentrated control are aggravated and render 
corporate financing more expensive.3 Concentration can be interpreted by investors as indicative 
of the high risk of expropriation, while dispersion is usually associated with managerial 
opportunism and high agency costs. In both cases, outside investors will adjust the price they are 
willing to pay for the shares and the cost of capital is determined accordingly. Nevertheless, most 
studies on the impact of concentration incorrectly assume that ownership structures involve the 
presence of a controlling shareholder and a group of dispersed minority shareholders who are 
reluctant and powerless to react. This assumption disregards the existence of MLS in the company 
and understates their impact on corporate governance.4 In this respect, for example, it is 
                                                          
1
 See Dyck A. and Zingales L., (2004), Private Benefits of Control: An International Comparison, The Center for Research in 
Security Prices Working Paper Nº535; Journal of Finance 59:537. They note that the potential extraction of private 
benefits by controlling shareholders 'reduces what minority shareholders are willing to pay for shares, lowering the value 
of all companies where such behavior represents a real possibility. And by raising the cost of finance, it limits the ability of 
such firms to fund attractive investment projects.'
 
 
2
 There is an important correlation of information quality and the cost of capital. For example, the firm’s information 
quality (e.g., asymmetric information) leads to high cost of capital. For the relationship between the cost of equity capital 
and information quality see O'Hara M. and Easley D., (2001), Information and the Cost of Capital. EFA 2002 Berlin 
Meetings Presented Paper; Cornell University Johnson Graduate School of Management Working Paper. Available at 
SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=300715; Hughes J. S., Liu, Jing and Liu, Jun, (2004), Information, Diversification, and Cost 
of Capital. AFA 2006 Boston Meetings Paper. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=651944. Moreover, greater 
disclosure is associated with a lower cost of equity capital for firms. See Botosan C. A., (1997), Disclosure Level and the 
Cost of Capital. The Accounting Review, 72(3). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=292. Similarly, enhanced 
financial information quality (e.g., more transparent earnings, more independent audit committees, and lower abnormal 
accruals) is associated with lower cost of equity capital. See Francis J.R., Khurana I. K. and Pereira R., (2005), Disclosure 
Incentives and Effects on Cost of Capitol Around the World. Accounting Review, 80(4):1125. Finally, information risk 
affects firm’s agency costs which, in turn, influences cost of equity capital. See Lambert R.A., Leuz C. and Verrecchia R.E., 
(2006), Accounting Information, Disclosure, and the Cost of Capital (March 2006). Available at SSRN: 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=823504. 
3
 La Porta R., F. Lopez-de-Silanes, and A. Shleifer, (1999b), Corporate Ownership Around the World, Journal of Finance, 
54:471. 
4
 Becht M. and Mayer C., (2002), Corporate control in Europe. Revue d’ Economie Politique 112(4), p.471; Faccio M. and 
Lang L. H. P., (2002), The ultimate ownership of western European corporations, Journal of Financial Economics, 65: 365-
395 where the ownership of 5,232 publicly-traded corporations in 13 Western European countries is examined ; Also see 
La Porta et al. (1999) supra note 3. They examine 600 of the largest publicly-traded firms across 27 countries, and they 
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documented that more than 25% of listed European companies have more than one large 
shareholder.5  
The structures including MLS have a positive impact on firm performance and valuation6 because 
controlling shareholders are incentivised to commit not to behave opportunistically.7 More 
specifically, as control is diluted, no single owner has enough shares to control the corporation 
unilaterally. Such control dilution arises in firms with two owners if ownership is shared equally 
and neither of the two owners is able to implement their preferred decision without the 
acceptance of the other owner.8 This restrictive effect on the opportunistic behaviour of large 
shareholders results from the need of each others’ support in the process of forming a controlling 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
find that one-quarter have more than one large owner; Bianchi M., and M. Bianco, (2006), Italian Corporate Governance 
in the Last 15 years: From Pyramids to Coalitions?, ECGI - Finance Working Paper; Kirchmaier T. and Grant J., (2004), Who 
Governs? Corporate Ownership and Control Structures in Europe. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=555877. 
5
 Ibid Becht and Mayer (2002) supra note4. 
Similarly, while ownership is concentrated in 50,11%
5
 of a sample of Western European companies, the presence of a 
second large shareholder is documented in 46.01% of the corporations with at least one controlling shareholder. See 
Faccio and Lang (2002), supra note4. 
6
 Empirical research provides support to the positive impact of multiple shareholders on corporate valuation. For 
example, it has been shown that the existence of a second large owner is positively associated with the profitability of 
German firms.  See Lehmann E. E. and Weigand J., (2001), Does the Governed Corporation Perform Better? Governance 
Structures and Corporate Performance in Germany. European Finance Review, 4(2):2001. Available at SSRN: 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=268734. 
Similarly, it has been found that the existence of multiple large shareholders increases dividend payouts in Europe, 
although it lowers them in Asia, probably due to the ineffectiveness of investor protection law. See Faccio M., Lang, L.H.P. 
and Young L. S.F., (2000), Dividends and Expropriation. AFA 2001 New Orleans; EFMA Athens 2000. Available at SSRN: 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=222428. 
7
 Bennedsen M. and Wolfenzon D., (2000), The Balance of Power in Closely Held Corporations. Journal of Financial 
Economics, 58(1-2). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=251877. 
Although, the aforementioned study refers to closely-held companies, it can also provide an initial indication of what can 
be expected to apply in the case of public corporations. The research by Bennedsen et al (2000) is of particular interest 
even in the context of public companies because it reveals the interrelations that emerge at the company level. A similar 
analysis for public companies is very complex and difficult, as the ownership structure of which continuously changes. In 
this light, examining the closely-held companies is the closest alternative to studying public corporations. Provided that 
corporate governance problems arising within concentrated ownership structures are identical in both private and public 
corporations, an analogy can be drawn, therefore allowing for this study to be used in the case of public corporations. 
8
Bennedsen, Morten, Fosgerau, Mogens and Nielsen, Kasper Meisner, (2003), ’The strategic choice of control allocation 
and ownership distribution in closely held firms’, (June 2003), available at 
http://kelley.iu.edu/Finance/Symposium/files/bennedsen_03.pdf  In a sample of 17,000 small, closely held corporations, 
Bennedsen et al have explored the strategic choice of ownership distribution and the implied allocation of control and 
found that the existence of multiple owners brings about significant dilution of control which has a positive effect on 
performance. 
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coalition.9 In this light, the presence of MLS alters the determinants of control by increasing 
internal competition for the control of the company.  
The internal contestability of control upgrades the overall role of minority shareholders because of 
the increased scope for their participation in the formation of coalitions. More specifically, the role 
of minority shareholders is less marginal as they have more power to determine where control will 
lie by supporting the coalitions which compete for the control of the company or for passing a 
given corporate resolution. Furthermore, in order for the controlling alliance to be sustainable, its 
members are indirectly forced to take into account the interests of other shareholders while 
running the company. It is exactly their need for compromise that reduces opportunistic behaviour 
and excessive risk taking, thus adding value to the corporations they are involved in. The internal 
competition for control emerging in the context of MLS structures limits the scope of expropriation 
by forcing shareholders to co-operate. The impact of MLS on firm performance is, therefore, 
positive because the cost of capital will be lower as investors will apply a lower discount to the 
price they are willing to pay compared to more absolute forms of concentrated ownership.  
The findings of empirical research10 support the aforementioned hypotheses by showing that 'the 
implied cost of equity decreases in the presence of large shareholders beyond the controlling 
owner'. This finding suggests that the market acknowledges the monitoring and disciplinary role of 
large shareholders within corporations characterised by concentrated ownership structures and 
reacts positively to them. The additional analysis of firms from East Asia and Western Europe also 
shows that the governance role of MLS is more valuable in East Asia, where agency problems 
embedded in corporate ownership structures are more severe and the legal environment is 
weak.11 These findings suggest that MLS are instrumental in reducing the firm’s equity financing 
costs, as they mitigate information asymmetry and the conflicts between the controlling owner 
and minority investors. 
                                                          
9
 ibid. Bennedsen et al (2003) verify that the ownership structure is generally chosen to avoid control dilution, since two 
thirds of the firms in their sample have a single owner.   
10
 Attig N., Guedhami O. and Mishra D.R., (2008), Multiple Large Shareholders, Control Contests, and Implied Cost of 
Equity, AFFI/EUROFIDAI, Paris December 2008 Finance International Meeting AFFI - EUROFIDAI. Available at SSRN: 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1282129. 
11
 ibid. 
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However, despite the desirability of internal control contestability, multiple blockholders are 
unlikely to emerge. It has been documented, for example, that investors are organised in such a 
way that only one of them holds a block in any given firm, precisely because they want to eschew 
the internal contests which limit their private benefits.12 Furthermore, the sustainability of the 
formed coalition is often threatened, as the composition of the controlling group over time 
substantially changes.13 The free-rider problem also applies to the monitoring efforts among MLS.14 
Shareholders coalitions within listed companies are therefore less sustainable, due to the transfers 
of shareholdings and the changes in the ownership composition occurring through the capital 
market.15 Notwithstanding the aforementioned limitations, the dynamics of MLS and shareholders 
coalitions challenge the underlying assumptions of the traditional hypotheses about the impact of 
concentration on corporate governance which only take into account more absolute forms of 
concentrated ownership. 
 
III. THE FACTORS OF CONTROL DILUTION AND THE VARIATIONS OF MULTIPLE LARGE 
SHAREHOLDERS INTERACTIONS AS DETERMINANTS OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
 
1. The factors of control dilution within concentrated ownership structures 
In the presence of MLS, the relationship between control allocation and ownership concentration 
is a further complicated. In terms of the factors which affect the allocation of control, the size and 
number of shareholders are probably the most obvious determinants of internal contestability 
levels.16 A less obvious factor is also the type of the shareholder involved.17 The size of the block-
                                                          
12 
Zwiebel J., (1995), Block Investment and Partial Benefits of Corporate Control. Review of Economic Studies, 62:161. 
13
 Gutiérrez Urtiaga M. and Tribo J.A., (2004), Ownership Structure and Minority Expropriation in Non-Listed Firms: The 
Case for Multiple Large Shareholders. ECGI - Finance Working Paper No. 053/2004. Available at SSRN: 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1106979. 
14
 Winton A., (1993), Limitation of Liability and the Ownership Structure of the Firm, Journal of Finance 48(2):487. 
15
 See Gutiérrez&Tribo (2004) supra note13. The importance of the absence of a market is also manifest in the scholars' 
documentation of a tendency for the controlling coalition to boost its stake, since reducing their stake constitutes a costly 
option in the absence of a market. This finding suggests that shareholders in listed companies will have more alternative 
choices that the shareholders of non-listed companies, thus rendering shareholders coalitions within listed companies 
less sustainable. 
16
 See below 1.1. 
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holders is a relevant factor and its practical importance for control emerges only when compared 
to the size of the other large shareholders in the company. Therefore, the overall level of the 
control that a shareholder achieves with a particular stake is determined by how ownership is 
distributed among multiple block-holders.18 In this context, the level of control dilution is a 
function of the number of large shareholders, the type of the owners and the distribution of 
ownership and control rights of the shareholders. These factors of ownership structure interact to 
produce various combinations of controlling coalitions. This means that the ownership structure 
determines whether the large shareholders are more likely to collude or compete with the 
controller to take on an essential monitoring role.  
1.1 The number and size of blocks 
The emergence of multiple block-holders in the company implies higher incentives to monitor the 
largest shareholder or challenge the controlling coalition, thus mitigating the risk of 
expropriation.19 As the costs of monitoring are shared and the collective action problems are 
manageable, MLS are more likely to form coalitions with a view to change the control in the 
company.  To this effect, the size of the blockholdings is instrumental.20 More specifically, the 
remaining large shareholders need to have significant cash-flow rights for their benefits to exceed 
their monitoring costs.21 Thus, the smaller the size of the large shareholders, the more rationally 
apathetic they will be and the higher their incentive to collude with the controller will be.  
                                                                                                                                                                                 
17
 See below 1.3. 
18
 See below 1.2. 
19 Laeven L. and Levine R., (2007), Complex Ownership Structures and Corporate Valuations; IMF Working Paper 07/140, 
June 1, 2007, available at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2007/wp07140.pdf; Claessens S., Djankov S., Fan J., 
and Lang L., (2002), Disentangling the Incentive and Entrenchment Effects of Large Shareholdings, Journal of Finance 
57:2741. 
For an alternative view that blockholders discipline managers through trading see Edmans A. and Manso G., (2011), 
Governance Through Trading and Intervention: A Theory of Multiple Blockholders (June 29, 2011). Review of Financial 
Studies, 24(7):2395; ECGI - Finance Working Paper No. 225/2008. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1102730 
The authors conceptualise multiple blockholders as informed traders, competing for trading profits like informed traders 
and improve the availability of information about the firm. 
20
 ibid Laeven&Levine (2007). 
21
 Burkart M., Gromb D. and Panunzi F., (1997), Large shareholders, monitoring and the value of the firm, Quarterly 
Journal of Economics 112. 
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1.2 The distribution of ownership 
Factors such as the relative voting size of the multiple block-holders vis-à-vis the first largest 
shareholder also affect their potential to coordinate or contest control in the company.22 For 
example, the existence of a second shareholder with a block large enough to enable him to control 
the company upon the support of other large shareholders makes the outcome of an internal 
competitive process for control far less predictable. The likelihood to form a coalition is also 
determined by the uneven distribution of the cash-flow rights of its members. More specifically, 
the uneven distribution of ownership shapes the incentives of blockholders to monitor, because 
the different stakes of each blockholder imply that monitoring does not make equal economic 
sense for all of them.23 In this context, the distribution of ownership is relevant only on the 
assumption that the cash-flow rights and the control rights of the shareholders are proportionate. 
In the case that the use of control-enhancing devices distorts how control rights are distributed 
across the company, the ownership stakes of shareholders become less relevant and it is now the 
distribution of control rights that will determine the potential for the formation of a coalition.  
The proportionality between the ownership and the control rights of the coalition also affects the 
impact of the coalition on corporate governance. More specifically, proportionate control is found 
to limit the scope for private benefit extraction to the detriment of minorities. This is indicated in 
the increased firm performance documented when the joint stakes of the shareholders 
participating in the coalition are high.24 The evidence for a positive correlation between corporate 
valuations and the high cash-flow rights of the biggest owner also suggests that highly 
                                                          
22
It is found, for example, that the relative voting size of block-holders affects the market valuation of companies owned 
by multiple large shareholders. See Attig (2008) supra note10; Also see Maury, Benjamin and Pajuste A., (2005), Multiple 
Large Shareholders and Firm Value, Journal of Banking and Finance, 29:1813. Available at SSRN: 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=617844. In an examination of Finnish firms, Maury&Pajuste (2005) argue that equal distribution 
of the votes among large blockholders has a positive effect on firm value and document that the positive result is 
particularly strong in family-controlled firms suggesting that families (which typically have managerial or board 
representation) are more prone to private benefit extraction if they are not monitored by another strong blockholder. 
They also show that the relation between multiple blockholders and firm value significantly depends on the identity of 
these blockholders. Finally, they also show that the relationship between corporate valuations and the presence of 
multiple large shareholders depends on the comparative sizes of the large shareholders.  
23
 Bloch F. and Hege U., (2003), Multiple Shareholders and Control Contests, available at 
https://studies2.hec.fr/jahia/webdav/site/hec/shared/sites/hege/acces_anonyme/papers/BlochHege_Control.(last 
accessed 02.05.2011) 
24
 Gutierrez&Tribo, (2004) Hypothesis 4 supra note13. 
The complex relationship of concentrated ownership structures and corporate governance 
Chapter IV: The impact of multiple large shareholders on corporate law and governance 
 
 
 
136 
 
concentrated cash-flow rights discourage the expropriation of corporate assets.25 Contrastingly, 
controlling coalitions with low cash-flow rights have both the incentives (low cash-flow rights) and 
the ability (sufficient voting rights, thus control) to divert corporate resources for private gain.26 In 
this respect, because uneven distribution facilitates the formation of coalitions with the least 
possible cash-flow rights27, minority shareholders run a higher risk of expropriation.28 
1.3 The type of shareholders 
Apart from the number and relative size of the large shareholders, the formation of a coalition 
and, thus, the internal contestability of control, are also affected by the type of the blockholders 
present in the company. More specifically, the identity of the shareholders affects their potential 
to collude with the controller or to form a shareholders coalition.29 If, for example, the larger 
shareholder and other blockholders are all families, there is more scope for their collusion than in 
the case where the largest shareholder is the state. In this respect, empirical evidence supports 
                                                          
25
 Lins K.V., (2003), Equity ownership and firm value in emerging markets, Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 
38:159. The author finds firm values to be lower when control and cash flow rights of a firm's management group are 
separated, which indicates that the private benefits of control are reflected in the price paid by non-controlling 
shareholders. The results also suggest that large non-management blockholders can reduce these private benefits. The 
separation of management group ownership and control has a significantly more negative relation to value in countries 
with low shareholder protection, whereas large non-management blockholders have a significantly more positive 
relation. These results imply that private control benefits are discounted even more by minority shareholders where 
external shareholder protections are weak and that large non-management blockholders can act as a partial substitute 
for these missing institutional governance mechanisms. 
26
Bloch&Hege (2003) supra note23. Their research problem and model is constructed around the perception that 
multiple large owners compete in forming controlling coalitions which will enable them to extract private benefits of 
control. In this light, the winning coalition will most probably be a combination of block-holders with more than 50% of 
the votes and the minimum cash-flow rights. According to their view, the low cash-flow rights of the winning coalition 
accentuate the problem of the expropriation of corporate resources. As a result, an initial owner choosing an ownership 
structure with multiple block-holders to maximize firm value subject to a wealth constraint, should bear in mind that the 
greater the dispersion of cash-flow rights, the easier it gets to form ruling coalitions with low cash-flow rights, which 
ultimately reduces the value of the firm. 
27
ibid Bloch&Hege (2003) supra note23 further show that enhanced monitoring is less likely when ownership is unevenly 
distributed, which again implies a negative relationship between cash-flow rights dispersion and valuations. 
28
 Considerable theoretical research further predicts a negative relationship between the cash-flow rights of a large, 
controlling owner and his/her incentives to expropriate corporate resources. See Jensen M., and Meckling W., (1976), 
Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, Journal of Financial Economics 3, 305-
360; Shleifer A. and Wolfenzon D., (2000), Investor Protection and Equity Markets, Harvard Institute of Economic 
Research Paper No. 1906. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=245448.  
Empirical research also confirms this prediction in the context of multiple shareholders ownership by finding a positive 
relationship between the cash-flow rights of the largest owners and firm value. See Lins, Karl V. and Lemmon, Michael L., 
Ownership Structure, Corporate Governance, and Firm Value: Evidence from the East Asian Financial Crisis (April 2001). 
William Davidson Institute Working Paper No. 393; 3rd Annual Fin. Mkt. Dev. Conference, Hong Kong 2001; U of Utah 
Working Paper. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=265108. 
29
Laeven&Levine (2007) supra note19. 
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that large shareholders are less likely to cooperate and form ruling coalitions when they are of 
different types.30  
 
2. Corporate governance and the varieties of structures of multiple large shareholders 
The variations in the number of blockholders, the levels of dispersion and the patterns of 
distribution produce infinite combinations of multiple shareholders seeking to form a controlling 
coalition. In this light, the interdependencies developed among blockholders do not only 
determine the outcome of the internal competition for control but also affect the nature of the 
resulting corporate governance problems, most notably the risk of private benefits extraction. The 
following examples illustrate what the impact of a variety of different types of controlling 
coalitions on corporate governance might be.31 When viewed from a wider perspective, the 
analysis outlines the complex interrelationship of the varieties of concentrated ownership 
structures and corporate governance.   
2.1. Absolute concentrated ownership structures 
Absolute concentrated ownership structures involve the presence of one controlling shareholder 
and many or a few minority shareholders who hold no significant stake in the company. In this 
case, the typical problem of conflicts of minority and majority shareholders interests is 
encountered. Minority investors run the risk of being expropriated by the controller,32 due to 
collective action problems and the high monitoring costs that they incur. These conflicts of 
                                                          
30
 For example, empirical evidence documents that the negative association between valuations and the dispersion of 
cash-flow rights becomes more pronounced when the holders of the largest cash-flow rights are of different types. This 
indicates that shareholders agreements and the positive effect they are bringing in are less likely to be formed among 
shareholders of different types. See Maury&Pajuste (2004), supra not22; Laeven&Levine (2007) supra note 19 
Also Attig (2008) supra note10 shows that within family-controlled firms the identity of the second largest shareholder 
determines the agency costs and thus the cost of equity. If the two largest shareholders are families, the information risk 
is high and so too is the cost of equity capital. In contrast, the presence of the state as the second largest shareholder in 
family-controlled firms seems to moderate firm’s agency costs and lowers its cost of equity.  
31
 The list to follow is only indicative and by no means restrictive. 
32
 Such expropriation may include the extraction of private benefits in a direct way, as for example by diverting corporate 
opportunities or even indirectly. An example of this latter category, is the one presented by Rubin&Barnea (2006). The 
scholars show that large block-holders are likely to over-invest in projects that improve the public perception of the firm 
as being socially responsible. They suggest that this is an expropriating strategy because these large block-holders take all 
the credit for the socially responsible behaviour but bear only a proportion of the cost of implementing such a strategy. 
See
 
Rubin A. and Barnea A., (2006), Corporate Social Responsibility as a Conflict Between Shareholders, EFA 2006 Zurich 
Meetings. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=686606. 
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interests are the manifestation of the agency problem within concentrated structures. Effectively, 
the role of the controlling shareholder is equivalent to the role of the managers in companies with 
dispersed ownership.33  
2.2. Hybrid concentrated ownership structures  
Hybrid concentrated ownership structures involve the presence of a controlling shareholder and 
MLS. In this scenario, the presence of MLS increases the competition for control within the 
company. The reaction of the large shareholders to the controller depends on their characteristics 
such as their voting power, their cash-flow rights and their identity.34  If their aggregate control 
rights enable them to influence the outcome of corporate resolutions and processes, then a 
coalition among large shareholders against the controller is likely. This likelihood is even higher, if 
the collective action problems are mitigated by a low dispersion of the blockholders' cash-flow 
rights. Should the large shareholders identify deficiencies in the governance and management of 
the firm, it would make economic sense for them to intervene to limit the potential of private 
benefit extraction by the controller.  
Similarly, the identity and general investment approach of the controller and the large 
shareholders are also important in determining the interdependencies and coalitions to be 
created. For example, shareholders of the same identity are more likely to form a coalition, while 
shareholders with a long-term investment horizon are expected to co-operate with other long-
term investors and short-term ones with each other. When viewed from this perspective, the 
existence of other large owners alters the dynamics of control allocation among shareholders, 
although it does not guarantee that the large shareholders will play an active role in monitoring 
                                                          
33
 Burkart et al (1997) supra note21; Also see Burkart M.C., Gromb D. and Panunzi F., (2005), Minority Blocks and 
Takeover Premia, ECGI - Finance Working Paper No. 96/2005. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=796765. 
According to their predictions, the takeover premium paid for a firm with a single block-holder accompanied by other 
minority shareholders is larger than that for a firm with a diluted ownership structure, which finding indicates the 
correlation of absolute concentration with the risk of private benefits extraction. 
Also see Pagano M. and Roell A., (1998), The Choice of Stock Ownership Structure: Agency Costs, Monitoring, and the 
Decision to Go Public, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 113:187. According to their predictions, in firms with a single 
controlling shareholder, the ownership stake of the non-controlling shareholders should also be more concentrated when 
expropriation is likely to be severe, so as to provide incentives for monitoring. 
34
 For an analysis of the impact of large shareholders on the financial policy decision making process within a company 
see Paligorova T. and Zhaoxia Xu, Complex Ownership and Capital Structure (2009), Bank of Canada Working Paper 
2009/12. 
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the controller. On this point, it has been found that there is an optimal level of monitoring to be 
achieved for a given second-largest shareholder's stake size.35 Internal control contests, therefore, 
imply a model of governance which is less prone to expropriation. However, the outcome of the 
competitive process cannot be easily predicted and is determined by the characteristics of the 
ownership structure of each specific company. Similarly, the sustainability of the formed coalition 
is questionable.  
2.3. Hybrid multiple blockholders ownership structures  
Hybrid multiple blockholders ownership structures involve the presence of a shareholder large 
enough to be the controller if unchallenged, a second large shareholder and many minority 
shareholders with no substantial stakes. In this case, the alternatives of the second large 
shareholder will be to either enhance their monitoring or to collude with the first large 
shareholder. They will then be left unchallenged to exercise control over the company. The risk 
that the two principal shareholders will collude rather than compete is determined by the 
comparative size of the two blockholders and the significance of the sizes of the remaining 
minority shareholders. The potential for collusion between the largest shareholders also increases 
in the event that these are of the same type, such as families. For example, in the absence of a 
comparable size, it makes more economic sense for the controller to form an alliance and share a 
part of the extracted private benefits with the largest shareholder rather than engage into a 
contest which could trigger high levels of monitoring and minimise the extraction of private 
benefits. For the largest shareholder, sharing a part of the extracted private benefits is also 
preferable to incurring the costs to defend against minority shareholders and their monitoring.  
By contrast, the incentives of the second largest shareholder to form a coalition with minority 
shareholders are low, given that due to the small stakes of the remaining minority shareholders 
the costs for such monitoring would mainly be incurred by the large shareholder, while the cash-
flow rights of the coalition would be low overall.  All this materially changes if the stake of the 
second largest shareholder is very similar to the stake of the first. In this latter case, the second 
larger shareholder has more incentives to closely monitor the leading blockholder and eventually 
                                                          
35
 Pagano&Roell (1998) supra note33. 
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compete for the control of the company through the formation of a coalition with the remaining 
minority shareholders. In this respect, the lower the dispersion of the ownership stakes of the 
remaining minority shareholders, the higher the likelihood that control will be contested internally 
by one of the two largest shareholders.  
2.4. Genuine multiple block-holders ownership structures  
Genuine multiple blockholders ownership structures involve the presence of MLS, none of which 
holds a controlling block of shares. There are several views about the role that the large 
shareholders in this scenario may play. The largest shareholders may, for instance, collude with 
each other and expropriate minority shareholders.36 Alternatively, they may compete with each 
other to form smaller, yet controlling coalitions with smaller shareholders.37 Provided that the 
controlling group is not formed among all large shareholders only, the dynamic interactions of 
large shareholders increases the possibility that they cross-monitor each other.38 Out of the 
various coalitions that have the power to control the company, the optimal coalition in terms of 
mitigating conflicts of shareholders interests is ex ante the one with the largest ownership stake 
because of its 'alignment effect'.39 
The greater the ownership stake of the controlling coalition the more the internalization of its 
costs. However, from the perspective of the large shareholders, the preferred coalition will actually 
be the one with the smallest ownership stake necessary to win control. This is described as the 
'coalition formation effect'.40 Given that private benefits accrue at the expense of all the non-
controlling shareholders, the coalition with the lowest possible ownership stake will have the 
largest minority group to expropriate. To put this simply, the larger the winning coalition is, the 
                                                          
36
 Zwiebel (1995) supra note12. He also points out that the control benefits are divided among large shareholders on the 
basis of their relative size of their blocks. He, thus, suggests that the holder of a small block does not necessarily share the 
private benefits of control proportionately.  
37
 Bennedsen&Wolfenzon (2000) supra note7. 
38
 Pagano&Roell (1998) supra note33; Winton (1993) supra note14; Bolton P. and Von Thaden E., (1998), Blocks, liquidity 
and corporate control, Journal of Finance, 53:1. 
39
 Bennedsen&Wolfenzon (2000) supra note7. 
40
 ibid. 
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less private benefits it will extract at the expense of minority shareholders.41 It is evident that, from 
a corporate governance perspective, the most desirable outcome is to have a coalition among 
large and smaller shareholders, with the largest ownership stake in the company, in order for the 
large shareholders to cross-monitor each other.  
The impact of MLS, none of which holds a controlling block of shares, and a continuum of small 
shareholders, has also been examined in the context of a voting contest.42 In this example, two 
blockholders compete for effective control in a company by determining the composition of the 
board of directors in a shareholders meeting. The two large shareholders submit competing 
proposals, and small shareholders will only vote if the proposals are relevant and sufficiently 
beneficial for them when compared to the cost of participation. In order to lure small 
shareholders, the two large shareholders rely on two elements: they pledge to limit the private 
benefits of control they will extract and they seek to improve their proposals, which are indicative 
of the competence of the specific shareholders to develop the company’s strategy.  
The aforementioned theoretical approach suggests that the internal contests for the allocation of 
control limit the shareholders' capacity to extract benefits, thus shifting the focus from ownership 
concentration to the internal control contests among MLS. In fact, the outcome of the internal 
contests is determined by two factors, namely the shareholders’ ability to create value when in 
control and the relative size of their blocks. Both factors work as substitutes, in the sense that 
control becomes more contestable as the controlling shareholder loses appeal as a wealth creator 
or as their block decreases in size relative to their competitor’s. The aforementioned examples 
illustrate that MLS structures significantly re-shape the traditional corporate governance problems 
arising within more absolute forms of concentration.  
 
                                                          
41
 However, caution is required with the idea of multiple shareholders acting as substitutes for poor legal protection of 
dispersed shareholders, as there may be important flaws involved. Bloch&Hege (2003) supra note23 point out that the 
weaker the legal protection, the less important is usually the gain that arises from shareholder competition.  
42
 Bloch&Hege (2003) supra note23 analyze the strategic interplay between the various block-holders on the one hand, 
and between any of the block-holders and small shareholders on the other hand. In doing so, they focus on the 
consequences for corporate performance and shareholder value. 
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3. Empirical findings regarding the impact of the varieties of blockholders ownership on 
corporate governance 
The common element in the theoretical models regarding the impact of multiple blockholders 
ownership is the underlying assumption that the presence of MLS limits the extraction of private 
benefits.43 As a result, firms with multiple block-holders and small dispersion of cash-flow rights 
have significantly higher valuations than firms with a single (non-majority) large shareholder.44 This 
finding also suggests that the extent to which the various multiple blockholders structures limit the 
extraction of private benefits depends on the dispersion of the blockholders' cash-flow rights. The 
higher dispersion of the cash-flow rights of blockholders is associated with the lower valuation of 
such companies.45 This negative correlation is explained by the collective action problems and high 
monitoring costs, which provide a disincentive for monitoring.  
In this respect, for a given controlling blockholder's combined stake, increasing the number of 
controlling block-holders is found to have a positive effect on performance.46 Similarly, a structure 
of two block-holders sharing control gives rise to less tunnelling.47 In this light, for a given 
ownership stake held by the controlling group, increasing the number of shareholders generates a 
'bargaining effect', therefore implying that private benefit and rent extraction will be less likely, 
since the controlling group formed by all the large shareholders will only approve a project if all 
the members of the group benefit from it.48 Although the bargaining problems among MLS are 
found to prevent decisions that may harm small shareholders, the company also risks missing out 
on valuable projects due to the shareholders’ internal disagreement.49 
                                                          
43
 Pagano&Roell (1998) supra note33. 
44
 Laeven&Levine (2007) supra note19 examine a sample of 1,657 publicly traded firms in Europe seeking to substantiate 
whether investors value firms with multiple block-holders differently from widely-held firms or those with a single large 
owner. 
45
 Bennedsen&Wolfenzon (2000) supra note7. However, the abovementioned line of argumentation has certain 
limitations given that greater dispersion also brings about interest misalignment and coordination problems among the 
multiple large shareholders. 
46
 Gutiérrez&Tribo (2004) supra note13. 
47
 Gomes A.R. and Novaes W., (2005), Sharing of Control as a Corporate Governance Mechanism. PIER Working Paper No. 
01-029; U. of Penn., Inst. for Law & Econ. Research Paper 01-12. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=277111. 
48
 ibid. The presence of more than one controlling shareholders substantially decreases private benefit extraction when 
the controlling group's stake is in the range between 50-60%. 
49
 See Gutiérrez&Tribo (2004) supra note13, stating that 'Remarkably, this effect becomes less positive when the number 
of block-holders is large (more than three). In that case, the difficulties to reach an agreement among controlling block-
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IV. SHAREHOLDERS AGREEMENTS AS A CORPORATE GOVERNANCE MECHANISM: 
SHAREHOLDERS' CO-ORDINATION OR EXPROPRIATION? 
 
1. Shareholders agreements: Their proliferation and content 
The existence of MLS within the corporation creates an environment in which shareholders 
coalitions are likely to thrive. Such coalitions may be expressed in the form of agreements entered 
into by the shareholders, aiming to regulate a variety of corporate governance issues. A recent 
study commissioned by the European Commission shows that shareholder agreements are not at 
all rare, as they are encountered in 12% of European listed companies.50 The extent of their 
proliferation varies.51 Shareholders agreements have received relatively limited attention in the 
literature, except in the context of venture capital investments where they are extensively used by 
venture capitalists to regulate their relations with owner-managers of growing firms.52 A 
shareholders agreement is chosen for its benefits. Such benefits include the secrecy53, the lack of 
formalities and the flexibility of shareholders agreements as to their form, their amendment, their 
length, their duration and the amount of detail required in the description of the rights and the 
relationship formed.  
                                                                                                                                                                                 
holders on the decision to take, not only protect the minority shareholders but also hinder the adoption of value-creation 
initiatives.' 
50
 ISS, Shearman and Sterling, and ECGI, 2007, “Report on the Proportionality Principle in the  European Union”, External 
Study Commissioned by the European Commission, available at  
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/company/docs/shareholders/study/final_report_en.pdf (last accessed 26.09.2011). 
51
 Roosenboom P. and Schramade W., (2006), The price of power: Valuing the controlling position of owner-managers in 
French IPO firms, Journal of Corporate Finance 12:270. For example, over the period from 1993 to 1999 26.4% of French 
IPOs featured a shareholder agreement. Later on in the life of the company, shareholders are also found to be kept 
together by an explicit agreement in 170 of 510 French listed firms (i.e. one third). For France also see Boubaker S., 
(2007), Ownership-Control Discrepancy and Firm Value: Evidence from France, Multinational Finance Journal 11:211. 
 In Italy, an agreement is in force in 15% of his sample of Italian listed companies. See Volpin, P., (2002), Governance with 
poor investor protection: evidence from top executive turnover in Italy, Journal of Financial Economics 64:61. 
52
  Kaplan S.N. and Strömberg P., (2002), Characteristics, Contracts and Actions: Evidence from Venture Capitalist 
Analyses. CRSP Working Paper No. 536. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=296956. 
53
 See Case 3265/1991 Multi-member First Instance Court of Athens (Πολυμελές Πρωτοδικείο Αθηνών). This case 
establishes that the secrecy of a shareholders agreement cannot be a reason for its unenforceability. 
The following extract has been translated from the original in Greek for the purpose of this thesis. 'Furthermore, the 
secrecy of shareholders agreements does not constitute a reason for infringing the law or the good morals, provided that 
the specific group of shareholders who are parties in the agreement does not take the form of any company that is subject 
to disclosure requirements, but constitutes a case of contractual agreement which is valid in the absence of disclosure. ' 
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These pacts are extra-statutory and may concern all or a part of the shareholders, including the 
company as a party to the agreement or not. They are facilitated by contracts which may contain a 
large number of clauses, regulating a vast variety of issues such as the exercise of the 
shareholders’ voting rights or the transferability of their shares.54 Effectively, such agreements may 
also specify the rights and duties of shareholders when the default provisions of company law do 
not reflect the desired governance arrangements. In this regard, shareholders agreements often 
contain terms which complement or even alter the distribution of powers manifested in the 
articles of association of a given company.55 
Regarding the terms of shareholders agreements, it is possible to distinguish three main 
categories.56 The management provisions of shareholders agreements determine the distribution 
of powers and the control over the company’s decisions. Shareholders may, therefore, regulate 
issues of internal corporate governance according to their interests, which are not necessarily 
aligned with the provisions set out in the articles of association of the company. The most common 
clauses are the ones prescribing the board composition57 between large shareholders or containing 
                                                          
54
 For a variety of clauses of a shareholders agreement see the Shareholders agreement between the Greek State and 
Deutsche Telecom regarding the Hellenic Telecommunications Organisation available at http://www.minfin.gr/content-
api/f/binaryChannel/minfin/datastore/b2/53/f8/b253f838f3ad28d122ef06faeccca9687439593b/application/pdf/3676_1
39-A-08_11_07_2008.pdf (last accessed 26.09.2011). This agreement has been approved by the Greek Parliament (Law 
3676/2008) and has been published in the Official Government Gazette (139/11.07.2008). 
55
 For the relationship of shareholders agreements with the articles of association see Chapter V. 
56
 Daigre J.-J., Bompoint D. and F. Basdevant, 2002, Les pactes d’actionnaires dans les sociétés cotées, Actes Pratiques et 
Ingénierie Sociétaire 64, 05-33. available at 
http://www.affi.asso.fr/uploads/Externe/48/CTR_FICHIER_343_1226349180.pdf (last accessed 26.09.20011). 
57
 Single-member First Instance Court of Athens (Μονομελές Πρωτοδικείο Αθηνών) Case 5570/2010. The following 
extract has been translated from the original in Greek for the purpose of this thesis. 
 ‘...in the shareholders agreement of 4.7.2006 of a 7-year duration, the shareholders agree that the first board of 
directors of the company will comprise the shareholders or their spouses and that each shareholder will have the right to 
appoint a members of her choice at the board...'  However, in the context of this case, the judgment rejects the claim that 
the shareholders can only revoke the members of the board that they have elected. Instead, it establishes that the 
shareholders’ meeting has the power to decide whether new members of the board will be elected and who these 
members will be. In this light, the arrangements set out in the shareholders agreement cannot restrict the statutory 
power of the shareholders meeting to elect new members at the board of directors.  
Multi-member First Instance Court of Athens (Πολυμελές Πρωτοδικείο Αθηνών) Case 3265/1991 In this case, the voting 
agreement involved 35 shareholders, who held more than 50% of the shares of the company and determined a detailed 
process of a) selecting their 10 representatives to be candidates as members of the board of directors, b) electing 7 of the 
aforementioned candidates as members of the BoD during the general meeting and c) distributing the powers among the 
elected members of the BoD according to the number of votes they obtained at the general meeting. For a detailed 
description of the terms of the agreement see Case 3265/1991. 
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restrictions or guidelines regarding the exercise of the shareholders’ voting rights.58 In Greece, this 
practice is particularly common within Societes Anonymes, because shareholders agreements 
regulate issues that could not have formed part of the content of the articles of association due to 
the strictness of the legal framework for Societes Anonymes.59 For example, issues such as the 
restriction of the transferability of shares cannot be part of the articles of association of a Societe 
Anonyme, while this may be set out in a shareholders agreement.  
Through an agreement shareholders may also be bound to exercise their voting rights in a certain 
way or seek to gain and maintain stable control over the company. Moreover, the financial 
provisions of a shareholders agreement are related to the purchase, the sale and the transfer of 
the shares in the company. The most widespread financial clause is the pre-emptive buying right.60 
Shareholders agreements may also provide, among others, for drag-along rights61 or tag-along 
rights.62 Finally, miscellaneous provisions within the shareholders agreements may concern the 
                                                          
58
 Multi-member First Instance Court of Athens (Πολυμελές Πρωτοδικείο Αθηνών) Case 3265/1991, for example held that 
a shareholders agreement determining the way they will exercise their voting rights during the general meeting regarding 
the election of the members of the board is valid. The validity of this agreement is only subject to 3 exceptions, namely a) 
when the voting agreement covers up a hidden buy-out of the shares according to Article 59 of Law 2190.1920, b) when 
the voting agreement is contrary to the interests of the company and c) when the voting agreement excessively restricts 
the rights of the parties to the agreement. 
59
 Multi-member First Instance Court of Athens (Πολυμελές Πρωτοδικείο Αθηνών) Case 569/2007. The following extract 
has been translated from the original in Greek for the purpose of this thesis. 
‘The shareholders agreements entered into by the shareholders of a Societe Anonyme or among the shareholders and 
third parties with a view to cover the practical needs of the contracting parties are legally established by the general 
principle of the freedom of contracts.(Georgakopoulos L., Company Law, Vol III, 1974, 328-329; Nisiraios E., The Law of the 
Societe Anonyme, Vol 1, 2nd Edition, 366), and are always of a contractual nature, namely they are binding for the 
contracting parties only (Perakis E., Contractual Restrictions of the shareholder's voting rights, 1976, 10.). ‘ 
60
 Under such a clause, a contracting shareholder wishing to sell her stake is required to offer it to the other contracting 
shareholders with the method of calculating the price to be paid for this transfer, often a premium to the market price of 
the shares, often set out in the agreement as well. For a variety of clauses of a shareholders agreement see the 
Shareholders agreement between the Greek State and Deutsche Telecom regarding the Hellenic Telecommunications 
Organisation supra note54. 
61
 Chemla G., Ljungqvist A. and Habib M.A., (2004), An Analysis of Shareholder Agreements, NYU, Ctr for Law and 
Business Research Paper No. 02-01; RICAFE Working Paper No. 006. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=299420. 
See Appendix 1 in particular. 
In case a shareholder sells his stake to an outside investor, drag-along rights grant the investor the right to buy out the 
other shareholders’ stakes at the same price and on the same terms as the first shareholder’s stake. Drag-along rights can 
be viewed as conditional call options granted to the outside investor. 
62
 ibid. Appendix 1. 
In case a shareholder sells his stake to an outside investor, tag-along rights grant the other shareholders the right to 
require the outside investor to buy these shareholders’ stakes at the same price and on the same terms as the first 
shareholder’s stake. Tag-along rights can be viewed as conditional put options granted to all shareholders. Interestingly, 
tag-along rights replicate the mandatory bid rule and drag-along rights recall squeeze-out rights, both mandatory rules of 
minority protection implemented in the context of the EU Takeover Bids Directive. 
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‘smooth functioning’ of the agreement. For instance, a referee can be ex ante designated to 
resolve potential problems arising ex post . Termination clauses are often also included, precisely 
defining ex ante the situations that will lead ex post to the cancellation of the agreement. 
In the context of concentrated ownership, an important function of shareholders agreements is 
the provision of distinct minority protection rights.63 In this regard, shareholders agreements can 
be used by minority shareholders to enhance their protection before they invest in the company. 
Similarly, they can be employed by former controlling shareholders or the founders of the 
company after shedding their controlling stake in order to attract outside investment. Such 
agreements often restrict the ability of majority shareholders to exercise their controlling power. 
For example, voting pacts can bind majority shareholders to a certain act or behaviour. Similarly, 
minority shareholders may be awarded special appointment or veto rights as part of the 
agreement to invest in the company.64 The function of shareholders agreements as mechanisms 
for the protection of minority shareholders is particularly important in the context of coalitions 
formed among large and small shareholders, where the reliability and enforceability of 
shareholders agreements are instrumental in safeguarding minority protection. When viewed from 
                                                          
63
 See Multi-member First Instance Court of Athens (Πολυμελές Πρωτοδικείο Αθηνών) Case 569/2007. The following 
extract has been translated from the original in Greek for the purpose of this thesis. 
'It is inherent in shareholders agreements that they aim to achieve, in addition to and independently of the corporate 
interest, the personal interests of the shareholders who are parties in the agreement. Minority shareholders may enter 
into a shareholders agreement in order to bind the remaining shareholders, and the majority shareholders in particular, to 
a specified behaviour or action (Perakis E., Contractual restrictions of the shareholder's voting rights, 1976, 224) More 
importantly, the minority shareholders may have imposed as a condition upon the majority shareholders, before they 
invested in the company, that a shareholders agreement be concluded containing specific terms which safeguard the 
investment of the minority shareholders.‘ 
64
 See Multi-member First Instance Court of Athens (Πολυμελές Πρωτοδικείο Αθηνών) Case 3265/1991 which accepts 
that a voting agreement does not limit the minority protection rights or cancel out the provisions of the articles of 
association, because the board of directors and the general meeting still have the exclusive authority, as organs of the 
company, to determine corporate decisions and actions. Similarly, in principle, the voting agreement does not excessively 
bind the right of the shareholders who are parties to the agreement. In this regard, see the following extract, as 
translated from the original in Greek for the purpose of this thesis. '...Finally, according to the factual background of the 
case, the Court cannot be led to find that the minority rights set out in Law 2190/1920 are infringed. The fact that the 
shareholders, who are also parties to the shareholders agreement, have decided in advance or have committed to vote in 
a specific way, does not necessarily result in the provisions of the law or the articles of association, which set out the 
exclusive and prevailing powers of the general meeting and the board of directors, have been cancelled out, because, 
independently of the contractual arrangements and restrictions that emerge among the contracting parties of the 
shareholders agreement (see Athens Court of Appeal (Εφετείο Αθηνών) Case 8129/1977), the general meeting and the 
board of directors are not bound to vote in the same way. Besides, the contractual obligation of the shareholder to vote 
towards a specific direction in the context of the shareholders agreement. does not, in principle, constitute an excessive 
restriction of her will,  sufficient to bring about the unlawfulness of her vote as a unilateral legal action.’ 
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this perspective, shareholders agreements constitute a central factor in the relationship of MLS 
ownership structures and corporate governance. 
 
2. The interaction of shareholders agreements and ownership structures: Theoretical 
predictions and empirical findings 
The effect of shareholders agreements on corporate governance is assessed by a variety of 
theoretical predictions which produce a conflicting picture. According to one view, for example, 
shareholders agreements contribute to the alignment of the shareholders' interests within a 
company in which MLS exist, therefore minimizing conflicts between minorities and majorities.65 
Viewed from another perspective, shareholders agreements are often classified under the 
category of control-enhancing mechanisms, which increase the risk of minority expropriation and 
render concentrated ownership structures less attractive to investors.66 Their nature as an 
expropriation tool derives from the distortion of the proportionality between control and cash-
flow rights due to the increased control power of the formed winning coalition. 
In light of the ambiguous nature of shareholders agreements, it is important to identify the factors 
which determine their actual effect on corporate governance. One such factor is the distribution of 
ownership of the shareholders who are also parties to the agreement. More specifically, if a 
shareholders agreement is in force between two shareholders whose stakes are very disparate in 
size, the expropriation effect of the coalition is considered to be maximal.67 In the context of 
shareholders agreements among shareholders owning disparate stakes, the limited scope for 
                                                          
65
 Gomes&Novaes (2005) supra note47. 
66
 For example, the EU Report, (2007), supra note50, considers shareholders agreements to be among the control 
enhancing mechanisms who accentuate the wedge between cash-flow and voting rights, therefore being likely to give 
rise to inefficiencies.  
67
 Bloch&Hege (2003) supra note23. The scholars have presented a model according to which in situations of low control 
contestability, such as in cases where the first shareholder holds cash flow rights that significantly excess those of the 
second shareholder, minority shareholders should anticipate expropriation. On the contrary, in a situation in which 
ownership distribution is even and, thus, control contestability is higher, the scope for expropriation is limited. Hence, 
following this model, it may be assumed that firm value should decrease as the size difference between major 
shareholders increases. The combination of a large shareholder and a small one signals that the aim of this agreement is 
securing effective control over the firm with the smallest possible cash flow stake. The uneven bargaining power among 
the parties to the agreement implies that the agreement does not serve the purpose of facilitating coordination among 
shareholders but is more likely to be used as an expropriation tool instead. 
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minority shareholders to challenge larger shareholders reduces internal control contests. 
Contrastingly, in the case of even distribution among large, non-controlling shareholders, control is 
more contestable internally and shareholders agreements are more likely to be used to facilitate 
the efficient coordination among shareholders.68 In the latter case, the correlation between 
shareholders agreements and firm value is a positive one.  
Empirical findings from a variety of countries only partly confirm the theoretical predictions for a 
negative impact of shareholders agreements. For example, the performance of Spanish firms is 
found to be better when the stakes of the members participating in the coalition are of similar 
size69 and a negative and significant abnormal return has been noticed when an agreement is 
signed and disclosed to the market, while the announcement of an agreement termination is 
associated with positive and significant abnormal returns.70 In the context of privately-held firms, 
such as joint ventures, shareholders agreements are generally viewed as positive71 and are 
extensively used by venture capitalists in order to alter the distribution of powers within the 
corporation and enhance or safeguard the value of their investment.72 Shareholders agreements 
                                                          
68
 For a confirmation of these predictions see the model created  by Bennedsen&Wolfenzon (2000) supra note7; Belot F., 
(2010), Shareholder Agreements and Firm Value: Evidence from French Listed Firms. Available at SSRN: 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1282144. The author explains, that when cash-flow and voting rights are unevenly distributed 
among shareholders of a closely held firm, shareholders will form coalitions in order to seize control over the firm. In 
doing so, they will seek to have the minimal financial participation. In this latter case, the shareholders of the coalition 
are less prone to internalize the costs of their actions and more attracted by the consumption of private benefits. At this 
point, the analysis would benefit from an example to illustrate this point. According to Belot, 'suppose there are only 
three shareholders and compare two possible ownership structures. The first structure is {1/3, 1/3, 1/3} and the second 
{45%, 35%, 20%}. In both situations, two shareholders can share control (because they own more than 50% of voting 
rights). In the first case this “winning coalition” pools 2/3 of the voting rights while in the second case a winning coalition 
could emerge with only 55%.' Such an outcome would potentially be more detrimental to minority shareholders, because 
the willingness of the coalition to maximise firm values is proportionate to the number of shares it owns (‘alignment 
effect’). Therefore, the potential for conflicts of interests among controlling and non-controlling shareholders is increased 
and the risk of expropriation is accentuated.   
69
 Gutiérrez&Tribo (2004) supra note13. 
70
 Gianfrate G., (2007), What Do Shareholders Coalitions Really Want? Evidence from Italian Voting Trusts. Corporate 
Governance: An International Review, 15:(2):122. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=972511 The author 
observes that in Italy, voting trust agreements are mainly aimed at both protecting controlling shareholders from hostile 
takeovers and entrenching incumbent management. 
71
 Chemla, Gilles, Ljungqvist, Alexander and Habib, Michel A., (2004), An Analysis of Shareholder Agreements, NYU, Ctr for 
Law and Business Research Paper No. 02-01; RICAFE Working Paper No. 006. Available at SSRN: 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=299420. 
72
 Steven N. K. and Stromberg P., (2003), Financial Contracting Theory Meets the Real World: An Empirical Analysis of 
Venture Capital Contracts, Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, 70(2):281. 
Although the specific research deals with the rights which form part of a shareholders agreement in the context of joint 
ventures and venture capital contracts, it is indicative of the role of shareholders agreements in complementing the law 
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are also found to mitigate the bargaining problems among MLS with respect to taking up 
investment projects that are beneficial for the company.73 The terms contained in such 
agreements can induce the parties to make ex ante investments and prevent ex post transfers, 
defined as the so-called ‘hold up problem’, therefore achieving the efficient ex post allocation of 
stakes within the firm.74  
The positive impact of shareholders agreements is also indicated by the higher sensitivity of CEO 
turnover to poor performance when the shareholders of the firm are kept together by an explicit 
agreement.75 Similarly, in the context of an analysis of the dividend payout policy of Italian firms, it 
has been observed that the payout in firms whose shareholders have signed an agreement is 
higher.76 Again, this finding can be interpreted as evidence of a less severe agency conflict between 
large and minority shareholders. In the US, the indications that voting agreements are a means of 
extracting private benefits are limited, even if the effect of the agreement is the creation of a 
wedge in cash-flow and control rights.77 In this respect, evidence suggests that firm value is 
enhanced even when voting agreements are used by family owners. France, a jurisdiction in which 
shareholders agreements are often encountered, constitutes another illustrative example of the 
positive effect of shareholders agreements. Despite the negative relationship observed between 
firm value and the dispersion of voting rights across major shareholders78, the existence of a 
shareholder agreement tends to offset this negative effect. This countervailing effect is more 
pronounced when a ‘concerted action’ provision79 is in force and/or the contracting shareholders 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
or in accommodating the needs and aims of corporate actors. It is also indicative of the potential beneficial impact of 
shareholders agreements on the efficient allocation of resources and the promotion of investment through the inclusion 
of special terms which will govern tender offers and the sale of control blocks. In this context, private benefits extraction 
is regarded as a pre-requisite of ex-ante investments. 
73
 Gomes&Novaes (2005) supra note47. 
74
 Kaplan&Stromberg (2003) supra note72. 
75
 Volpin (2002) supra note51. 
Although the turnover is significantly lower and unaffected by performance when the controlling shareholder of the firm 
is also a top executive in the firm, it is more sensitive to performance when control is contestable and when the 
controlling shareholder owns a larger fraction of the firm's cash-flow rights.  
76
Mancinelli L. and Ozkan A., (2006). Ownership structure and dividend policy: Evidence from Italian firms. European 
Journal of Finance, 12(3):265. 
77
 Villalonga B. and R. Amit, (2009a), How are U.S. Family Firms Controlled?, Review of Financial Studies 2009 22(8):3047-
3091. 
78
 Belot (2010) supra note68. 
79
 For the definition of concerted action see Chapter VI. 
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are of the same type. In alignment with the aforementioned findings, higher valuations are also 
documented for French firms which have in place a shareholders agreement in which the pre- and 
post-IPO controlling shareholders agree to share control.80  
 
V. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
Multiple large shareholders are often encountered within companies of concentrated ownership. 
The distinct characteristics of multiple blockholders structures determine the impact of this form 
of concentrated ownership on corporate governance. The most important elements of multiple 
blockholders ownership include the number and the size of the blockholdings, the distribution of 
shareholders cash-flow and control rights and the identity of the large shareholders. These factors 
interact to produce a wide variety of combinations of controlling coalitions. They also shape the 
characteristics of the resulting coalitions and their impact on corporate governance, most notably 
the scope for private benefit extraction. The concrete examples of this Chapter clearly illustrate 
how each factor contributes to internal control contestability, which is one of the main drivers of 
low private benefit extraction.  
Internal control contestability is closely linked to the formation of shareholders agreements. Such 
agreements are the legal expression of the interactions and arrangements among the shareholders 
participating in a coalition. Shareholders agreements have been cited for their dynamic potential 
and ambiguous impact as corporate governance mechanisms. The legal effectiveness of the 
regulation of shareholders agreements is the main determinant of their benign or malign character 
as a corporate governance mechanism. In this respect, by presenting the interrelation of 
shareholders coalitions and corporate governance, this Chapter sets the general background, 
against which the legal effectiveness of investor protection provisions within multiple blockholders 
ownership structures is assessed in Chapters V and VI of this thesis. 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
The study, therefore, indicates that the positive effect of the shareholders agreements is greater when the contracting 
shareholders confirm through the agreement their common view on the strategy of the company. 
80
 Schramade W. and Roosenboom P., (2006), The Price of Power: Valuing the Controlling Position of Owner-Managers in 
French IPO Firms. Journal of Corporate Finance, 12(2):270. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=708985. Their 
findings derive from the analysis of a sample of 299 French companies conducting an IPO over the period from 1993 to 
1999. 
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CHAPTER V: THE ROLE OF THE LAW IN FACILITATING THE INTERACTIONS OF 
MULTIPLE LARGE SHAREHOLDERS: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF THE 
REGULATION OF SHAREHOLDERS AGREEMENTS IN THE UK AND GREECE 
 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Theoretically, shareholders agreements have the potential to be a beneficial mechanism which 
facilitates the coordination of shareholders but their role in practice depends on the context and 
the overall regulatory framework in which they operate. More specifically, as shareholders 
agreements often include minority protection provisions, their enforceability determines their 
impact on investor protection. The role of the law is, therefore, vital because it affects the 
reliability of shareholders agreements as a governance tool. If the legal uncertainty and risk1 are 
excessive, shareholders agreements turn into unreliable and ineffective governance mechanisms 
which shareholders are unwilling to use for their coordination. In this regard, a facilitative 
regulatory regime constitutes the first prerequisite for the development of shareholders 
agreements into a reliable and effective corporate governance mechanism. However, the dynamics 
of shareholders agreements, most notably the ambiguity regarding their impact as minority 
expropriating tools or efficient coordination mechanisms, necessitate that limits be imposed on 
their enforceability. In this respect, legal rules and principles act as a filter which allows beneficial 
shareholders coalitions to be formed while restricting the risk of minority expropriation resulting 
from the control-enhancing effect of the shareholders agreements. In this context, legal 
effectiveness is defined as the effectiveness of the law to strike down shareholders agreements of 
an expropriating nature. 
                                                          
1
Legal risk derives from the terms that affect the rights and duties of the shareholders with regard to the voting process 
and power, and the composition, election and powers of the board of directors.    
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In this Chapter, the identification of the mechanisms employed by the selected jurisdictions to 
strike the right balance between the efficient coordination of shareholders and minority 
expropriation involves the comparative analysis between two different jurisdictions. More 
specifically, the comparative assessment of the law of shareholders agreements, viewed as the 
legal expression of shareholders interactions, involves two jurisdictions of different legal origin, 
namely the UK and Greece. This comparison highlights the differences and similarities of the 
regulation of the same legal relationship, namely shareholders agreements, by two legal systems 
of different origin. In both jurisdictions shareholders agreements have a central role for different 
reasons: In the UK, shareholders agreements facilitate the coordination of dispersed institutional 
shareholders, who collectively own the vast majority of listed companies. In Greece, shareholders 
agreements facilitate the interaction of multiple large shareholders and often constitute a minority 
protection mechanism. Structuring the comparative analysis around two countries with different 
legal systems is perfectly aligned with the argument underlying this thesis, that the effectiveness of 
the legal framework rather than the legal origin determines the quality of investor protection. 
The substantive analysis of black-letter rules and case law guarantees the reliable evaluation of the 
quality of the legal framework of investor protection. The comparison is structured around three 
determinants of legal effectiveness, the first being the legal nature of shareholders agreements. 
This analysis indicates how shareholders agreements are perceived by the law and sets the basis 
for understanding the more complex issues regarding their regulation. The second factor involves 
the complex relationship of shareholders agreements and the articles of association of the 
company. This point is particularly important in light of the distinct legal nature of shareholders 
agreements, as they lie at the intersection of company and contract law. The third factor refers to 
the limitations imposed on shareholders agreements by the law. This aspect is vital because it 
determines the extent to which shareholders agreements can be used as expropriation 
mechanisms.  
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II. THE LEGAL NATURE OF SHAREHOLDERS AGREEMENTS 
 
1. The legal nature of shareholders agreements in the UK 
In the UK, shareholders agreements are viewed as an expression of the parties’ freedom of 
contract.2 This implies an inherent flexibility associated with shareholders agreements, as the 
parties have a wide discretion when determining their content. However, the lack of disclosure3 of 
the terms of the agreement is in contrast with the transparency imposed at the level of the articles 
of association. Moreover, the interference of the terms of shareholders agreements with the 
articles of association creates a tension between the two sets of regulation, thus giving rise to legal 
risk born by the parties to the agreement. Legal risk emerges because the limits of the 
enforceability of shareholders agreements and the limits of the contractual freedom of the 
shareholders are often blurred.  
In this respect, different views have been expressed. According to the restrictive view4, there is a 
limited scope for legally enforceable shareholders agreements because they facilitate the evasion 
of company law rules. Contrastingly, the liberal view5 not only accepts an unfettered contractual 
freedom between shareholders, but extends this freedom to the agreements between 
shareholders and the company as a party. In the latter case, shareholders agreements importantly 
become part of the arrangements of the corporation and in effect complement the regulation of 
the governance of the company illustrated in the company's articles of association. An example in 
support of this view is Section 40(3)(b) of the Companies Act 2006 which acknowledges that 
shareholders agreements complement the articles of association. By covering both the restrictions 
deriving from the articles and the ones deriving from shareholders agreements, it, therefore, 
                                                          
2
 For the treatment of shareholders agreements in the context of UK law see for example E. Ferran, (1994), The Decision 
of the House of Lords in Russell v Northern Bank Development Corporation Limited, Cambridge Law Journal, 53:343. 
According to the most liberal view expressed in this paper, shareholders agreements constitute an expression of the 
contractual freedom of the shareholders and the company, should the latter choose to enter into such an agreement. 
3
 To the extent that there is no requirement for such agreements to be disclosed, they distort the transparency imposed 
on the internal governance of companies for the protection of shareholders and third parties alike.  
4
 Schmitthoff k., (1970), House of Lords Sanctions Evasion of Companies Act, Journal of Business Law, 1970, 1. 
5
 Ferran (1994) supra note2. 
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provides an expanded definition of the company’s constitution compared to the definition in S17 
and S29.6  
A key element of the law of shareholders agreements, whether agreed by all or some of the 
shareholders only, is that they create personal obligations between the parties only and, in 
principle, the agreement does not become a regulation of the company. Additionally, as the 
principle of privity of contract applies, the agreement does not become binding on the transferees 
of the parties to it or upon new or non-assenting shareholders.7 The flexibility underpinning the 
shareholders agreements allows the parties to agree on the matters they choose. Similarly, the 
parties can alter their agreement as long as they all agree or follow the procedures that the 
shareholders agreement prescribes.8 
An additional important aspect of the law of shareholders agreements in the UK involves the 
remedies available for the parties to the agreement. Should a breach occur, the parties have the 
option to either bring a claim for damages or request injunctive relief. In Puddephatt v Leith9, for 
example, the court compelled a shareholder to vote as agreed in a shareholders agreement. In 
Russell v Northern Bank10, such an order would also possibly have been granted by the court, had it 
been sought by the claimant, which would prevent the shareholders-parties from voting in favour 
of the resolution in question.11 The availability of specific performance remedies under UK law is a 
determining factor when it comes to the assessment of the effectiveness of the legal framework to 
protect minority shareholders who are parties to the agreement. As the courts will grant orders to 
enforce shareholders agreements, they send out an important signal to market participants that 
the contractual obligations undertaken in the context of shareholders agreements must be 
respected. To the extent that shareholders agreements contain provisions which protect minority 
                                                          
6
 Gower&Davies, (2008), Principles of Modern Company Law, 8th Edition, Sweet & Maxwell page76 footnote 124. 
7
 Lord Davey in Welton v Saffery, [1897] A.C.299. 
8
 In Euro Brokers Holdings Ltd v Monecor (London) Ltd [2003] EWCA Civ 105 [2003] BCC 573,[2003] 1 BCLC 506, the Court 
of Appeal found that a unanimous informal agreement could alter procedures agreed in a shareholders’ agreement. 
9
 Puddephatt v Leith [1916] 1 Ch 200. 
10
 Russell v Northern Bank Development Corp Ltd [1992] BCC 578; [1992] 1 WLR 588. 
11
 Kershaw D., (2009), Company Law in Context: Text and Materials, OUP, p.95. 
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shareholders, this approach limits the risk of minority expropriation and reinforces the perception 
of shareholders agreements as a reliable mechanism of corporate governance. 
 
2. The legal nature of shareholders agreements in Greece 
Under Greek law, shareholders agreements are also premised on the freedom of contract as 
expressed in Article 361 of the Greek Civil Code and as such are presumed to be lawful.12 Such 
agreements are contractual in nature and, as the principle of the privity of contracts applies, they 
are only binding among the parties to the agreement. As a result, they do not bind the company or 
the shareholders who became members of the company following a subsequent transfer of 
shares.13 The shareholders agreements are not subject to any form or disclosure requirements and 
may be express or implied.14 The stake or the economic participation of the shareholders in the 
company does not affect the rights and processes established under the shareholders agreement, 
unless specifically stated. For example, their amendment requires the agreement of all parties, 
unless otherwise prescribed within the agreement.  
Their function and operation is subject to the rules and general principles of contract law as stated 
in the Greek Civil Code. A voting agreement, for example, may be valid, although it restricts the 
exercise of the shareholders' statutory voting right, the obligation undertaken by the shareholders 
                                                          
12
 Case 304/1998 Multi-member First Instance Court of Verroia (Πολυμελές Πρωτοδικείο Βέρροιας). The following extract 
has been translated from the original in Greek for the purpose of this thesis. 
‘Τhe legal foundation of the relevant agreements is the principle of freedom of contract, (Article 361 GCC), coupled with 
the provisions of Law 2190/1920.’ 
13
 Marinos M., (2004), Shareholders agreements as a means of coordination and planning,(Οι συμφωνίες μεταξύ μετόχων 
ως μέσο οργάνωσης και προγραμματισμού), Chronicles of Private Law, 2004, 97; Marinos M., (2008), Contractual 
shareholders agreements and the articles of association-Some normative observations on the distinction between the 
statutory and the contractual agreement following Case 1121/2006 of the Supreme Court of Greece (Άρειος 
Πάγος),(Ενοχική συμφωνία μετόχων και καταστατικό-Μερικές δογματικές παρατηρήσεις στη διάκριση μεταξύ 
καταστατικής και ενοχικής σύμβασης με αφορμή την απόφαση ΑΠ 1121/2006), Elliniki Dikaiosini, 2008, 677. 
14
Case 304/1998 Multi-member First Instance Court of Verroia (Πολυμελές Πρωτοδικείο Βέρροιας).  The following extract 
has been translated from the original in Greek for the purpose of this thesis. 
‘Commercial practices, particularly in the field of Societes Anonymes, involve that the shareholders of the company 
complement or to some extent substitute the organisation of the company with contractual agreements among 
themselves or even with persons who are not shareholders of the company. These shareholders agreements are not 
subject to any form and are not disclosed, they are being entered into explicitly or tacitly and regulate issues regarding the 
operation of the company.’  
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being only contractual in nature.15 It is also possible that a separate legal relationship between the 
parties to the agreement is established as a result of the agreement. For example, if a shareholder 
takes up the obligation to vote in a certain way against a third party, who is not a shareholder, the 
voting agreement may also give rise to a relationship of agency among the parties according to 
Article 713 of the Greek Civil Code.16 Similarly, if all the shareholders are parties to a voting 
agreement, a distinct legal relationship of 'civil company' may be formed among them, according 
to Article 741 of the Greek Civil Code.17  
In terms of enforcement, the failure of the shareholder to comply with the terms of the agreement 
constitutes a breach and the shareholder will be liable to compensate the parties to the agreement 
for the breach.18 The distinct legal relationships which arise in the context of the specific factual 
background may often provide an alternative legal basis for the compensation of the contracting 
                                                          
15
Case 304/1998 Multi-member First Instance Court of Verroia (Πολυμελές Πρωτοδικείο Βέρροιας).  The following extract 
has been translated from the original in Greek for the purpose of this thesis.  
' Under the category of shareholders agreements also fall the voting agreements, according to which the shareholder 
undertakes the obligation to vote at the shareholders meeting in a specified way, in order to bring about a specified 
outcome and  shape the will of the company as a legal person accordingly. The restrictions of the shareholders'  voting 
powers fall under contract, rather than  company law, because the undertaking of the shareholder does not alter the 
nature of her voting right; the shareholder is simply restricting her power to exercise her voting rights freely at the 
shareholders meeting.'  
Also see relevant case law: Case 3265/91Multi-member First Instance Court of Athens, published in Commercial Law 
Review 1991, 444; Case 5001/71 Multi-member First Instance Court of Athens, published in Commercial Law Review 1971, 
545; Perakis E., (1976), Contractual restrictions  of shareholders' voting rights (Ενοχικαί δεσμεύσεις του δικαιώματος 
ψήφου του μετόχου), 1976, 3. 
16
 Case 304/1998 Multi-member First Instance Court of Verroia (Πολυμελές Πρωτοδικείο Βέρροιας).  The following 
extract has been translated from the original in Greek for the purpose of this thesis. 
‘..., if the shareholder unilaterally undertakes to vote in a specified way without any consideration/remuneration and 
without a similar undertaking by her counterparty, such as in the case that the counterparty is not a shareholder of the 
company, an agency relationship is concluded, according to article 713 of the Civil Code, the agency involving the exercise 
of the voting rights in a specified way. Consequently, if the shareholder fails to comply with the undertaking, she is 
contractually liable to compensate her counterparty, as provided by Article 714, according to which the agent is liable to 
compensate her principle even when negligence is involved.’ 
17
 The civil company created among the parties of the agreement has no separate legal personality. See further Marinos 
(2004, 2008) supra note13; Rokas N., (1996), Commercial Companies,4th Edition, Ant.Sakkoulas Publications, page3. An 
important element of this type of legal relationship is that the members of the civil company owe a duty of loyalty to 
each other, the breach of which gives rise to an additional legal basis of contractual liability. The duty of loyalty will, for 
instance, be infringed should the majority shareholders fail to comply with the shareholders agreement, thus 
expropriating the minority shareholders, who are also parties to the agreement. 
18
 Case 304/1998 Multi-member First Instance Court of Verroia (Πολυμελές Πρωτοδικείο Βέρροιας). The following extract 
has been translated from the original in Greek for the purpose of this thesis.  
‘…..Furthermore, if the shareholder is unable to comply with her undertaking, either because she never had the voting 
rights to do so or lost her voting rights subsequently or she undertook to vote contrary to the law, the provisions of Articles 
362 and 335 of the Civil Code apply.’  
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parties due to the breach. However, an important deficiency of the Greek legal framework derives 
from the fact that the breach of the shareholders agreement only gives the contracting 
counterparties the right to seek compensation for damages rather than specific performance.19 
The lack of availability of specific performance remedies implies that the parties to an agreement 
which protects minority shareholders can potentially choose between the compliance with the 
agreement and the exercise of their voting power, for example, to approve transactions or 
strategies which enable them to extract private benefits of control, so long as the benefits from 
the breach outweigh the costs of compensation owed to the minority shareholders harmed by the 
breach. As the parties to the agreement are provided with a leeway from their contractual 
obligations, the reliability of shareholders agreements as a corporate governance mechanism is 
substantially compromised. 
 
III. THE INTERACTION OF SHAREHOLDERS AGREEMENTS WITH THE ARTICLES OF 
ASSOCIATION 
An important source of complexity in the relationship of shareholders agreements and the articles 
of association derives from the fact that a common set of issues regarding the organisation of the 
company is regulated by two different legal sources. In the context of this thesis, this relationship 
is important because it affects the enforceability of shareholders agreements and, consequently, 
the reliance of market participants on them as an effective governance mechanism. More 
specifically, the distinct legal nature of the articles of association limits the contractual freedom of 
the parties to an agreement. Effectively, this relationship gives rise to a paradox, as the articles of 
association often neutralise the shareholders agreements, which aim to alter the company's 
internal organisation or the allocation of control rights as manifested in the company's articles of 
association. A vicious circle is initiated, because the objective of the shareholders agreement is 
often the change in the company's organisation and operation, as prescribed in the articles of 
association. 
                                                          
19
 ibid.  Case 304/1998Multi-member First Instance Court of Verroia (Πολυμελές Πρωτοδικείο Βέρροιας). 
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Although shareholders agreements are only contractual in nature across both jurisdictions, under 
certain conditions, their impact on corporate actions and decisions is determining. For example, 
although in both jurisdictions the resolutions passed at the general meeting are subject to 
corporate formalities and disclosure requirements, the participation of all the shareholders of the 
company to an agreement could have the equivalent effect of a resolution passed by the general 
meeting even without the observation of the required procedural formalities and disclosure. The 
issue has arisen both in the UK and Greece and the approach adopted is found in the case of Re 
Duomatic in the UK and in Case 26/1998 of the Supreme Court of Greece (Άρειος Πάγος) in 
Greece. The factual background in both cases involved the participation of all shareholders as 
parties to the agreement. The permissive approach to shareholders agreements reflected in the 
acceptance by both legal systems of the effect of a corporate action, even without the observation 
of corporate formalities, constitutes an illustrative example of the similarities of both jurisdictions.  
 
1. The relationship of shareholders agreements and the articles of association in the UK 
1.1 The prevalence of the articles of association 
In the UK, the articles of association are a so called ‘statutory contract’, created by the Companies 
Act 2006 (CA2006, Section 33).20 They constitute the manifestation of the freedom of the members 
to organise the company through governance rules that meet their preferences and correspond to 
the activity undertaken by the company. As default rules, the Model Articles21 issued pursuant to 
the CA2006 apply to a company unless the members of the company have put alternative rules in 
place through the articles of association. The Model Articles, although optional, set out the 
practices which become a benchmark governance standard.22 According to Section 33, the articles 
have the effect of a contract between both the members inter se and between the members and 
                                                          
20
 Reece Thomas K. and Ryan C.L., (1999) The Law and Practice of Shareholders Agreements, Butterworths, LexisNexis, 
1999, 4; Kershaw (2009) supra note11, p.85; Rayfield v Hands [1958] 2WLR 851; Wood v Odessa Waterworks Co [1889]  
42 Ch D 636. On the enforceability of the corporate contract and the limitations imposed see Kershaw (2009) supra 
note11, p.87-93; Gower&Davies (2008) supra note6  p.68-74. 
21
 See the Companies Model Articles Regulations 2008 No 3229, issued pursuant to S19 CA 2006, by the Secretary of 
State. 
22
 Kershaw (2009) supra note11, p.82 The Articles of Association may deviate from the Model Articles to the extent that 
no mandatory rules of company law are affected. 
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the company.23 Contrary to regular contracts, however, the company’s articles of association and 
any amendments must be filed with the Companies House and are made publicly available.24  
Despite the similarities to contracts, the articles of association which provide the internal 
governance rules of the company as a separate legal entity differ from an ordinary contract in 
several ways.25 For example, their binding character extends to the new shareholders acquiring the 
company’s shares after the adoption of the articles, notwithstanding the lack of their specific 
consent to the terms set out in the articles of association.26 Such consent is implied and the new 
shareholders are deemed by statute to be bound by virtue of their shareholding. Viewed from this 
perspective, the articles of association establish an exception to the principle of privity of contract. 
In addition to this, the articles of association, despite their contractual elements, are not 
enforceable by the shareholders against one another or the company and vice versa, with the 
exception of special rights held by shareholders in their capacity as shareholders.27  
The differences in the nature of the shareholders agreements and the articles of association are 
legally important. More specifically, the UK case law confirms the prevalent legal nature of the 
                                                          
23
 Hickman v Kent Romney Marsh Sheep-Breeders' Association [1915] 1 Ch 881. 
24
 S18(2) CA2006 and S26 CA2006 requiring for any amendments to the Articles to be filed within 15 days of the 
amendment. 
25
 Reece&Ryan (1999) supra note20, p.6 For example, the AOA can be amended without the unanimous consent of the 
parties by virtue of the right of the company to change its articles by special resolution. (Section 21 of CA 2006) For the 
purposes of amending the Articles of Association the company is represented by its members and a special resolution is 
required. This means that the resolution must attract 75% of the votes cast in a shareholders meeting. The 75% threshold 
is a mandatory minimum threshold. When exercising their voting rights, shareholders are also subject to a duty to vote 
bona fide to the benefit of the company as developed in common law. See Allen v Gold Reefs of Africa LTD[1900-03] All 
ER REP 746; Brown v British Abrasive Wheel Co Ltd [1918-19] All ER Rep 308; Sidebottom v Kershaw, Leese and Company 
Ltd [1920] 1 Ch 154 (CA); Dafen Tinplate Company Limited v Llanelly Steel Company [1920] 2 Ch124; Shuttleworth v Cox 
Bros Ltd [1927] 2KB 9 (CA), Greenhalgh v Anderne Cinemas [1951] Ch 286, Citco Banking Corporation NV v Pusser's Ltd 
[2007] UKPC 13. 
26
 Section 33 (1) CA2006 states that the articles bind the company and its members, referring those that at any time are 
members to the company. 
27
 Kershaw (2009) supra note11, p.89. The articles do not create individual rights but their primary function is to provide 
for collective decision-making procedures and to distribute collective members rights. Thus, a breach of the collective 
rights of the shareholders created by the articles can only be enforced by the shareholders as a body. In this latter case, 
such a breach of the corporate contract amounts to an internal irregularity. By contrast a shareholder will be able to 
enforce the corporate contract, only if this gives rise to personal rights in his/her capacity as a shareholder. On this 
distinction and the important of the factor of discrimination against a shareholder with regard to his rights granted by the 
articles see Macdoougall v Gardiner[1875] 1 Ch D 13 and Pender v Lushington [1877] 6 CH D 70.  
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articles of association28 by establishing that a shareholders agreement will be unenforceable 
against the company, if the agreement contains provisions which are in breach of statutory or 
common law. The participation of the company to the agreement will not be a material factor and 
any restriction of the company's statutory rights through a shareholders agreement cannot be 
justified on the basis of the freedom of contract of the company. The comparison between 
shareholders agreements and the articles of association in the UK, therefore, indicates the 
prevalence of the latter due to their distinct legal nature. However, this general proposition is 
subject to important exceptions, which blur the limits of their relationship. 
1.2. Exceptions to the prevalence of the articles of association  
1.2.1 Shareholders agreements as corporate resolutions 
In the UK, the legal basis of the flexible, permissive approach to shareholders agreements is set out 
in Re Duomatic29, which establishes the principle that ‘where it can be shown that all shareholders 
who have the right to attend and vote at a general meeting of the company assent to some matter 
which a general meeting of the company could carry into effect, that assent is as binding as a 
resolution in general meeting would be.’30 The wording of the judgment indicates that there is no 
limitation with regard to the actual ‘matters’ to which shareholders assent. This suggests that this 
principle does not only apply to approvals required by the company’s constitution or to 
ratifications of breach of duty.31 
1.2.2 Shareholders agreements as an amendment of the articles of association 
The principle established in Re Duomatic, can also be extended to apply to the resolutions which 
approve an amendment of the articles of association. The prerequisite for the application of the 
principle is that all shareholders provide their approval, even if their consent is informal or is 
granted outside the context of the shareholders meeting, for example.32 In this light, few 
                                                          
28
 Russell v Northern Bank supra note10. 
29
 Re Duomatic [1969] 1 All ER 161. 
30
 As per Buckley J in Re Duomatic. 
31
 See Kershaw (2009) supra note11, p.103 footnote 93, Bankgesellschaft Berlin AG (formerly Berliner Bank AG) v Makris 
[1999] All ER (D) 56. 
32
 See Kershaw (2009) supra note11, p.103 with further references in footnote 92 to Cane v Jones (1981) 1 All ER 533, per 
Michael Wheeler QC: 'it is a basic principle of company law that all the corporators, acting together, can do anything 
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objections remain to the application of the Re Duomatic principle in the context of a shareholders 
agreement, provided that all the shareholders are parties. The consent of the shareholders 
expressed within the agreement could, therefore, have the effect of an amendment of the articles 
of association despite the fact that the requirements set out in Section 21 of the CA2006 are not 
complied with. This could be particularly relevant in the context of small companies which 
habitually exhibit a lack of adherence to corporate formalities when conducting their affairs.  
 
2. The relationship of shareholders agreements and the articles of association in Greece 
2.1. The prevalence of the articles of association 
The tension between the articles of association and shareholders agreements is also the case in 
Greek law.33 The most widely-accepted view considers the relationship between shareholders 
agreements and the articles of association to be a hierarchical one.34 According to the principle of 
separation of the two contracts and the principle of the prevalence of the provisions of the articles 
of association, shareholders agreements will only be enforceable to the extent that they are not 
contrary to the provisions set out in the articles of association. As shareholders agreements are 
only contractual in nature, they do not strictly complement or amend the articles of association, in 
light of the statutory legal nature of the latter.  
Therefore, the articles of association and shareholders agreements only work in parallel, subject to 
the prevalence of the former. This view is manifested in the general rule that a decision or action 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
which is intra vires the company'; to Re Bailey, Hay&Co Ltd (1971) 3 All ER 693, per Brightman J: 'it is established law that 
a company is bound, in a matter intra vires the company, by the unanimous agreement of all its corporators'. 
33
 Vervesos N., (2007), Shareholders agreement among all the shareholders of the company (Omnilaterale 
Gesellshaftervereinbarung) and invalidity of the resolution of the general meeting of the shareholders, Simultaneously, 
observations on Case 1121/2006 of the Supreme Court of Greece (Άρειος Πάγος), (Εξωεταιρική συμφωνία ανάμεσα σε 
όλους τους μετόχους της εταιρίας (Omnilaterale Gesellshaftervereinbarung)  και ακυρότητα της απόφασης της γενικής 
συνέλευσης των μετόχων. Συγχρόνως παρατηρήσεις στην απόφαση 1121/2006 ΑΠ), Commercial Law Review, 2007, 932. 
34
 Marinos M., (2006), Comments on Multi-member First Instance Court of Athens Case 5723/2006, published in Law of 
Enterprises and Companies, 2006, 1151. 
More specifically, shareholders agreements are constrained by the articles of association and, should a conflict arise, the 
provisions of the articles of association prevail. See above Part III.2.(2.1). 
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of the organs of the company in breach of the articles of association will be void.35 However, such a 
strict approach aligned with the principle of separation is under criticism mainly for being 
formalistic and for distorting the corporate reality shaped by the shareholders agreement. Instead, 
the articles of association and the shareholders agreement should be applied as a unity, in order 
for the law to capture and effectively regulate the complex arrangements developed at the level of 
the corporation.36 To this effect, a variety of exceptions mitigates the formalistic affect of the 
principle of separation and blurs the limits of the relationship of shareholders agreements and the 
articles of association. 
2.2 Exceptions to the prevalence of the articles of association 
2.2.1   Shareholders agreements as corporate resolutions 
An important exception to the prevalence of the articles of association is established under Greek 
company law by considering that a shareholders agreement which is entered into by all the 
shareholders has the effect of a resolution of the shareholders meeting.37 The favourable approach 
of the Greek law is manifested in Case 26/1998 of the Supreme Court of Greece, which has 
accepted that ‘it is possible for the will of the legal person to be expressed, at least in special 
circumstances, without the involvement of the organs of the company, through all of its 
shareholders, who are effectively identified with it.’38 Such 'special circumstances' may involve 
closely-held corporations, where the participation of all the shareholders to the agreement can be 
equal to their participation in a duly convened general meeting where a resolution would normally 
                                                          
35
 See Article 35a par2b of Law 2190/1920, as amended by Law 3604/2007, which applies to Societes Anonymes. The 
decisions of the general shareholders meeting will be void if they are in breach of the articles of association or if they are 
taken in breach of general principles of good faith, good moral etc as such principles apply in the context of company law. 
See Case 832/1976 Supreme Court of Greece (Άρειος Πάγος), published in Νοmiko Vima, 25:190. 
Similarly, the actions/resolutions of the board of directors can be void for similar breaches. See for example Case 
1339/1995 Piraeus Court of Appeal, published in Elliniki Dikaiosini 1996, 201; Case 433/1995 Multi-member First Instance 
Court of Piraeus, published in Law of Enterprises and Companies 1995, 405; Case 48/1991 Multi-member First Instance 
Court of Rodopi (Μονομελές Πρωτοδικείο Ροδόπης), published in Elliniki Dikaiosini 1992, 1626. 
36
 Marinos (2006) supra note34. 
37
 Also see Vervesos (2007) supra note33. 
38
 On the issue also see Case 26/1998, Supreme Court of Greece ('Αρειος Πάγος), published in Commercial Law Review 
1998, p.669, and Pampoukis K., Comments on Case 26/1998 Supreme Court of Greece ('Αρειος Πάγος), published in 
Commercial Law Review, 1998, p.553. 
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be passed at. In the context of such an approach, a statutory effect is attributed to the contractual 
nature of the shareholders agreement. 
2.2.2   Shareholders agreements as an amendment of the articles of association  
Under Greek law, in principle, a shareholders agreement cannot alter the articles of association, 
which constitute a contract between the company and its members in respect of the rights and 
liabilities they have in their capacity as members. However, courts have developed a more 
permissive approach to shareholders agreements by accepting that a shareholders agreement to 
which all shareholders are a party is more than contractual in nature.39 In this respect, a recent 
Greek judgment40 held that the legal nature of shareholders agreements is altered if all the 
shareholders are parties to the agreement, as it may often be the case in the context of a small 
company incorporated under the form of a Societe Anonyme. The terms of such an agreement 
acquire the nature of de facto provisions of the articles of association and become quasi statutory 
in nature. In order for this effect to be created, it is immaterial whether there is a specific 
reference by the articles of association to the shareholders agreement or not.41  
This approach substantially favours shareholders agreements and protects the parties to the 
agreement by extending its binding effect and by rendering it a part of the constitutional 
documents of the company. As a result, the role and impact of shareholders agreements as a 
governance mechanism is substantially upgraded, because the legal consequences of a breach of 
the terms of the agreement will, in effect, threaten the validity of the company’s actions. In the 
case that the shareholders agreement contains provisions for the protection of minorities, this 
approach limits the ability of majority shareholders to pass resolutions contrary to the terms of the 
agreement to the detriment of minority shareholders. However, this change in the legal nature of 
the shareholders agreements and the attribution of a statutory effect to the terms of the 
shareholders agreement have been criticised heavily as being contrary to basic formalities and 
                                                          
39
 Also see Vervesos (2007) supra note33. 
40
 Case 5079/2002 Single-member Court of First Instance of Athens, published in Commercial Law Review 2002, 572, Also 
see Opinion of Rokas N. in the context of Case 5565/2003 Single-member Court of First Instance of Athens, published in 
Commercial Law Review 2003, 831. 
41
 Case 26/1998 of the Supreme Court of Greece (Άρειος Πάγος). The extract has been translated from the original in 
Greek for the purpose of this thesis. 
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general principles of company and contract law, such as important disclosure requirements and 
the principle of privity of contracts.42   
 
IV. THE INTERACTION OF SHAREHOLDERS AGREEMENTS WITH MANDATORY COMPANY 
LAW RULES 
In addition to the articles of association, the mandatory provisions of company law impose 
important restrictions on shareholders agreements. In both jurisdictions examined, shareholders 
agreements are, in principle, unenforceable to the extent that they facilitate the avoidance of 
mandatory provisions of company law. The fact that both jurisdictions impose limits on the 
enforceability of shareholders agreements through mandatory rules, does not necessarily imply 
that the actual effect of the limitations is identical, because the number of mandatory rules in each 
of the selected jurisdictions is different. Similarly, the approach of the case law to the interaction 
of shareholders agreements and mandatory law also differs in terms of flexibility and strictness.  
In effect, the increased number of mandatory provisions in Law 2190/1920 in Greece is 
counterbalanced by a permissive approach of the case law, therefore allowing the shareholders 
agreements to determine the organisation of the company more freely. Therefore, in both 
jurisdictions, the interpretation of the legal relationship between shareholders agreements and 
mandatory legal provisions mitigates the impact of mandatory rules in practice. This is particularly 
important in the case of Greece, because the favourable approach of the case law counteracts the 
restrictive effect of the multiple mandatory rules, therefore promoting shareholders coordination 
and the use of shareholders agreements as a tool of minority protection. 
                                                          
42
 At this point, it must be noted that the aforementioned approach has received extensive criticism on several grounds. 
The attribution by the case law of such a de facto, quasi-statutory effect to shareholders agreements, to which all 
shareholders are parties, effectively disapplies the general principle of privity of contracts as its binding effect is extended 
to the company. Furthermore, such an effect may as well be problematic for third parties, in light of the lack of any 
requirement that the shareholders agreement be disclosed to them. This approach is incoherent with the particular 
emphasis laid by Greek company law on the disclosure of the company’s articles association and corporate decisions for 
the purpose of protecting third parties. More specifically, the company’s articles of association, all amendments and 
corporate decisions must be made widely available to third parties by being submitted to the specified divisions of the 
Greek Courts, which serve the same purpose and are equivalent to the Company’s House in the UK, and by being 
published on the Public Gazette. Also see Vervesos (2007) supra note33; Marinos (2004) supra note13 p.102. 
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1. Shareholders agreements in light of the mandatory provisions of UK company law  
1.1 Restrictions imposed on the appointment of Directors in light of Section 168 of the 
Companies Act 2006  
In the UK, shareholders agreements are unenforceable if they are contrary to mandatory 
provisions of company law. One example of a mandatory provision is S168 of CA2006, which 
establishes the shareholders’ right to remove a director at any time and without cause.43 The 
rationale for this rule is the protection of shareholders from managerial misconduct and its aim is 
to act as a disciplining mechanism for the management. In this respect, Russell v Northern Bank 
held that a shareholders agreement cannot be enforced against the company, if the latter is a 
party to the agreement and the agreement contains provisions which, had they been included in 
the articles of association, they would be invalid as contrary to mandatory company law principles 
and rules established by statute such as, for example, S168 of the CA2006.  
However, in Bushell v Faith44 the absolute, prohibitive effect of S168 was mitigated. In that case, a 
provision of the articles of association, which made the removal of a director practically 
impossible, was not found to have breached S303 of CA1985 (the predecessor of S168 of CA2006). 
More specifically, the mandatory nature of S303 was found to be compatible with the provision of 
the articles of association, that in the event of a resolution being proposed for the removal of any 
director, any shares held by that director shall, on a poll in respect of such resolution, carry the 
right to three votes per share.45 In light of the decision in Bushell v Faith, UK company law seems to 
allow for weighted voting rights to be used to protect a director from being removed, despite the 
fact that such an approach could be interpreted as effectively distorting the mandatory nature of 
                                                          
43
 The mandatory nature of the rule has also been contested. Section 168 provides that 'A company may by ordinary 
resolution remove a director before the expiration of his term, notwithstanding anything in any agreement between it 
and him'. The omission of the reference to 'anything in the articles of association or in any agreement ', as it was the 
wording of section 303 of the 1985 CA, at first sight creates interpretative difficulties as to the mandatory nature of the 
rule. However, it is clear that 'the articles may not override any requirements set out in the Act' and to the extent that 
S168 does not explicitly give the company the opportunity to opt out, it remains mandatory in nature. See Kershaw 
(2009) supra note11, p.212 supports the mandatory nature of the rule, citing Lord Sainsbury of Turville, Hansard 9 May 
2006. 
44
 Bushell v Faith [1970] AC1099 (House of Lords). 
45
 ibid The legality of such a provision was based on the analogy drawn by the Law Lords between the special voting rights 
on a poll, attached to the shares of the director in the context of passing a resolution, and the use of different classes of 
shares. Lord Morris was the dissenting judge and held that the unconcealed effect of the provision was to make a director 
irremovable and in this light, the provision was illegal as it was used to circumvent S303. 
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the rule. In this light, this judgment could also be used to support the argument that a 
shareholders agreement with a restraining effect on the shareholders’ right to remove directors as 
set out in S168 is enforceable. To the extent that the provision of weighted voting rights included 
in the articles of association is lawful, it can, by analogy, be assumed that such a provision, if 
included in a shareholders agreement, will also be lawful. 
Similarly, the enforceability of the shareholders agreement could also be argued on the legal 
grounds of Russell v Northern Bank.46 Drawing on the judgment of Lord Jauncey47, it could be 
argued that, while a provision in a company’s articles restricting its statutory power to remove a 
director is invalid, an agreement with the similar content among the shareholders is not 
necessarily so. Such an agreement would establish a personal obligation and as such it would be 
enforceable, therefore enabling the claimant to obtain an injunction to prevent the shareholders 
who are also parties to the agreement from exercising their votes in order to remove the director. 
In light of the aggregate effect of the decisions of the House of Lords in Bushell v Faith and Russell 
v Northern Bank, the legality of such a term included in the shareholders agreement could hardly 
be contested.    
1.2 Shareholders agreements in light of Section 21 of the Companies Act 2006   
Shareholders agreements may also interfere with important common law and statutory rules on 
companies, such as the one set out in Section 21 of the CA2006. Although an undertaking by the 
company to restrict its right to amend its articles of association according to Section 21 of the 
CA2006 would be unenforceable against the company48, an agreement of an identical content 
among the shareholders is not necessarily invalid, as the House of Lords judgment in Russell v 
Northern Bank points out. This would particularly be the case, if the parties state that the 
shareholders agreement will take precedence over the articles of association. Similarly, the parties 
could also undertake the obligation to amend the articles of association accordingly, should a 
conflict with the articles of association occur or if an amendment is required to give effect to one 
                                                          
46
 as per Lord Jauncey of Tullichettle, Russell v Northern Bank Development Corporation Limited  supra note10. 
47
 ibid. 
48
 Punt v Symons & Co Ltd [1903] 2 Ch 506. 
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of the terms of the shareholders agreement. Although all such obligations will only be contractual 
in nature, their effect will nevertheless have wider implications.  
 
2. Shareholders agreements in light of the mandatory provisions of Greek company law 
2.1 Shareholders agreements in light of the mandatory provisions of Law 2190/1920 
In Greek law, shareholders agreements are unlawful to the extent that they are contrary to the 
general principles applicable to Societes Anonymes and the mandatory rules set out in Law 
2190/1920.49 The list of mandatory company law rules applicable to a Societe Anonyme includes 
the right of the shareholders to remove the directors of the board without good reason by simple 
majority50, the right of the minority shareholders to request the replacement of the board of 
directors in case of conflicts in the interests of the directors and the company51, the provisions of 
Law 2190/1920 which establish majority or supermajority requirements.52 In addition to the 
applicable mandatory rules, the content of shareholders agreements is also limited by the general 
principles of the law on Societes Anonymes. The principle of the equal treatment of all 
shareholders53 and the general majority principle54, which apply to the decision-making processes 
of the organs of the Societe Anonyme, constitute such an example.55  
Although the aforementioned summary outlines the prevalent view in the literature and the case 
law, a minority of scholars advocate for additional limitations on shareholders agreements, which 
include the compliance of the agreement with the 'company's interest'56 or the requirement that 
the agreement must be within the limits imposed by the nature and the form of the company as a 
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 Rokas (1996) supra note17, p.226.  
50
 Article 31 of the Commercial Code. See Rokas (1996) supra note17, p.206 with further references. 
51
 Article 69 of the Greek Civil Code. See Rokas (1996) supra note17, p.202. 
52
 Article 29 of Law 2190/1920. See Rokas (1996) supra note17, p.188. 
53
 See Rokas (1996) supra note17, p.233-234. 
54
 According to the majority principle, within the decision-making processes of the organs of the Societe Anonyme 
resolutions require majority approval to be passed.  For example, shareholders in general meeting constitute one of the 
main organs of the company. See Rokas (1996) supra note17, p.184-189, 193. 
55
 See Marinos (2004) supra note13. 
56
 On the notion of the company’s interest see Triantafyllakis G., (1998), The interest of the company as a behavioural 
standard of the organs of the Societe Anonyme, 1998. Sakkoulas Publications. 
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Societe Anonyme, in line with the distinctive characteristics of this corporate form.57 However, 
both such limitations are too abstract and have the potential to lead to an arbitrary, non-
systematic interpretation of the law.58 For instance, the notion of 'corporate interest' is particularly 
vague. Similarly, it is always arguable which core characteristics are distinctive of the corporate 
form of a Societe Anonyme. In this light, the dominant view adopted by the Greek scholars and the 
Greek case law has rightly limited the impact of such theories. 
The limitations imposed by the Greek law on shareholder agreements resemble the UK approach 
where shareholders agreements will similarly not be enforceable to the extent that they facilitate 
the avoidance of a mandatory rule. At first sight, however, the approach of UK company law to 
shareholders agreements appears to be more accommodating and permissive. The differentiating 
factor is not to be found in the legal nature and binding effect attributed to shareholders 
agreements or mandatory rules in general, but to the high number of mandatory provisions of the 
Greek law for Societes Anonymes.59 In the UK, the limited number of rules and provisions of a 
mandatory nature implies that the shareholders enjoy wide discretion when they shape the 
internal governance of the company through the articles of association and shareholders 
agreements. Such flexibility is less available in Greece, especially in the context of a Societe 
Anonyme, which is a form of company with predetermined characteristics and objectives.60 Market 
participants have various corporate forms to choose from when incorporating, but, if they choose 
the Societe Anonyme form, the list of mandatory rules and principles that the shareholders cannot 
contract out of is a long one. The limitations imposed by mandatory company law rules on the 
content and enforceability of shareholders agreements is, therefore, reflected on their role as 
effective corporate governance mechanisms. 
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 Perakis (1976) supra note15, p.136. 
58
Marinos (2004) supra note13, p.101. 
59
 ibid. 
60
 It is important to note that Greek company law provides market participants with several choices when it comes to the 
corporate form to be used: The Limited Liability Company to which Law 3190/1955 applies and the Societe Anonyme 
which is regulated by the provisions of Law 2190/1920. The SA form is quite common and, although designed for large 
companies, it is often used by small, family-owned companies as well. Contrary to the Companies Act 2006 in the UK, 
which mainly consists of default provisions and allows for the wide discretion of the parties to regulate the company 
through the articles of association as they see fit, company law in Greece and Law 2190/1920, which is applicable to SA, 
consist of an important number of mandatory provisions. The mandatory nature of the provisions is justified on grounds 
of public order and of the distinctive character of the SA as a corporate form. 
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However, Greek case law substantially mitigates the strict effect of the mandatory rules or 
principles on shareholders agreements by  accepting that the shareholders agreements which are 
contrary to mandatory rules of the law for Societes Anonymes are not necessarily void (invalid ab 
initio). Instead, the validity of the shareholders agreement will need to be assessed by the Greek 
courts ad hoc, namely in light of the special circumstances of each individual case. In the context of 
the assessment process, the courts have the discretion to interpret the scope of the applicable 
mandatory rule or principle of the Societe Anonyme more strictly so as to favour the enforceability 
of the shareholders agreement. The determining factors which trigger such a flexible interpretative 
approach are the purpose of the rule or principle and the extent to which there is a negative effect 
on the interests of the constituencies the rule is designed to protect. In this respect, it has been 
found, for example, that a shareholders agreement according to which minority shareholders are 
provided with the right to appoint the directors of the company is valid, although effectively it is 
contrary to the mandatory majority principle of Greek company law which applies to Societes 
Anonymes.61 As the right of shareholders to remove directors is of a similar mandatory nature62, an 
agreement imposing a restriction on the right of shareholders to remove directors would most 
likely be void, unless the factual background of the case justifies an alternative interpretation.  
More specifically, when assessing the enforceability of shareholders agreements in light of Law 
2190/1920, Greek courts will attribute a special weighting to the factor of the size and the 
ownership structure of the company. The strict mandatory rules and principles that derive from 
Law 2190/1920 will be interpreted in light of the character of the company as a small, family-
owned entity, even though the company has been incorporated under Law 2190/1920, which was 
mainly designed for larger corporations. Therefore, the validity of the agreement will not be 
affected if the latter is not in breach of the protective aim and spirit of the mandatory rule given 
the factual background determined by the size and ownership structure of the company. By 
accepting that shareholders agreements may exceptionally be valid even if they include deviations 
from the mandatory provisions of Law 2190/1920, Greek courts have adopted a more flexible 
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 See supra note52. 
62
 More specifically, the shareholders’ right to remove the Directors without cause constitutes a mandatory general rule 
applicable to companies which operate under the form of the Societe Anonyme. See supra note50. 
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interpretational approach, manifested in the interpretation of the rule on the basis of its purpose 
and protective aim. The net effect of such an approach is to reduce the restrictions imposed on the 
content of shareholders agreements by the extensive mandatory provisions of Greek company law 
which applies to Societes Anonymes.  
 
V. THE LIMITATIONS IMPOSED ON SHAREHOLDERS AGREEMENTS AS A DETERMINANT OF 
THEIR LEGAL EFFECTIVENESS 
The ambiguous nature of shareholders agreements as α tool of minority protection and as a 
control-enhancing mechanism implies that the effectiveness of a legal system is determined by its 
capacity to mitigate the risk that shareholders agreements result in the expropriation of minority 
shareholders. In the UK, limits on shareholders agreements are imposed by the duties of the 
shareholders owed to the company in the circumstances specified by the law.63 For example, 
shareholders are subject to a duty to vote bona fide to the benefit of the company during the 
amendment of the articles of association. In Greece, shareholders agreements are subject to the 
control of Article 281 of the Greek Civil Code, which strikes down agreements of an abusive nature. 
This set of provisions complements the permissive approach to shareholders agreements adopted 
by the Greek legal system and maintains the right balance between the facilitation of beneficial 
shareholders coalitions and the limitation of minority expropriation.  
 
1. The balance between minority protection and minority expropriation in the context of 
shareholders agreements in the UK 
1.1 The common law duty of shareholders to vote bona fide in the interests of the company as a 
whole 
Shareholders agreements often dictate how shareholders must exercise their statutory rights, 
most notably their voting rights or their right to amend the articles of association. An amendment 
of the articles of association often takes place after the shareholders agreement and according to 
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 On  the duties of shareholders see Kershaw (2009) supra note11, p.590-602.  
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its terms as a means of safeguarding its enforceability. In the context of an amendment of the 
articles of association, however, the strict adherence to the freedom of contract and the 
enforceability of the agreement could sometimes result in the agreement possibly being used as a 
tool to facilitate minority expropriation through the amendment. In such a scenario, the 
shareholders' voting right is subject to the common law duty to act bona fide in the interests of the 
company as a whole.64 This duty complements the statutory requirement of Section 21 CA2006 
that the articles can be amended by special resolution only, and has been established and 
developed in common law.65 To the extent that a shareholders agreement imposes an obligation 
on shareholders to amend the articles of association in a certain way which may conflict with their 
common law duty to act bona fide in the interests of the company, such an agreement would be 
void as contrary to common law.  
The restrictive effect of the duty to act bona fide in the interests of the company holds, even if the 
requirement is only imposed on the general meeting as the body exercising the corporate power 
rather than on each shareholder individually.66 This principle restricts the ability of individual 
shareholders to use the power of the general meeting to expropriate minority shareholders. 
Viewed from this perspective, the common law duty to act in the interests of the company during 
an amendment of the articles of association could prevent compliance with shareholders 
agreements designed to facilitate the expropriation of minority shareholders, when implemented 
through an amendment of the articles of association. By contrast, the amendments of 
shareholders agreements providing for enhanced minority protection provisions is more likely to 
be consistent with the duty to act bona fide in the best interests of the company. Although the 
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 On the meaning of 'acting bona fide in the interests of the company as a whole' see Allen v Gold Reefs of Africa LTD; 
Brown v British Abrasive Wheel Co Ltd [; Sidebottom v Kershaw, Leese and Company Ltd; Dafen Tinplate Company Limited 
v Llanelly Steel Company; Shuttleworth v Cox Bros Ltd; Greenhalgh v Anderne Cinemas; Citco Banking Corporation NV v 
Pusser's Ltd. For all cases see supra note25. Also see Kershaw (2009) supra note11, p.590-602. 
65
 More specifically, in Allen v Gold Reefs, Sir Nathaniel Lindley MR states that 'The power conferred on companies to alter 
the regulations contained in their articles is limited only by the provisions contained in the statute and the conditions 
contained in the company's memorandum of association. Wide, however, as the language of S50 is the power conferred 
by it, it must, like other powers, be exercised subject to those general principles of law and equity which are applicable to 
all powers conferred on majorities and enabling them to bind minorities. It must be exercised, not only in the manner 
required by law but also bona fide for the benefit of the company as a whole, and it must not be exceeded. These 
conditions are always implied, and are seldom, if ever, expressed.'    
66
 Allen v Gold Reefs, Greenhalgh v Anderne Cinemas, Shuttleworth v Cox. For all cases see supra note25. Also see 
Kershaw (2009) supra note11, p.601. 
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interests of the company are not identical to the interests of its minority or majority shareholders 
or any member whatsoever, the protection of minorities through a binding shareholders 
agreement could more easily than not be interpreted as being beneficial for the company as a 
whole. Consequently, the aforementioned duty constitutes an effective mechanism which achieves 
the right balance between minority protective and minority expropriating amendments when 
implementing a shareholders agreement.  
1.2 The limits on the exercise of the statutory rights of the company 
In the UK, the shareholders can use their statutory rights to neutralise the effect of shareholders 
agreements, because shareholders agreements cannot restrict statutory rights such as the 
company's right to alter its articles of association.67 The case law imposes limitations on when the 
exercise of the company's statutory rights can be used as a defence against the enforceability of a 
shareholders agreement. More specifically, in Southern Foundries (1926) Ltd v Shirlaw Ac, it has 
been held that the subsequent alteration of the articles of association to empower the company to 
act contrary to the terms of the shareholders agreement constitutes a breach of the agreement 
and gives rise to contractual liability.68 According to the facts of the case, the company exercised its 
statutory right to alter the articles of association and acted upon the subsequently changed 
articles, such action amounting to a breach of a prior contract. As the judgment by Lord Porter 
held,69 ‘(a) company cannot be precluded from altering its articles thereby giving itself power to act 
upon the provisions of the altered articles – but so to act may nevertheless be a breach of contract 
if it is contrary to a stipulation in a contract validly made before the alteration'.  
Although this case involved the service agreement between the company and one of its managers, 
the exception it establishes could also be extended to apply to a contract between the company 
and its shareholders, such as an agreement aiming to protect a shareholder.70 Therefore, the 
approach adopted in Southern Foundries (1926) Ltd v Shirlaw suggests that any subsequent 
alteration of the articles of association will have no impact on the validity of the shareholders 
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 See above Part IV.1(1.1). 
68
 Southern Foundries (1926) Ltd v Shirlaw (1940) AC 701, HL. 
69
 Art 740-741 per Lord Porter, Southern Foundries (1926) Ltd v Shirlaw Ac. 
70
 Gower&Davies (2008) supra note6, par.19-25, p.677-678. 
The complex relationship of concentrated ownership structures and corporate governance 
Chapter V: The role of the law in facilitating the interactions of multiple large shareholders – A 
comparative study of the regulation of shareholders agreements in the UK and Greece 
 
 
 
173 
 
agreement. Instead, it is the relationship of the shareholders agreement with the articles of 
association in force at the time that the company entered into the agreement that will determine 
the binding effect of the latter.71 In this light, shareholders will be unable to escape liability under 
the shareholders agreement by changing the articles of association. In particular, these limits are 
relevant in the context of shareholders agreements which entail minority protection provisions.  
 
2. The balance between minority protection and minority expropriation in the context of 
shareholders agreements in Greece 
In Greece, the ability of contracting parties to evade their contractual obligations through company 
law is limited through the narrow interpretation of the principle of separation of shareholders 
agreements and the articles of association so as to facilitate the enforceability of shareholders 
agreements (in dubio pro libertate).72 Indeed, Greek case law suggests that existing shareholders 
agreements constitute a determining factor to be taken into consideration when assessing the 
lawfulness of the actions of the company through its organs. In this respect, shareholders 
agreements may have important implications for the organisation of the company, despite the rule 
of separation and the hierarchical relationship of shareholders agreements and the articles of 
association. 
2.1 The general principles of the Greek Civil Code and the notion of ‘corporate interest’ 
Greek law provides that the shareholders’ freedom to enter into shareholders agreements is 
limited by the general restrictions imposed on contracts by Article 174, Article 17873, Article 17974, 
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 The only problematic issue of such an approach is the type of remedy to be available to the shareholder-party under 
protection. In addition to a claim for damages for breach of contract, it has been argued that the shareholder could also 
seek injunctive relief. In the latter case, an injunction could be granted to prevent the adoption of the new articles, for 
example. See Gower&Davies (2008) supra note6, p.677-678. 
72
 Marinos (2004) supra note13, p.102. 
73
 The Article constitutes the foundation of the general principle of good morals as follows: Article 178 - Transaction 
contrary to morality 'A transaction which is contrary to good morals is null and void'. 
74
 Article 179: 'A transaction is considered to be null and void as contrary to good morals wherever the freedom of a 
person is hampered excessively or wherever the need, the levity of character or the lack of experience of the other party 
are exploited for the other’s benefit or for the benefit of a third party or where the consideration of a thing furnished or 
pecuniary advantages awarded under the circumstances are in obvious disproportion to the consideration furnished.' 
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Article 28875 and Article 28176 of the Greek Civil Code, which are jointly interpreted and 
implemented as necessary.77 As these fundamental limitations apply to all types of obligations 
undertaken, shareholders agreements can lawfully dictate how the shareholders can exercise their 
voting rights only to the extent that this restriction does not infringe the aforementioned 
provisions. In the context of company law, the effect of Articles 174 and 281 of the Greek Civil 
Code is similar to the effect of the shareholders’ duty to vote bona fide in the benefit of the 
company when amending the articles of association. For example, an agreement to vote in a way 
which is contrary to the interests of the company or discriminates against its minority shareholders 
will practically be ineffective because voting to this effect amounts to an abusive exercise of rights 
and the relevant resolution will, therefore, be void.78 The abuse of the shareholders' voting rights 
renders the resolution regarding the amendment of the articles of association void. 
However, under Greek law the limits imposed by Article 178 and Article 17479 apply beyond the 
case of amending the articles of association to all corporate actions or decisions of the organs of 
the company. Articles 178, 174 and 281 of the Greek Civil Code, therefore, establish a mechanism 
to strike the right balance between allowing efficient shareholders agreements and striking down 
the ones of an expropriating nature. The joint application of the aforementioned provisions of the 
Greek Civil Code allows for the decisions of the shareholders meeting to be impeached to the 
extent that they are manifestly detrimental for minority shareholders or disproportionately limit 
their contractual freedom or constitute an abusive exercise of the majority shareholders’ rights.80 
Such an abuse may involve the infringement of the interests of minority shareholders, unless 
                                                          
75
 Establishes the general principle of good faith in civil law. According to Article 288, 'the obligor is under the obligation 
to perform an undertaking according to good faith, after taking into account business practices.' 
76
 According to this provision, 'the abusive exercise of one’s rights invalidates the act/omission etc. More specifically, 
Article 281 provides that the exercise of one's right is prohibited if it evidently exceeds the limits imposed by good faith, 
good morals or the economic or social objective of the right.' For further references and applications of this provision see 
Chapter III.  
77
 Rokas (1996) supra note17, p.226. 
78
 Marinos (2004) supra note13 p. 108. 
79
 Article 174: 'A transaction that is contrary to a prohibitive provision of the Law...is null and void'. 
80
 See relevant case law: Case 11/72 Multi-member First Instance Court of Corinth; Case 832/76 Supreme Court of Greece 
(Άρειος Πάγος); Case 139/78 Crete Court of Appeal (Εφετείο Κρήτης); Case 6299/1979 Multi-member First Instance Court 
of Athens (Πολυμελές Πρωτοδικείο Αθηνών). 
Also see Rokas N., The limits of the powers of the majority shareholders in the Law of Societes Anonymes (Τα όρια της 
εξουσίας της πλειοψηφίας εις το δίκαιον των Α.Ε.), Nomiko Vima, 1971; Rokas (1996) supra note17 p.193-194. 
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justified by a good cause, and the breach of the principle of equal treatment of the shareholders.81 
It also involves cases of conflict of the shareholders agreement with the interests of the company. 
In this respect, the notion of ‘corporate interest’ constitutes a concept which may impose limits on 
all corporate actions which are deemed to be harmful for the company.82  However, the general 
definition and the wide scope of the notion of 'corporate interest' negatively affects its 
applicability and use in company law, while case law which interprets or applies the notion is 
scarce.83  
2.2 The limits imposed on the exercise of shareholders' statutory rights  
In the context of Greek law, an additional mechanism for filtering the beneficial shareholders 
agreements is provided by Law 2190/1920 and the general principles of the Greek Civil Code. More 
specifically, according to Article 281 of the Greek Civil Code, a decision or action of the organs of 
the company is void, if it is contrary to good faith, good morals or constitutes an abusive exercise 
of the shareholders’ rights.84 In this light, to the extent that the shareholders use their rights in the 
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 Rokas (1996) supra note17 p.233-234. 
82
 See Triantafyllakis (1998) supra note56. 
83
 For a critique on the notion of corporate interest see Marinos (2004) supra note13 p.101-102 noting that the use of 
such an abstract notion gives rise to arbitrary, non-systematic legal outcomes. 
84
 Case 569/2007 Multi-member First Instance Court of Athens (Πολυμελές Πρωτοδικείο Αθηνών).  The following extract 
has been translated from the original in Greek for the purpose of this thesis. 
According to Article 35a par.1-2 of Law 2190, the resolutions of the general meeting of the shareholders of the company 
are void...in all cases that they conflict with the prohibitive provisions of the aforementioned Law or the Civil Law (Articles 
174 and 180 GCC). The resolutions, although they are outright void, shall be declared void subject to a claim brought by 
anyone with a legal interest to that effect by a decision of the Court which can be enforced against everyone.'   
Relevant case law: Case 5565/2003 Multi-member First Instance Court of Athens, published on www.dsanet.com; Case 
94/1999 Supreme Court of Greece, published in Commercial Law Review, 1999, 324; Supreme Court of Greece, Case 
459/1989, Elliniki Dikaiosini, 31:356; 4505/2004 Thessaloniki Court of Appeal Case, Law of Enterprises and Companies, 
2004, 1010; Case 2401/1998 Thessaloniki Court of Appeal, Elliniki Dikaiosini, 40:420 
Also see Kintis S., Void and voidable resolutions of the shareholders meeting in the Societe Anonyme (Ακυρώτης και 
ακυρωσία των αποφάσεων γενικής συνέλευσης της ανώνυμης εταιρείας), 1981, p.20; Rokas (1996) supra note17, p.179, 
193; Passias I., The Law of the Societe Anonyme, 1969, Vol Β', p.382.  
Case 7119/2004 Athens Court of Appeal (Εφετείο Αθηνών). The following extract has been translated from the original in 
Greek for the purpose of this thesis. 
'A special form of invalidity arises when the resolutions of the shareholders meeting of the Societe Anonyme, are passed 
by the majority shareholders in abuse of their rights, namely in breach of the limits set out by good faith, good morals and 
the social and economic objective, and are not dictated by the interests of the company, but are, instead, adopted for the 
exclusive benefit of the interests of the majority shareholders or to the detriment of the minority shareholders' 
Also see relevant case law: Case 155/198 Supreme Court of Greece, published in Elliniki Dikaiosini, 1985, 458; Case 
832/1976 Supreme Court of Greece, published in Νοmiko Vima, 1977, 190; Case 14292/1988 Athens Court of Appeal, 
published in Commercial Law Review, 1989, 238; Case 765/1974 Thessaloniki Court of Appeal, published in Νοmiko Vima 
1975, 678. 
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shareholders meeting to pass a resolution which is contrary to a shareholders agreement to which 
they are parties, such an action could constitute an abusive exercise of their rights. As a result, the 
associated resolutions or actions will be void. The aforementioned interpretation has been 
considered in a recent case which gained a lot of attention, namely Case 7119/2004 of the Athens 
Court of Appeal. 
According to the facts of the case, the two shareholders of company X disputed the validity of a 
series of resolutions of the general meeting and the board of directors, which resulted in the 
limitation of the right of one of the shareholders to manage the company, although this was set 
out in a shareholders agreement. More specifically, the two shareholders of the company, which 
was active in the food industry, had entered into a shareholders agreement according to which 
Shareholder A, who held a 40% stake in the company, would have the right to appoint three out of 
the seven members of the board. Moreover, Shareholder B was contractually bound to agree with 
the appointment of Shareholder A as the CEO of the company who could remain in this position for 
as long as she wished and could not be revoked, unless her sanity and capacity to run the company 
was compromised or she intentionally caused harm on the business and commercial strategy of 
the company.85 The shareholders agreement was part of the sale of a block of shares in the 
company, as a result of which Shareholder B became the majority shareholder, holding 60% of the 
shares in the company. It also aimed to protect the rights of the minority shareholder to 
participate in the management of the company.  
Following certain losses incurred by the company while managed by Shareholder A, Shareholder B 
called an extraordinary general meeting in order to elect a new board of directors, despite the fact 
that only a few months earlier a new board had been elected. The new board, which involved all 
the members of the previous board except for one new member appointed by the majority 
shareholder, passed a resolution which limited the authority of the chief executive officer, namely 
Shareholder A. This resolution was held to be void because it was passed in breach of the 
                                                          
85
 On special appointment rights of shareholders see Mastrokostas Hr., (2003), The distinct personal right of the 
shareholder to appoint the members of the board of directors (Article 18 par.3 of Law 2190/1920), (Το ατομικό ιδιαίτερο 
δικαίωμα του μετόχου να διορίζει μέλη του διοικητικού συμβουλίου (Άρθρο 18 παρ.3 Ν.2190/1920)) Chronicles of 
Private Law, 2003, 487. 
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procedural requirements set out in the articles of association (namely passing the resolution with 
4/7 votes instead of 6/7 and the appointment of three managing directors, contrary to the 
provisions of the articles of association that the company will be represented by only one 
managing director).86 The court also held that the resolution of the general meeting for the 
election of a new board was void as abusive, because its aim had been to restrict the powers of 
Shareholder A, as the only managing director of the company.87  
The factual background in this case, namely the election of a new board just a few months after a 
board had been elected and the resolutions passed by the new board immediately after its 
election effecting the limitation of the powers of Shareholder A, was considered by the Court as an 
indication of the abusive character of the resolution of the shareholders meeting effectively passed 
by the majority shareholder. This judgment of the Athens Court of Appeal was partly overturned 
by the Supreme Court of Greece, Case 1121/2006 (A' Civil Division).88 The legal issue under dispute 
at the High Court was again whether the resolution is void according to article 35 of Law 
2190/1920 by reason of having been passed in breach of the shareholders agreement. The 
majority of the judges (3 members of the Court) found that the second-instance judgment89 
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 Case 7119/2004 Athens Court of Appeal (Εφετείο Αθηνών). Also see Comments on Case 7119/2004 by Rokas N. and 
Legal Opinion by Kotsiris L., published in Commercial Law Review, 2005, 166; Varela M., Comments on Case 7119/2004, 
published in Law of Companies and Enterprises, 2007, 583. 
87
 Case 7119/2004 Athens Court of Appeal. The following extract has been translated from the original in Greek for the 
purpose of this thesis. 
‘All this leads to the safe conclusion that the convention of the shareholders meeting of 15-4-2002 regarding the election 
of the new board of directors, despite the election seven months ago of a fully operational board of directors for a five-
year term, the majority shareholder, who took the initiative, aimed at weakening the powers of the claimant and to 
remove her from chief executive officer. This conclusion is reinforced by the fact that the majority shareholder was unable 
to repeal the claimant from being a member of the board of directors or from chief executive officer, because she had the 
right to be appointed at the board, while her removal could not be achieved through a resolution of the board, because 
the supermajority of 6/7 of the members of the board was required. Therefore, the election of a new board of directors 
was promoted through the convention of a extraordinary shareholders meeting, without an important or good cause to 
this effect, so that the powers of the claimant as mentioned above could be reduced, immediately after the election of the 
new board and the appointment of the new chief executive officer. The resolution of the shareholders meeting of the 15-4-
2002 regarding the election of the new board of directors is rationally linked to the resolution of the new board of 
directors and proves the objective of the majority shareholder to weaken the minority shareholder and remove her from 
the board, in breach of the shareholders agreement dated 31-10-1995. In the context of this factual background, the 
resolution of the general meeting of 15-4-2002 regarding the election of the new board of directors exceeds the limits set 
out by Article 281 of the Civil Code, as prescribed by the good faith, the good morals and the social and economic objective 
of the majority shareholders' rights and is, therefore, void.’  
88
 'Άρειος Πάγος' in Greek. 
89
 Case 7119/2004 Athens Court of Appeal. 
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misinterpreted Article 281 GCC and the resolution of the general meeting providing for the 
election of the new board of directors was not abusive.90  
However, according to the dissenting judges (2 members of the Court), the resolution was passed 
in abuse of the majority shareholders’ rights and as such is void.91 Their judgment was premised on 
the general principle of the Greek Civil Code set out in Article 281. More specifically, the dissenting 
judges argued that the resolution of the general meeting was abusive because it effectively 
neutralised the provisions of the agreement aiming to protect the minority shareholders and the 
majority shareholder was controlling the corporate organ, the shareholders meeting, which passed 
the resolution which amounted to a breach of the agreement.92 Moreover, according to the 
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 Case 1121/2006 Supreme Court of Greece A' Civil Division ('Αρειος Πάγος, A' Πολιτικό Τμήμα). The following extract 
has been translated from the original in Greek for the purpose of this thesis. 
'According to the prevailing opinion of the members of this Court, the Court of Appeal wrongfully applied article 281 of the 
Civil Code, because, according to the facts accepted as proven by the judgment to be contested, the resolution of the 
shareholders meeting of 15-4-2002, which was lawfully convened according to Article 39 of Law 2190/1920, ....does not 
exceed the limits of Article 281 of the Civil Law and is not abusive, because, although the resolution of the board of 
directors dated 17-4-2002 is void because it infringes article 15par3 of the articles of association and, under the conditions 
of the law, gives rise to the right of the minority shareholder to claim damages due to the breach of the shareholders 
agreement and the reduction of the powers of the minority shareholder, it cannot substantiate the abusive character of 
the preceding resolution of the shareholders meeting of 15-4-2002 regarding the election of the board of directors, despite 
the fact that the shareholders meeting was convened to elect a new board of directors in order to reduce the powers of 
the minority shareholder.' According to the High Court, the resolution of the board of directors of 17-4-2002 is therefore 
void as abusive and gives rise to claims in damages because it infringes the shareholders agreement but it does not 
support the abusive character of the preceding resolution of the extraordinary shareholders meeting regarding the 
election of the board of directors.' 
91
 Case 1121/2006 Supreme Court of Greece A' Civil Division ('Αρειος Πάγος, A' Πολιτικό Τμήμα). The following extract 
has been translated from the original in Greek for the purpose of this thesis. 
'According to two members of the Court,..., the 15-4-2002 resolution of the extraordinary shareholders meeting regarding 
the election of the new board in order to reduce the powers of the minority shareholder is abusive, because it falls beyond 
the limits set by good faith and good morals, which fact constitutes an abusive exercise of ones rights according to article 
281 of the Civil Code, given that a) the resolution was passed by the shareholders meeting, which expressed the will of the 
majority shareholder under the veil of the organ of the company, so that the shareholders meeting is identified with the 
majority shareholder and b) the majority shareholder, acting under the veil of an organ of the company, achieved the 
repeal of the right of the minority shareholder, as established by the agreement between them in their capacity as the 
only shareholders of the company, and achieved the outcome of restricting the powers of the minority shareholder 
regarding the management and the representation of the company.  
Moreover, the causal link between the resolution of the shareholders meeting and the restrictive effect is not interrupted 
by the resolution of the board of directors on the 17-4-2002, which restricts the powers of the minority shareholders, 
because according to the second-instance judgment, the shareholders meeting of 15-4-2002 elected the new board of 
directors in order to achieve the goal of disempowering the minority shareholder, as provided by Article 926a.1 regarding 
joint causality, according to which  if the damage results from the action of two or more, in collaboration or not, so that, 
in the absence of one action, the effect would not occur, everybody is jointly liable.' 
92
 Case 1121/2006 Supreme Court of Greece A' Civil Division ('Αρειος Πάγος, A' Πολιτικό Τμήμα). The following extract 
has been translated from the original in Greek for the purpose of this thesis. 
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dissenting judges, the organs of the company cannot disregard the agreements among the 
shareholders of the company, especially if the organs are controlled by the majority shareholder 
who passes a resolution to the effect of cancelling out the shareholders agreement.93 The 
approach adopted by the dissenting judges substantially promotes shareholders agreements by 
extending the protection offered to the parties in the case of a breach, without changing their legal 
nature as contracts. In this light, the breach of the agreement does not only give rise to claims for 
compensation but, most importantly, also provides shareholders with the right to contest the 
validity of the corporate resolution adopted in breach of the agreement. The effectiveness of the 
shareholders agreement is, therefore, enhanced. In light of the importance of the issue and the 
marginal majority of judges obtained in the A' (Civil) Division94, the final judgment is to be held by 
the Court in Plenary Session.95  
 
VI. THE INEFFICIENCIES OF THE LAW OF SHAREHOLDERS AGREEMENTS AND THEIR 
IMPLICATIONS FOR CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
The foregoing comparative study documents a similar, flexible and permissive approach adopted in 
both jurisdictions of reference, despite their different legal origins. More specifically, both 
jurisdictions recognise the contractual legal nature of shareholders agreements and allow for 
corporate governance arrangements, such as the restrictions of voting rights, to take effect. In 
both jurisdictions the limit on the enforceability of shareholders agreements is set by the 
company's articles of association. The interpretation of this complex interaction between the 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
'Finally, in the context of the reviewed case, for the application of the general legal concept of the rule regarding the 
prohibition of the abusive exercise of one's rights, the dissenting opinion took into account (among other elements)... the 
following: a) the protection of minority shareholders is established by legal provisions, allowing for the power of a 
shareholder to appoint the members of the board of directors, according to the provisions of the articles of association to 
this effect (article 18 par 3 of Law 2190/1920), b) the piercing of the corporate veil, when this is justified by good faith, 
needs to apply in the context of the majority shareholder's actions, when she/he acts under the veil of an organ of the 
company contrary to her/his agreement with the only additional shareholder of the company and c) the agreement of all 
the shareholders of the company regarding its organisation must not be disregarded by the organs of the company, when 
they are comprised by the shareholders, who are also parties to the agreement.' 
93
 ibid Case 1121/2006 Supreme Court of Greece A' Civil Division ('Αρειος Πάγος, A' Πολιτικό Τμήμα). 
94
 Άρειος Πάγος, Α' Πολιτικό Τμήμα. 
95
 Ολομέλεια Αρείου Πάγου. 
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articles of association and shareholders agreements by the case law has on many occasions been 
favourable towards the latter. This flexible interpretation is in line with economic reality and the 
necessity to promote shareholders coordination, especially within financial systems of 
concentrated ownership.  
In Greece, a country where concentrated ownership is prevalent, this comparative study reveals 
certain inefficiencies of the Greek legal system, which hinder shareholders' reliance on 
shareholders agreements as efficient coordination mechanisms. Such inefficiencies are partly 
attributed to the widely-accepted principle of separation of the articles of association and 
shareholders agreements, which affects the enforceability of the latter. However, this problem is 
mitigated by the approach of the case law to see beyond the strict principle of separation in order 
to prevent shareholders who are also parties to the agreement from evading their contractual 
obligations through company law. The lack of specific performance remedies adds a further 
obstacle to the use of shareholders agreements as minority protection tools, because shareholders 
effectively have limited means to enforce them. 
 
1. The lack of specific performance remedies as a source of inefficiency of Greek company 
law 
One of the most important sources of the inefficiency of the regulatory framework regarding 
shareholders agreements in Greece is the lack of the remedy of injunctive relief as a result of the 
contractual nature of the agreement. In this respect, Case 569/200796 presents the prevalent 
approach of Greek law. This judgment outlines the position of Greek law that a breach of the 
agreement only provides minority shareholders with a claim for damages against the majority but 
the minority shareholders will not be able to enforce the agreement by requesting that the 
majority complies with its terms. The lack of specific performance remedies substantially limits the 
effectiveness of the shareholders agreement as a minority protection mechanism because it 
signals that the compliance with the terms of the agreement cannot be enforced so as to achieve 
                                                          
96
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the results at stake, had the breach not occurred. By contrast, the shareholders agreement can 
only be enforced indirectly, through the threat of damages. This approach provides an important 
leeway to majority shareholders to disregard their contractual obligations at their discretion to the 
detriment of minority shareholders. The judgment in Case 569/2007 acknowledges this risk by 
noting that '(t)he risk incurred by minority shareholders is the intentional breach of the 
shareholders agreement by the majority and the adoption of resolutions to this effect by the organs 
of the corporation facilitated by the controlling power of their majority stake. The investment of 
minority shareholders will, therefore, be reduced without the ability of minority shareholders to 
seek relief otherwise than to seek compensation in the form of damages for their losses on the 
basis of the contractual liability of the majority.' 97 
 
2. Legal uncertainty as a source of inefficiency in the UK and Greece 
The legal uncertainty deriving from the complex relationship between the articles of association 
and shareholders agreements jeopardises the reliability of the shareholders agreements as an 
effective corporate governance mechanism. For example, the reliability of shareholders 
agreements can be compromised to the extent that a term of the agreement might be interpreted 
as being contrary to the articles of association, in which case enforceability is not guaranteed. In 
order to avoid the conflict of the provisions of the shareholders agreement with the articles of 
association, the parties will usually include a term in the shareholders agreement binding them to 
amend the articles to be aligned with the content of the agreement. The technique of 
incorporating the terms of the agreement into the articles of association enhances the protection 
of the parties to the agreement, by extending the binding effect of such term to the company and 
all its shareholders. Although the amendment of the articles of association pursuant to the 
shareholders agreement minimises the risk that such agreements will be unenforceable, the 
original obligation undertaken to amend the articles remains only contractual in nature.  
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 See Case 569/2007 Multi-Member First Instance Court of Athens (Πολυμελές Πρωτοδικείο Αθηνών). The extract cited 
has been translated from the original in Greek. 
Also see Mihalopoulos G., (1992), Issues on shareholders agreements, (Ζητήματα εξωεταιρικών συμφωνιών), Commercial 
Law Review, 1992, 348.  
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The source of the problem regarding the enforceability of shareholders agreements is the principle 
of separation of shareholders agreements and the articles of association, as adopted by UK and 
Greek company law. Although shareholders agreements and the articles of association regulate 
similar or identical issues of internal corporate governance, the law only conditionally 
acknowledges the interaction between the two sources of governance arrangements, treating 
them as parallel, instead. The strict application of the principle of separation disregards the 
corporate reality and gives rise to a fragmented system of governance arrangements, which is 
partly prescribed in the articles of association and partly shaped by the shareholders agreement.  
In the context of investor protection, the principle of separation allows the parties to the 
agreement to avoid compliance with their contractual obligations under the agreement. This effect 
has a negative impact on the incentives of large shareholders to coordinate, because it signals that 
the shareholders agreement which reflects their coordination arrangements can be breached, in 
which case the breaching counterparty is only contractually liable. When viewed from this 
perspective, the strictly defined interrelationship of shareholders agreements and the articles of 
association by the UK and Greek company law not only allows shareholders to avoid their existing 
obligations imposed by the agreement, but effectively also facilitates the abuse of the corporate 
form. This approach compromises the protection of the market participants and substantive 
fairness.98 The criticism that the aforementioned legal approach to shareholders agreements leads 
to the prevalence of form over substance, is mitigated by the response of courts and legal scholars 
to interpret and apply shareholders agreements and the articles of association as a unity, on a 
consolidated basis.  
 
VII. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
In the context of this thesis, legal effectiveness refers to the extent to which an issue can be dealt 
with by the law and if so, how well it is dealt with in terms of consistency and predictability, on the 
one side, and the delivery of efficient and just outcomes, on the other. Legal effectiveness is 
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assessed on the basis of the type of concentrated ownership involved.  For example, in the case of 
multiple blockholders, legal effectiveness refers to the capacity of the rules to allow for beneficial 
shareholder collaboration and responsible, active ownership, while limiting the risk of 
shareholders agreements being employed as expropriating mechanisms. This thesis considers a 
number of factors when evaluating the effectiveness of the law to address the corporate 
governance issues involved. Such factors include the consistency and predictability in the 
application of the law, the enforceability of the legal rules and agreements, how the law facilitates 
and promotes the efficient use of resources and whether the law reflects the best practices and 
high standards of corporate governance. 
 
The foregoing analysis highlights the important similarities in the treatment of shareholders 
agreements across the selected jurisdictions. The legal mechanisms facilitating the permissive 
approach of both systems to shareholders agreements are different, their permissive character, 
however, is a common outcome. For example, in both jurisdictions the contractual nature of the 
shareholders agreements is the rule. However, according to Greek case law the nature of the 
shareholders agreement changes if all shareholders of a small company are parties to the 
agreement, notwithstanding the form under which the company is incorporated. By accepting that 
shareholders agreements complement or amend the articles of association, the shareholders 
agreements effectively become part of the company’s statutory documents. Under these 
circumstances the legal nature of shareholders agreements becomes quasi-statutory and its 
binding effect exceptionally extends to the company and its organs.  
 
Despite all criticisms, the aforementioned approach adopted by the Greek courts has been 
pragmatic, flexible and permissive of shareholders agreements.99 Similarly, in the UK, Russell v 
Northern Bank is also indicative of a very flexible and liberal approach to shareholders agreements 
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 The aforementioned approach is substantially less formalistic than the UK one, although it may be seen as having a 
negative impact on legal certainty. More specifically, to the extent that such a shareholders agreement is found to be 
binding against the company and its organs, there is a clear breach of the general principle of the privity of contract. Very 
importantly, from a company law perspective such an approach could be interpreted as disregarding the separate legal 
personality of the company, thus amounting to a lifting of the corporate veil.  
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based on the freedom of contract and the unwillingness of judges to allow parties to avoid their 
contractual obligations.100 Across both jurisdictions, for example, under a flexible interpretation of 
the law, the risk that the controlling shareholders may rely on the generally applicable majority 
principle in order to pass resolutions contrary to what has been agreed within the frames of the 
shareholders agreement is minimised.101 Viewed from this perspective, this approach benefits 
minority shareholders, who use shareholders agreements as a tool to enhance their protection 
against the majority.  
 
However, the grey areas in the legal treatment of shareholders agreements, the complex, obscure 
relationship of such agreements with company law across both jurisdictions and the lack of 
sufficient enforcement mechanisms, particularly in the case of Greece, limit the reliability of 
shareholders agreements as a corporate governance mechanism. As a result, internal control 
contestability and shareholders interactions are discouraged. In this light, rather than reflecting 
the superiority of one legal system over the other, the differences documented among the two 
selected jurisdictions demonstrate that the same outcome can be achieved through different legal 
rules and mechanisms. The identification of different, yet functionally equivalent legal mechanisms 
with a similar effect on the legal relationship of shareholders agreements clearly substantiates the 
'legal effectiveness' argument. 
                                                          
100
 Despite the wide, flexible approach of shareholders agreements and their enforceability in UK company law, there 
have been criticisms against the legal reasoning supporting such an outcome. More specifically, Ferran (1994) has 
criticised the reliance on formalistic distinctions which formed the basis of the decision and argues that it should instead 
be accepted that the company can bind itself in its future exercise of statutory powers through such shareholders’ 
agreements. See Ferran (1994) supra note2. 
101
 In such a scenario, minority shareholders have the option to bring a claim for damages for breach of contract. 
Alternatively, to the extent that the resolution is in breach of the agreement, it will be void and will thus be deemed to 
have had no effect ab initio. 
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CHAPTER VI: THE IMPACT OF EU REGULATION ON MULTIPLE LARGE 
SHAREHOLDERS INTERACTIONS 
 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The EU perspective is particularly relevant in the context of this thesis because the EU rules shape 
the regulatory framework which affects investor protection in general and shareholders 
agreements in particular across Member States. The company law framework formed at the level 
of the European Union includes a number of Directives, most notably the Takeover Bids Directive1 
and the Transparency Directive.2 However, the current regulatory regime appears to be 
insufficiently adapted to the concentrated ownership forms which are prevalent in most EU 
countries. Despite the prevalence of concentrated ownership across the EU, there is an important 
deficit of EU regulation tackling shareholders conflicts of interests.3 In particular, EU Company Law 
ignores the dynamic relationship between ownership structures involving multiple large 
shareholders (MLS) and the conflicts of interests of minority and majority shareholders. Aligned 
                                                          
1
 Directive 2004/25/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 April 2004 on takeover bids (OJ L 142, 
30.4.2004). 
2
 Directive 2004/109/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 December2004 on the harmonisation of 
transparency requirements in relation to information about issuers whose securities are admitted to trading on a 
regulated market and amending Directive 2001/34/EC (OJ L 390, 31.12.2004). 
3
 The issue has remained unaddressed by the latter Directives on EU corporate governance such as Directive 2007/36/EC 
of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 July 2007 on the exercise of certain rights of shareholders in listed 
companies (OJ L 184, 14.7.2007). Commission Recommendation 2005/162/EC of 15 February 2005 on the role of non-
executive or supervisory directors of listed companies and on the committees of the (supervisory) board (OJ L 52, 
25.2.2005). Commission Recommendation 2009/385/EC of 30 April 2009 complementing Recommendations 
2004/913/EC and 2005/162/EC as regards the regime for the remuneration of directors of listed companies (OJ L 120, 
15.5.2009). 
Also see Report of the Reflection group on the future of EU Company Law, Brussels, 05.04.2011, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/company/docs/modern/reflectiongroup_report_en.pdf (last accessed 18.09.2011) 
The complex relationship of concentrated ownership structures and corporate governance 
Chapter VI: The impact of EU regulation on multiple large shareholders interactions 
 
 
 
186 
 
with this critique, the recent Green Paper4 on EU Corporate Governance issued by the European 
Commission identifies the issue of minority protection in companies with dominant or controlling 
shareholders in particular. 
The negative impact of EU regulation on MLS structures and interactions spreads across two axes. 
Firstly, the provisions of two different EU Directives imposing disclosure requirements regarding 
shareholders agreements lead to the duplication of efforts and, therefore, unnecessarily raise the 
compliance costs for shareholders wishing to coordinate through a shareholders agreement. In this 
light, it is questionable whether the benefits of the disclosure regime, as currently designed and 
used by investors in the EU, counteract the loss from the lack of shareholders coordination. 
Secondly, the EU regulation on takeovers, most notably the break-through rule and the mandatory 
bid rule, appear to be misplaced because they result, more often than not, in hindering rather than 
promoting the emergence and interactions of MLS within EU corporations. The problematic effect 
of the EU rules on 'concerted action' has recently been acknowledged by the Commission's Green 
Paper on the EU corporate governance framework.5   
The rules constitute a manifestation of the failure of EU law to take into account the important 
role of MLS as a structure of corporate ownership. In this context, the example of MLS highlights a 
problematic aspect of the EU Company Law, namely its negative impact on shareholders 
interactions and agreements, therefore highlighting how ineffective law distorts the incentives of 
market participants. Similarly, it demonstrates that the legal effectiveness of investor protection 
mechanisms is strongly interrelated with the ownership structures of their investee companies. In 
particular, in the case of the EU, the variety in the forms of ownership across jurisdictions implies 
that imposing a one-size-fits-all approach, based on the rationale of harmonization and the need to 
level the playing field across Member States, is likely to create more problems than it solves.  
 
                                                          
4
 European Commission, Green Paper on the EU corporate governance framework, Brussels, 05.04.2011 available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/company/docs/modern/com2011-164_en.pdf (last accessed 18.09.2011). 
5
 ibid.  
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II. SHAREHOLDERS AGREEMENTS IN THE EU 
 
A.  EU TRANSPARENCY REQUIREMENTS 
The requirement that shareholders agreement be disclosed is justified by the role of shareholders 
agreements as the tools which facilitate the acquisition, retention and/or organisation of effective 
control over the firm.6 In particular, the potential of shareholders agreements to promote 
disproportionality between ownership and control further provides a clear rationale for requiring 
that listed companies report such agreements.7 At the EU level, particular emphasis is placed on 
transparency through disclosure, in order to facilitate the pricing of such agreements by market 
participants.8 This is one of the main rationales of the proposal for the full disclosure of 
shareholders agreements which have an impact on a company's or group’s governance structure, 
set out in the High Level Group of Company Law Experts Final Report.9 Therefore, in the context of 
                                                          
6
 See Chapter IV for further references on the role and functions of shareholders agreements. 
7
 Shareholders agreements also have the potential to be used as control-enhancing mechanisms. This latter observation 
introduces an aspect of shareholders agreements as control-enhancing mechanisms, which disproportionately enhance 
control and exacerbate the problems of minority expropriation, economic entrenchment and ultimately the misallocation 
of resources. In this regard, also see the EU Report on the proportionality principle (2007), which classifies shareholders 
agreements as control-enhancing mechanisms because they bind shareholders on how they will exercise their voting 
rights. See ISS, Shearman and Sterling, and ECGI, 2007, 'Report on the Proportionality Principle in the European Union', 
External Study Commissioned by the European Commission available at 
http://www.ecgi.org/osov/documents/final_report_en.pdf (last accessed 29.09.2011). 
The main rationale for European intervention was, of course, the promotion of the freedom of movement of capital as 
established in Article 56 of the EC Treaty, through the minimum harmonisation of the legal frameworks, as most member 
states had in place different rules on disclosure of material shareholders’ agreements, which fact is regarded to distort 
the function and promotion of the internal market. 
8
 See Annex 1 of Commission’s Working Document on the Revision of the Transparency Directive available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/securities/docs/transparency/directive/sec-2010_611_en.pdf (last accessed 
29.09.2011), stating the following: 
'1.20. Transparency of information about securities issuers enhances both investor protection and market efficiency and 
thus contributes to growth and job creation by better allocation of capital and by reducing costs. On the other hand, lack 
of transparency with regard to such information could hinder investor confidence and affect market resilience, reducing 
investment and slowing economic growth.’  
.... 
1.33. Transparency is key for robust, well functioning markets providing reliable price discovery mechanisms. The recent 
period of market turmoil and illiquidity has highlighted the importance to market confidence of reliable and useful 
financial disclosures. Financial reporting permits the measurement of the financial condition and performance of 
companies and is the cornerstone of a well-functioning financial system. Sound disclosure, accounting and valuation 
practices are essential to achieve transparency, to maintain market confidence and to promote effective market 
discipline.’ 
9
 High Level Group of Company Law Experts Final Report on a Modern Regulatory Framework for Company Law in 
Europe, (2002), available at http://www.ecgi.org/publications/documents/report_en.pdf (last accessed 29.09.2011). 
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shareholders agreements, disclosure requirements apply when the terms of the agreement have 
an impact on core issues of corporate governance. For instance, this includes the provisions which 
bind shareholders to exercise their voting rights in a certain way or to establish a special regime for 
the appointment of the members of the board or dictate how shareholders will react in a takeover 
situation. The fragmented system resulting from the disclosure requirements imposed by two 
separate EU Directives, the Transparency Directive and the Takeover Bids Directive, significantly 
impedes the legal effectiveness of the regulatory framework through duplication and increases 
compliance costs disproportionately to the benefits of disclosure. 
 
1. Disclosure requirements under the EU Transparency Directive 
Shareholders agreements are regulated in the context of the Transparency Directive10, which 
requires issuers of securities in regulated markets11 within the European Union to ensure 
appropriate transparency for investors through a regular flow of information by disclosing periodic 
and on-going regulated information and by disseminating such information to the public. Apart 
from financial reports, regulated information consists of information on major holdings of voting 
rights. Information on shareholders agreements fall under Article 1012, which modernizes the rules 
                                                          
10
 Directive 2004/109/EC. The Transparency Directive was to be transposed in national law by 20 January 2007 and the 
Commission is to review its operation by 30 June 2009.  
The EU Commission has launched a public consultation on the Modernisation of the Directive 2004/109/EC. (27.05.2010), 
available at http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/securities/docs/transparency/transparency-info_en.pdf  
See EU Commission report on the operation of the Transparency Directive, 27.05.2010, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/securities/docs/transparency/directive/com-2010-243_en.pdf (last accessed 
29.09.2011). 
EU Commission staff working document - The Review of the operation of Directive 2004/109/EC: emerging issues, 
27.05.2010, available at http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/securities/docs/transparency/directive/sec-
2010_611_en.pdf (last accessed 29.09.2011). 
External Study on the Application of the Transparency Directive (December 2009): executive summary, final report and 
annexes http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/securities/docs/transparency/report-application_en.pdf and 
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/securities/docs/transparency/report-application-annexes_en.pdf (all accessed last 
on 29.09.2010). 
11
 In the context of the Transparency Directive, a ‘regulated market’ means a market as defined in Article 4(1), point 14, 
of Directive 2004/39/EC. More specifically, '‘(r)egulated market’ means a multilateral system operated and/or managed 
by a market operator, which brings together or facilitates the bringing together of multiple third party buying and selling 
interests in financial instruments – in the system and in accordance with its nondiscretionary rules – in a way that results 
in a contract, in respect of the financial instruments admitted to trading under its rules and/or systems, and which is 
authorised and functions regularly and in accordance with the provisions of Title III;' 
12
 'Article 10 - Acquisition or disposal of major proportions of voting rights 
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regarding the disclosure of holdings of voting rights. The Transparency Directive imposes on 
holders of voting rights the obligation to notify the issuer, whenever their voting rights reach, 
exceed or fall under certain thresholds.13 This obligation also applies on shareholders who control 
voting rights as a result of a shareholders agreement, while issuers are to publish all such 
notifications within three days of receipt. 
 
2. Disclosure requirements under the EU Takeover Bids Directive 
Article 10 of the Takeover Bids Directive also requires companies admitted to trading on a 
regulated market to provide detailed information on the structure of the share capital, the 
restrictions on the transfer of securities, the significant shareholdings, the shareholders with 
special controlling rights and a description of those rights, the system of control of any employee 
share schemes and any restrictions on voting rights, in their annual report14, which is also 
accompanied by the presentation of an explanatory report of the board to the annual general 
meeting of shareholders.15 Article 10 provides an extensive list of the types of agreements and 
information to be disclosed by listed companies.16 Special reference is made to the agreements 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
The notification requirements defined in paragraphs 1 and 2 of Article 9 shall also apply to a natural person or legal entity 
to the extent it is entitled to acquire, to dispose of, or to exercise voting rights in any of the following cases or a 
combination of them:  
(a) voting rights held by a third party with whom that person or entity has concluded an agreement, which obliges them to 
adopt, by concerted exercise of the voting rights they hold, a lasting common policy towards the management of the 
issuer in question;…' 
13
 By virtue of Article 3 of the Directive, Member States may impose on their issuers lower disclosure thresholds than that 
of 5% provided for in the directive. However, this flexibility challenges the harmonisation of the legal systems as it allows 
for different thresholds to be set.  
14
 Article 5.2 of the Takeover Bids Directive and Article 46 of Directive 78/660/EEC(13) and Article 36 of 
Directive 83/349/EEC(14). 
15
 Article 5.3 of the Takeover Bids Directive. 
16
 Article 10 of the Takeover Bids Directive  
‘Article 10 
Information on companies as referred to in Article 1(1) 
1. Member States shall ensure that companies as referred to in Article 1(1) publish detailed information on the following: 
(a) the structure of their capital, including securities which are not admitted to trading on a regulated market in a 
Member State, where appropriate with an indication of the different classes of shares and, for each class of shares, the 
rights and obligations attaching to it and the percentage of total share capital that it represents; 
(b) any restrictions on the transfer of securities, such as limitations on the holding of securities or the need to obtain the 
approval of the company or other holders of securities, without prejudice to Article 46 of Directive 2001/34/EC; 
(c) significant direct and indirect shareholdings (including indirect shareholdings through pyramid structures and cross-
shareholdings) within the meaning of Article 85 of Directive 2001/34/EC; 
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between shareholders which may restrict transfers of securities or voting rights, as well as the 
rules governing the appointment and replacement of board members and the changes to the 
articles of association. Reference is also made to significant agreements of the company, which 
take effect, alter or terminate upon a change of the control of the company. Such disclosure is part 
of the EU regulation on takeovers and is designed to facilitate the application and promote the 
effectiveness of the core provisions of the Directive, such as the mandatory bid rule which is 
triggered upon the acquisition of a specified stake by a shareholder. The disclosure requirements 
under Article 10 form part of the set of wider reporting requirements imposed on companies 
admitted to be trading on a regulated market.17  
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
(d) the holders of any securities with special control rights and a description of those rights; 
(e) the system of control of any employee share scheme where the control rights are not exercised directly by the 
employees; 
(f) any restrictions on voting rights, such as limitations of the voting rights of holders of a given percentage or number of 
votes, deadlines for exercising voting rights, or systems whereby, with the company’s cooperation, the financial rights 
attaching to securities are separated from the holding of securities; 
(g) any agreements between shareholders which are known to the company and may result in restrictions on the transfer 
of securities and/or voting rights within the meaning of Directive 2001/34/EC; 
(h) the rules governing the appointment and replacement of board members and the amendment of the articles of 
association; 
(i) the powers of board members, and in particular the power to issue or buy back shares; 
(j) any significant agreements to which the company is a party and which take effect, alter or terminate upon a change of 
control of the company following a takeover bid, and the effects thereof, except where their nature is such that their 
disclosure would be seriously prejudicial to the company; this exception shall not apply where the company is specifically 
obliged to disclose such information on the basis of other legal requirements; 
(k) any agreements between the company and its board members or employees providing for compensation if they resign 
or are made redundant without valid reason or if their employment ceases because of a takeover bid.’ 
17
 There have been substantial recent initiatives in this field, both at the UK level (in the form of the Operating and 
Financial Review and subsequently of the Business Review) and within the EU context in the form of a Directive amending 
the 4th and 7th Directives on accounting. More specifically, in the UK, the new disclosure requirements were 
implemented by SI 2006/1183 ‘The Takeover Directive (Interim Implementation) Regulations 2006 and were transferred 
into Schedule 7 Part VII of the Companies Act 1985 by section 992 of the Companies Act 2006. This includes a 
requirement for an annual corporate governance statement which includes elements of the disclosures required under 
Article 10 of the Takeovers Directive. Listed companies are now subject to an obligation to disclose annually in the 
business report certain information that is likely to affect the outcome of a public offer. This information includes 
material contracts with change of control provisions. 
The complex relationship of concentrated ownership structures and corporate governance 
Chapter VI: The impact of EU regulation on multiple large shareholders interactions 
 
 
 
191 
 
3. Criticisms against the EU disclosure framework 
3.1. The definition of ‘acting in concert’: Differences between the Transparency Directive and the 
Takeover Bids Directive 
Although the implementation of the Takeover Bids Directive and the Transparency Directive has 
substantially enhanced transparency in listed companies, it has also given rise to important 
inconsistencies which generate legal risk and increase the compliance costs incurred by market 
participants. An important source of legal risk is the divergence in the definitions of 'acting in 
concert' set out in Article 10(a) of the Transparency Directive and in Articles 2.1(d) and 5 of the 
Takeover Bids Directive. According to the Transparency Directive, the notification requirements 
prescribed apply to cases of an 'agreement' which 'obliges' parties to adopt, 'by concerted exercise' 
of the voting rights, a 'lasting common policy towards the management'. Therefore the necessary 
conditions for the obligation to arise, as imposed by the EU legislation, involve an agreement 
between the parties, the aim of adopting a common policy towards the issuer, the duration of the 
common policy ('lasting'), the object of the policy (not the issuer per se but the management of the 
issuer), and, finally, the rise above the relevant threshold (5% or less). In the context of the 
Takeover Bids Directive, persons acting in concert, thus triggering the launch of a mandatory bid, 
shall mean natural or legal person who 'cooperate' with the offeror or the offeree company 'on the 
basis of an agreement', either express or tacit, either oral or written, 'aimed' either at acquiring 
control of the offeree company or at frustrating the successful outcome of a bid. The conditions 
giving rise to the obligation involve the cooperation of the parties involved, an underlying 
agreement and the potential aim of the agreement to be used in order to facilitate the acquisition 
of the company or to frustrate a bid. 
With regard to the application of the aforementioned rules, the European Securities Markets 
Experts (ESME) Group states, that the definition of ‘acting in concert’ should be interpreted in light 
of the goals to be pursued by the two Directives.18 Article 10 of the Transparency Directive aims, 
                                                          
18
 European Securities Markets Expert Group (ESME) states that these goals although complementary, are different. See 
Preliminary views on the definition of 'acting in concert' between the Transparency Directive and the Takeover Bids 
Directive, 17.11.2008, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/securities/docs/esme/acting_in_concert_20081117_en.pdf (last accessed 
18.09.2011). 
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inter alia, to ensure transparency as to who has the power to exercise voting rights when voting-
rights holders agree on pooling their votes. Articles 2.1 (d) and 5 of the Takeover Bids Directive aim 
to protect minority shareholders by requesting the launch of mandatory bids at equitable prices, 
when shareholders act in concert to acquire control. However, the different wording and 
definitions of the two Directives may lead to further uncertainties in practice, as diverging 
interpretations are adopted by Member States on key concepts such as 'lasting common policy' (in 
the Transparency Directive), or 'acquiring control' (in the Takeover Bids Directive) or 'agreement' 
(in both Directives).19 These differences in the implementation and interpretation of the legal 
provisions imply that identical behaviours are treated differently across Member States. Such 
uncertainties constitute an important source of legal risk for market participants and add to the 
complexity of the notification requirements. This aspect of the problem especially affects cross-
border institutional and private shareholders, therefore imposing an additional obstacle on cross-
border activity. In this regard, ESME proposes the possible compulsory adoption by all competent 
authorities of a common standard at least for the transparency obligation. 
3.2 The high costs of compliance and the quality of company reporting 
The disclosure requirements imposed by EU Directives illustrate the importance of and the 
emphasis laid on disclosure as a regulatory tool in the hands of corporate law makers. This 
approach suggests that the promotion of transparency is a preferable option to any structural 
intervention in the form of a prohibition imposed on the shareholders agreements and control-
enhancing mechanisms used by listed firms. Moreover, extensive transparency through disclosure 
constitutes a necessary prerequisite for responsible ownership and facilitates shareholder activism 
in corporate law and governance. However, the different content of the notifications required by 
each Directive implies that the divergence between the definitions and their purpose has 
considerable implications. More specifically, in the event that an agreement falls under the 
protective scope of both Directives, there is an overlap, whenever the notification requirements of 
the Transparency Directive are triggered by agreements which also fall within the scope of the 
Takeover Bids Directive and vice versa. In this case, the compliance with both Directives requires 
notifications of different contents, which fact gives rise to a duplication of efforts and increases the 
                                                          
19
 ESME ibid. 
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compliance costs in the form of legal fees, auditors’ fees, costs of publication, costs of preparing 
the accounts etc. 20 
Additionally, the effectiveness of such disclosure substantially depends on the use to be made of 
the information by potential investors.21 In this respect, the imposition of high compliance costs, 
which are not proportional to the benefit that such disclosure brings to shareholders, raises 
important concerns regarding the efficiency of regulation. In the context of large shareholders 
interaction, for example, the high costs of compliance render the formation of coalitions an 
unattractive option for shareholders groups. Viewed from a corporate governance perspective, the 
limitation of the beneficial effects of shareholders coalitions due to the patchy, incoherent 
disclosure regime constitutes an important source of compliance opportunity costs.22 Similar 
considerations apply to the avoidance of unnecessary duplication due to the different corporate 
reporting requirements of the Transparency Directive and the Takeover Bids Directive. The 
consolidation of the requirements imposed would lead to the simplification of the presentation of 
information to shareholders and would better facilitate their informed decisions and responsible 
ownership.23 This approach would increase the legal effectiveness of the rules on disclosure and 
                                                          
20
For an overview of the provisions of the Transparency Directive under review see EU Commission Consultation 
document on the modernisation of the Directive 2004/109/EC on the harmonisation of transparency requirements in 
relation to information about issuers whose securities are admitted to trading on a regulated market, Brussels, 
27.05.2011, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/securities/docs/transparency/directive/consultation_questions_en.pdf (last 
accessed 19.09.2011). 
On compliance costs in particular, see EU Commission Feedback Statement: Summary of responses to the consultation by 
DG Internal Markets and Services on the modernisation of the Transparency Directive (2004/109/EC), Brussels, 
17.12.2010, available at http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/securities/docs/transparency/transparency-consultation-
summary_en.pdf (last accessed 19.09.2011); EU Commission Consultation Document on the Transparency Directive, 
Response of the Law Society of England and Wales and the City of London Law Society, 25.08.2010 available at 
http://international.lawsociety.org.uk/files/LSEW&CLLSResponse-TransparencyDirective-August2010.pdf (last accessed 
18.09.2011) noting that 'the corporate governance requirements in general generate significant costs, which may be 
proportionally greater for smaller listed companies.'  
21
 ibid See particularly the EU Consultation on the modernisation of the Transparency Directive and related documents. 
22
 See Holger F. and Schmolke K.U., (2011), The reform of the Transparency Directive: Minimum or full harmonisation of 
ownership disclosure?', European Business Organization Law Review, 12:121, where the debate on full or minimum 
harmonisation of disclosure requirements is presented. In the context of this debate and in light of the high compliance 
costs imposed by the current disclosure framework, it is stated that the EU Transparency Directive has failed to simplify 
reporting requirements across the EU. The fragmented framework applying to the disclosure of shareholders agreements 
constitutes a manifestation of the complexity created by the two Directives.  
23
 ibid See the debate on full or minimum harmonisation of disclosure requirements. 
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would provide an example of targeted regulatory intervention in the context of concentrated 
ownership structures. 
 
B. SHAREHOLDERS AGREEMENTS IN THE EU: THE MANDATORY BID RULE 
In addition to the disclosure requirements, shareholders agreements are also subject to the 
provisions of the EU law which applies to takeovers. For instance, the Mandatory Bid Rule 
(hereafter MBR) shapes the legal treatment of shareholders agreements at the European level. 
More specifically, the MBR states that upon the acquisition of securities which results in the 
natural or legal person holding the securities in the company gaining control over the company, 
such person is required to make a bid to obtain the shares of minority shareholders in that 
company. This rule aims to safeguard the interests of minority shareholders by distributing to all 
shareholders the takeover premium, which in the absence of the rule would only accrue to the 
controlling shareholder.24 This rule is particularly important as it applies whenever voting rights are 
exercised and control is exerted in concert with another party.  
                                                          
24
 The rationale of MBR’s lays at the fact that they reallocate takeover gains between controlling and minority 
shareholders. Important criticisms have been raised on the basis that minority protection comes at the expense of 
promoting the restructuring of firms. Bebchuk (1994), for example, argues that the MBR may discourage efficient bidders 
by raising the cost of acquiring companies. See Bebchuk L. A., (1994), Efficient and Inefficient Sales of Corporate Control. 
The Quarterly Journal of Economics 109(4):957; Enriques L., (2003), The Mandatory Bid Rule in the Proposed EC Takeover 
Directive: Harmonization As Rent-Seeking? Reforming Company and Takeover Law in Europe. G. Ferrarini, K. Hopt, J. 
Winter and E.Wymeersch, 2004, OUP. 
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The definitions provided in articles 2.1(d) of the Directive25 determine when the rule in Article 526 
of the Directive will be triggered. More specifically, for the launch of a mandatory bid, persons 
acting in concert shall mean natural or legal person who 'cooperate' with the offeror or the offeree 
company 'on the basis of an agreement', either express or tacit, either oral or written, 'aimed' 
either at acquiring control of the offeree company or at frustrating the successful outcome of a 
bid. The conditions required in this case involve the cooperation of the parties involved, an 
underlying agreement, the aim to acquire a company or frustrate a bid, the crossing of the 
threshold of voting rights that confers control. This threshold is determined by Member States and 
is currently set around 30%-33,33% of the voting capital.27 In this light, agreements between 
shareholders, which regulate the exercise of their voting rights, may trigger the application of the 
mandatory bid rule, if they contain terms aiming to facilitate or frustrate a takeover. The link which 
needs to be established between a term and its impact on a takeover is a weak one.   
The MBR has been extensively criticised for increasing the cost of control changes, therefore 
effectively discouraging takeovers.28 Similarly, the role of the MBR to facilitate the efficient 
                                                          
25
 See Article 2 of the Takeover Bids Directive 
'Article 2 - Definitions 
1.For the purposes of this Directive: 
 (d) «persons acting in concert» shall mean natural or legal persons who cooperate with the offeror or the offeree 
company on the basis of an agreement, either express or tacit, either oral or written, aimed either at acquiring control of 
the offeree company or at frustrating the successful outcome of a bid;...' 
26
 Article 5 of the Takeover Bids Directive  
'Article 5 - Protection of minority shareholders, the mandatory bid and the equitable price 
1.Where a natural or legal person, as a result of his/her own acquisition or the acquisition by persons acting in concert 
with him/her, holds securities of a company as referred to in Article 1(1) which, added to any existing holdings of those 
securities of his/hers and the holdings of those securities of persons acting in concert with him/her, directly or indirectly 
give him/her a specified percentage of voting rights in that company, giving him/her control of that company, Member 
States shall ensure that such a person is required to make a bid as a means of protecting the minority shareholders of that 
company. Such a bid shall be addressed at the earliest opportunity to all the holders of those securities for all their 
holdings at the equitable price as defined in paragraph 4. 
.... 
3.The percentage of voting rights which confers control for the purposes of paragraph 1 and the method of its calculation 
shall be determined by the rules of the Member State in which the company has its registered office...' 
27
 Criticisms have been raised as a result of Pirelli being able to circumvent the mandatory bid rule by acquiring control of 
Olivetti just below the threshold of 30% set by Italian legislation. It has been argued that the threshold may prove to be 
too low especially in the case of concentrated ownership structures with multiple large shareholders/pyramidal 
structures. See Kirchmaier T., Grant J. and Kirschner J., (2009), Financial Tunnelling and the Mandatory Bid Rule, FMG 
Discussion Paper No. 536. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=613945. 
28
 See Burkart M. and Panunzi F., (2004), Mandatory Bids, Squeeze-out, Sell-out and the Dynamics of the Tender Offer 
Process, in G. Ferrarini, K. Hopt, J. Winter, and E. Wymeersch (eds.), Modern Company Law and Takeover Law in Europe, 
2004, OUP; See McCahery J.A. and Renneboog L., (2003), The Economics of the Proposed Takeover Directive, Brussels: 
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allocation of capital has been under scrutiny, especially in the context of concentrated ownership 
structures.29 In particular, scholars have questioned whether the rationale for a MBR is applicable 
and relevant within systems characterised by concentrated ownership.30 For example, it has been 
argued that the MBR induces majority shareholders to increase the size of their block in order to 
prevent having their control rents expropriated by hostile bidders. Under such an assumption, the 
effect of the MBR benefits incumbent shareholders and serves as a mechanism which limits 
contestability of control instead of improving the ownership structures and promoting efficient 
changes of control.31 Given the extensive criticism against the MBR, 'the key issue is whether the 
aggregate value of the non-value maximizing transactions that it deters is greater than the 
aggregate value of the efficient takeovers that would have occurred in its absence'.32 
 
1. The diverging definitions of ‘concerted action’ and the problem of legal uncertainty  
The MBR provides an illustrative example of the restrictive effect of the Takeover Bids Directive on 
shareholders coordination. Entering into shareholders agreements substantially increases the risk 
of being found to be ‘acting in concert’, therefore triggering the application of the MBR. In addition 
to this, the legal uncertainty arising due to the diverging interpretations adopted by Member 
States on key concepts of the Takeover Bids Directive such as ‘acting in concert’ or 'acquiring 
control'33 substantially shapes the incentives of shareholders to interact and coordinate.34 More 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
CEPS (2003); See Bergstrom C., Hogfeldt P. and Molin J., (1997), The Optimality of the Mandatory Bid, Journal of Law, 
Economics and Organization, 13:433.  
29
 Sepe S.M., (2008), Private Sales of Corporate Control: Why the European Mandatory Bid is Inefficient, Yale Law School 
Working Paper. 
30
Goergen M., Martynova M. and Renneboog L., (2005), Corporate Governance Convergence: Evidence From Takeovers: 
Evidence from Takeover Regulation Reforms in Europe, 21 Oxford Review of Economic Policy, 2005, 243;  Ventoruzzo M., 
(2008), Takeover Regulation as a Wolf in Sheep’s Clothing: Taking Armour & Skeel’s Thesis to Continental Europe, Bocconi 
University Working Paper (2008). 
31
 ibid. 
32
 McCahery J. A. and Vermeulen E. P. M., (2010), Does the Takeover Bids Directive Need Revision?, TILEC Discussion 
Paper No. 2010-006; Tilburg Law School Research Paper No. 005/2010. Available at SSRN: 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1547861. 
33
 On related issues as to the thresholds and as to whether obtaining de facto control could trigger the protection of the 
MBR, see for example ‘Transparency and corporate finance: monitoring control of listed companies’, AMF Annual 
Conference 2008 Panel Discussion III available at http://www.amf-france.org/documents/general/8561_1.pdf (accessed 
June 22, 2010) stating that ‘In France, the dispersion of share ownership in listed companies means that it is more and 
more common for a shareholder with less than a third of the voting rights to be able to determine the outcome of votes in 
general meetings. In such cases, especially as the abstention rate at general meetings remains high, a stake of 25% in a 
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specifically, provided that the Takeover Bids Directive only sets out the minimum harmonisation 
requirements, the necessarily generic definition of the Directive allows for a wide interpretation of 
the 'acting in concert' provision.35 However, it is unlikely that all Member States will adopt a 
common definition, either wide or narrow. This would suggest that, for example, certain 
behaviours of participants which could be presumed to fall under the 'acting in concert' definition 
in one Member State, will not necessarily require to be disclosed or trigger the MBR in others.  
Therefore, the restrictive effect of the MBR and the legal uncertainty deriving from its inconsistent 
application across EU jurisdictions limit the reliability and, consequently, the use of shareholders 
agreements as a coordination mechanism, since shareholders may be found to be liable to bid for 
the shares of the company at a specific price as a result of their coordination. The lack of a 
harmonised interpretation across the various EU jurisdictions particularly exacerbates its 
restrictive impact on shareholders agreements. The different treatment of identical behaviours 
and the resulting uncertainties for market participants, especially where cross-border 
shareholdings are concerned, constitute an important source of legal risk and discourage 
shareholders agreements and interactions. 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
company may be enough to control the general meeting, without being required to make a mandatory bid. This state of 
affairs means that the effectiveness of the threshold that triggers a mandatory bid for all of the shares in a company must 
be questioned. Using de facto control as a triggering factor for mandatory bids would be a delicate matter however, since 
a shareholder’s control of the general meeting has to be assessed in retrospect. It also seems to be contrary to the 
provisions of Article 5 of the Takeover Directive, which refers to a percentage of shares or voting rights. Using a 
quantitative and objective notion as the triggering factor for mandatory bids also makes it possible to avoid debates 
about whether control exists since shareholding percentages can be verified in material terms.’ 
34
 The City Takeover Code requires buyers that attain more than 30% of a company’s outstanding shares to bid for the 
remaining shares at the highest price paid for the same shares in the preceding year. In particular, Rule 9 defines parties 
‘acting in concert’ as those who, pursuant to an agreement or understanding, formal or informal, cooperate to obtain or 
consolidate control of a company or to frustrate the successful outcome of an offer for a company. The Code establishes 
a presumption that a ‘concert action’ exists in the absence of contrary evidence. See City Takeover Code available at 
http://www.thetakeoverpanel.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2008/11/code.pdf (last accessed 29.09.2011). 
35
 See for example Kirchmaier et al (2009) supra note27. The authors juxtapose the French approach to the German one. 
As a result of the narrow definition of German courts, a consortium of buyers including Tchibo, HGV Hamburger 
Gesellschaft für Vermögens- und Beiteiligungsverwaltung mbH, a holding company for the assets of the City of Hamburg, 
and Beiersdorf’s own pension fund TROMA, managed to acquire a 33.6% stake in Beiersdorf, without triggering the 
German MBR currently set at a 30% threshold. In Germany, the definition of acting in concert has been so narrow by the 
courts so as to trigger the intervention through the reform of the law imposing a broader definition of the actions and 
types of co-ordination that constitute ‘acting in concert’ for the purpose of applying the MBR. On the Eiffage case see 
below Part II.B.2. 
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The negative effect of the MBR on shareholders agreements is clearly illustrated by two specific 
case studies, namely the Eiffage takeover bid by Sacyr in France and the Beiersdorf and Tschibo 
case in Germany. More specifically, the two case studies revolve around the uncertain definition of 
‘acting in concert’ and show how this uncertainty can ultimately disincentivise market participants 
to interact or challenge the corporate governance arrangements within a corporation. The 
comparative analysis of how the Directive has been applied by two different Member indicates 
that the different interpretation of the same notion across the various jurisdictions substantially 
defies the objective of harmonising the legal framework and creating a level playing field for 
corporations across the EU. In particular, the broad interpretation of 'acting in concert' and the 
flexible approach to proving the ‘concerted action’ in the Eiffage case reveal the potential of the 
MBR to effectively become a defence mechanism against undesirable hostile takeovers. By 
contrast, the narrow definition of BaFin in the Beiersdorf case mitigates the effects of the MBR on 
minority protection, as it allows the parties to avoid the application of the MBR.  
The problem of the legal uncertainty deriving from the divergent interpretation of the definitions 
of the Directive among Member States is exacerbated due to the inherently broad definition of 
'concerted action'. More specifically, in order for the MBR to be triggered, the existence of a legally 
binding shareholders agreement aiming to either acquire control of a company or to frustrate the 
successful outcome of a bid is a sufficient condition across Member States. Such an agreement 
may be either express or tacit, either oral or written. However, it must be noted that for the 
purpose of applying the MBR, the shareholders agreement does not need to be legally binding in 
nature within the strict terms of contract law. Thus, the principles of contract law which determine 
whether a shareholders agreement is legally binding or not, are not at all decisive in the context of 
a takeover. Instead, the broad definition of 'concerted action' implies that shareholders 
agreements and similar, even legally non-binding forms of coordination may trigger the rule.  
The blurred limits of the notion of 'legitimate communication' and 'concerted action', therefore, 
create a tension which is inherent in generic definitions such as the definitions mentioned in this 
Chapter. Nevertheless,  it is crucial to distinguish among shareholders actions which constitute 
‘concerted action’ and shareholders behaviours which amount to legitimate communication 
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among shareholders and should normally fall under the category of behaviours which would not 
trigger the MBR. In general, they are to be promoted as the precondition of responsible ownership 
and a manifestation of shareholder activism. The importance of a clear demarcation between the 
actions which are legally important and the behaviours which do not trigger the application of the 
MBR, is self-evident.  
 
2. Lessons from Sacyr/Eiffage and Beiersdorf/Tschibo case studies: EIFFAGE 
2.1 Facts of the case36 
At Eiffage’s 2006 Annual General Meeting, Sacyr Vallehermoso SA (hereafter Sacyr), a Spanish 
construction group, tried but failed to appoint four of its executives to the board of Eiffage. In its 
attempt to block Sacyr from winning seats on his board, the Eiffage board barred former 
employees from selling their investments held in a company trust. Since early 2006, Sacyr, has 
been the largest shareholder of Eiffage, a French construction company, owning 32.1% of the 
company's shares, an amount just under France’s MBR threshold of 33.33% at the time.37 
Following the response of Eiffage, Sacyr began preparing a hostile tender offer for the 2007 Annual 
General Meeting. In the 2007 Annual Meeting, the board of Eiffage attracted further criticism by 
revoking voting rights of 89 new Spanish shareholders that control 17,5% of the company amid 
allegations that they were acting in concert with Sacyr, which owned 33.32%. Eiffage claimed that 
                                                          
36
 See Peggy Hollinger Eiffage strips Spanish of voting rights, FT, 18.04.2007 available at 
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/c086486c-ed9d-11db-8584-000b5df10621.html#axzz1Yo0KkPMk; Peggy Hollinger and Mark 
Mulligan, Eiffage opts to take the fight to predator Sacyr, FT, 23.04.2007 available at 
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/b2c6e634-f200-11db-b5b6-000b5df10621.html#axzz1Yo0KkPMk; Mark Mulligan, Peggy 
Hollinger, Sacyr drops interest in Eiffage, FT, 09.04.2008, available at http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/7e179a12-0606-11dd-
802c-0000779fd2ac.html#axzz1Yo0KkPMk; Neil Dennis, Eiffage stands out in Europe on Sacyr ruling, FT, 26.06.2007 
available at http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/2829a6ce-23ce-11dc-8ee2-000b5df10621.html#axzz1Yo0KkPMk; Financial 
Times, Alarm after watchdog bares teeth over Eiffage, FT, 27.06.2007 available at http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/581323a6-
24d7-11dc-bf47-000b5df10621.html#axzz1Yo0KkPMk (all accessed last on 29.09.2011). 
37
 The 2010 Reform Act (Law No 2010-1249 of October 22, 2010 on banking and financial regulations, JORF No 0247 of 
October 23, 2010) amends shareholder disclosure and mandatory tender offer rules by harmonizing aggregation 
requirements, expanding the definition of concerted action and lowering the mandatory tender offer threshold to 30%. 
These new rules became effective October 23, 2010, except for those relating to mandatory tender offers and the new 
30% Statutory Disclosure Threshold, which came into effect on February 1, 2011. On December 3, 2010, the French 
securities regulator (the Autorité des Marchés Financiers or 'AMF') released a new set of proposed amendments (the 
'2010 Proposed Rules') to its regulations (the 'AMF General Regulations') in view of implementing the 2010 Reform Act. 
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the coordination of Sacyr with 89 other Spanish investors aimed to gain control over the company. 
The board’s tactics handed victory to the French management team, which narrowly defeated 
Sacyr’s attempt to win five board seats and won support to issue poison pill warrants to be used as 
a defence in the event of an unwanted bid. 
2.2 Legal framework at the time of the conflict 
France is a jurisdiction which regulates shareholders agreements by requiring that the terms and 
conditions of shareholders agreements be disclosed. In France shareholders agreements need to 
be disclosed to the AMF in the five days following their signature if they concern at least 0,5% of 
the shares or voting rights.38 This provision promotes the transparency of the use of shareholders 
agreements in companies and renders France an ideal case study of a jurisdiction which regulates 
shareholders agreements through disclosure. More specifically, on March 30, 2008, the French 
market regulator (the 'Autorité des Marchés Financiers' or 'AMF') amended the mandatory 
disclosure rules applicable to purchases or sales of equity securities in publicly-traded French 
companies.39 The revised AMF regulations specifically implement EU Commission Directive 
2007/14/EC40 of March 8, 2007 laying down detailed rules for the implementation of certain 
provisions of the Transparency Directive. The stated aim of this revision has been to enable 
investors to acquire or dispose of shares in full knowledge of changes in the voting structure, as 
                                                          
38
 Below are listed some of the basic elements of the Statutory Disclosure Thresholds regime in France at the time of the 
Sacyr/Eiffage conflict: 
1. An investor, acting alone or through concerted action, whose percentage ownership of outstanding shares or voting 
rights in a publicly traded French company rises above or falls below thresholds of 5%, 10%, 15%, 20%, 25%, 33%1/3, 
50%, 66%2/3, 90% or 95% ('Statutory Disclosure Thresholds') must notify the issuer and the AMF, within 5 trading days, 
specifying the number of shares it holds and corresponding number of voting rights. It must be noted that the 33%1/3 is 
the threshold which also constitutes the mandatory bid threshold under French regulations. Article 222-12-3 of the AMF 
General Regulations; Article R 233-1 of the French Commercial Code. 
2. Statutory Disclosure Thresholds may be crossed whether an investor's ownership interest in an issuer rises above or is 
reduced below the relevant thresholds. Article L.233-7, I, second paragraph of the Commercial Code 
3. The information disclosed must include, among others: (1) the identity of the reporting person; (2) where applicable, 
the identity of the individual or legal entity entitled to exercise voting rights on behalf of the reporting person; (3) the 
date on which the threshold was crossed; (4) the reason why the threshold was crossed; (5) the resulting situation in 
terms of shares and voting rights; (6) where applicable, any potential aggregation of the shares or voting rights held by 
the reporting person; and (7) where applicable, the chain of control (as defined below) through which the shares and 
voting rights are held. Article 223-14 of the AMF General Regulations. 
39
 See Ministerial Order (Arrêté) of March 18, 2008, concerning the adaptation of the General Regulations of the 'Autorité 
des Marchés Financiers' (AMF). 
40
 See Commission Directive 2007/14/EC of 8 March 2007, laying down detailed rules for the implementation of certain 
provisions of Directive 2004/109/EC on the harmonisation of transparency requirements in relation to information about 
issuers whose securities are admitted to trading on a regulated market. 
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well as to enhance effective control by issuers and the overall market transparency of important 
capital movements.41  
Apart from these general elements of the regime, of particular interest for the purposes of this 
part of this study are the principles applying to the aggregation of controlling interests.42 In the 
context of the Eiffage case, the important provision is Article L. 233-9, I, 3 of the French 
Commercial Code which provide that the investor must also aggregate the shares and voting rights 
it holds with shares or voting rights held by other investors with whom it 'acts in concert'. Investors 
are considered to be 'acting in concert' if they have entered into an agreement to jointly acquire or 
sell securities of the company or to exercise their voting rights in common, in implementation of a 
common policy regarding the company.43 Executive officers of an investor, or investors controlled 
by or under common control with an investor, are presumed to be 'acting in concert'.44 The 
concerted action aggregation rule and the control aggregation rule are linked, as two or more 
investors acting in concert are deemed to jointly control a company where they exercise de facto 
control over the outcome of shareholder meetings.45 
In addition to the abovementioned disclosure requirements, the French law implemented the EU 
Takeover Bids Directive and set 33.33% as the threshold for triggering the MBR, while a new 
provision for defensive ‘acting in concert’, Article L233-10-1, has been introduced into the French 
Commercial Code. According to the provision: 'I. - Persons who have entered into an agreement 
with a view to buying or selling voting rights or with a view to exercising voting rights to implement 
                                                          
41
 See Recital 18 of the Transparency Directive. 
42
 More specifically, Article L.233-9, I, 2 of the French Commercial Code provides that in order to determine whether 
statutory thresholds have been crossed, the investor must aggregate the shares and voting rights held by other entities it 
'controls' as such term is defined by Article L.233-3 of the French Commercial Code. For these purposes, in 
implementation of Article 2(f) of the Transparency Directive, Article L.233-3 of the French Commercial Code (the 'Code') 
defines 'control' broadly as:  
(i) the direct or indirect ownership of a majority of voting rights at shareholders meetings (de jure control test); 
(ii) a contractual right to direct by itself a majority of voting rights pursuant to an agreement entered into with other 
shareholders or members of the company in question (contractual control test); 
(iii) ownership of sufficient voting rights to exercise de facto control over the outcome of shareholder meetings (de facto 
control test); or 
(iv) the right to appoint or remove a majority of the members of the administrative, management or supervisory board 
(e.g., the board of directors) (board control test). 
43
 Article L.233-10, I of the French Commercial Code. 
44
 Article L.233-10, II of the French Commercial Code. 
45
 Article L.233-3, III of the French Commercial Code. 
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a policy in relation to a company shall be deemed to be acting in concert.' This definition is 
supplemented by the Act of 31 March 2006, which applies during the bid period: 'In the event of a 
takeover bid, persons who have concluded an agreement with the instigator of a takeover bid 
aimed at acquiring control of the target company shall be deemed to be acting in concert.' 
Similarly, Article L.233-10-1 also notes that 'Persons who have concluded an agreement with the 
target company to frustrate a takeover bid shall also be deemed to be acting in concert.' 
2.3 AMF decisions and judgments held by French Courts 
The legal issues raised by the Spanish group’s acquisition of a stake in Eiffage have been addressed 
in two rulings by the AMF46 and four court decisions.47 Initially, AMF decided that a number of 
Spanish investors, including Sacyr, had acted in concert to seek changes to Eiffage’s board without 
abiding by the laws on shareholder disclosure and mandatory bids and confirmed the suspension 
of their voting rights on such grounds. The AMF ruling in favour of Eiffage was grounded on the 
fact that the successive acquisitions of shares in Eiffage by Sacyr and the six Spanish shareholders 
did not arise from individual and autonomous transactions but rather through a collective 
undertaking in pursuit of a common objective, namely to obtain enough seats on the board of 
directors of Eiffage to be able to implement a friendly takeover. Therefore, the AMF ruling 
required Sacyr to make an offer for the French group in compliance with the applicable 
regulations. As Eiffage claimed that prior to Sacyr’s offer, a stake was purchased by one of the 
shareholders it believed to be part of the bidding group for €129.30, this latter claim contributed 
to making the bid a higher one, which Sacyr was less able to bear.48 
Both Sacyr and the Spanish investor Grupo Rayet lost the cases brought against Eiffage over the 
withdrawal of their voting rights but immediately appealed. The Nanterre Commercial Tribunal 
confirmed the AMF ruling and ordered Sacyr to bid for Eiffage’s outstanding shares. Eventually, 
Sacyr escaped having to launch a €8bn ($12.5bn) cash bid for Eiffage after the Paris Court of 
Appeal overturned the ruling of AMF on procedural grounds, because the parties have not been 
                                                          
46
 AMF Decision No 207C1202 of June 26, 2007; AMF, 208C0741, 21 April 2008.  
47
 Eiffage-Sacyr: Nanterre Commercial Tribunal, 1 June 2007; Versailles Court of Appeal 27 June 2007; Paris Court of 
Appeal, 2 April 2008; Nanterre Commercial Tribunal, 6 May 2008. 
48
 This compared with Sacyr’s bid of €104.70. Under French law, shareholders working together cannot make a bid below 
the price of the last stock purchase made by any of them. 
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given access to files related to their case. The Court ruled that the AMF had failed to follow proper 
procedure by not allowing Sacyr the right to defend itself against the concert party allegations. 
However, the Court did not go as far as to neither reject nor uphold the AMF’s finding of concerted 
action directly. Although it found that the six shareholders had acted 'in an organized, collective 
approach' aiming to acquire control over Eiffage, it did not actually confirm the finding that they all 
acted as a group.49  
The AMF ruling, in particular, surprised lawyers with regard to the evidence on which concerted 
action was found, especially in light of the inherent difficulty to prove that parties actually acted in 
concert.50 Regarding the clues which proved concerted action, the AMF found no direct proof such 
as an email or a letter to support the claim that Sacyr acted in concert with the rest of the Spanish 
shareholders. However, provided that the written form is not a requirement in order for an 
agreement to be binding, the AMF decision took into account other important elements such as 
the business and personal ties between Sacyr and the shareholders who have been suspected to 
be acting in concert with it, coupled with other unusual facts which have been interpreted as 
evidence of long-term planning among them to take over the control of Eiffage.51 For example, the 
AMF argued that the six had enough assets to acquire large amounts of Eiffage stock, since they 
were part of family groups that could have done so. Finally, failures to declare their holdings 
properly were also held to be relevant. 
                                                          
49
 Paris Court of Appeal, 1st Chamber, Section H, April 2, 2008, RG No 2007/11675, p. 13. This decision was based on the 
grounds that Article L.233-10 of the Commercial Code does not require the agreement to jointly acquire or sell securities 
of a company or to exercise voting rights in common 'to be in writing, nor does it need to be legally binding'. 
50
 In recent years the only significant European example was in Italy, where the regulator Consob found in 2005 that stock 
market raiders had acted in concert to help a bid by Banca Popolare Italiana for rival Antonveneta, which was the subject 
of an approach by Dutch bank ABN Amro. 
But in the same year in Germany, BaFin, the German regulator, found no evidence of an alleged concert party among 
activist investors in Deutsche Börse after they overturned its strategy and ousted the directors.  
The most famous UK example was the Guinness scandal in 1986, when several parties colluded to manipulate the drinks 
maker’s shares, a debacle that led to an overhaul of the UK’s Takeover Code. Guiness was found to have breached the 
Code in relation to its takeover of Distillers. For the history of the case and the decisions of the Takeover Panel see 
http://www.thetakeoverpanel.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2008/12/1989-13.pdf (last accessed 29.09.2010). 
51
 For example, the fact that some of the 89 had changed their bylaws in the same way and during the same time period 
so as to allow them to buy shares in foreign companies. Similarly, five of the shareholders were allegedly close to two 
Sacyr directors, and all had invested in a company called Opera Bona. 
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In this light, the board of Eiffage has been criticised for using the provision as a defence to frustrate 
a hostile bid by Sacyr.52 Similarly, the AMF’s ruling, that a 'concert party' existed between Spanish 
investors in Eiffage has been characterised as aggressive and was attributed to the political 
dimension of the case, as it involved a French company being taken over by a Spanish one.53 When 
viewed from a legal perspective, this case clearly illustrates how arbitrary the definition of 
'concerted action' can be. The AMF decision provided a wide interpretation of 'concerted action'54, 
which implies that shareholders agreements will trigger the MBR, may they be formal or informal. 
It also suggests that the link to be established between the terms of the agreement and their 
impact on the takeover is a weak one. Any term affecting the governance of the company, such as 
one’s ability to appoint directors at the board, could be interpreted as having the potential to 
facilitate or frustrate a takeover bid. Additionally, the lax approach of the AMF regarding the 
evidence which was held to be conclusive of a concerted action further increases the restrictive 
effect of the MBR on shareholders interaction, as it is presumed that the legitimate 
communication between shareholders constitutes ‘concerted action’ in the absence of striking 
evidence to the contrary.  
 
3. Lessons from Sacyr/Eiffage and Beiersdorf/Tschibo case studies: BEIERSDORF 
3.1 Facts of the case
55
 
Beiersdorf , a skincare and adhesives manufacturer based in Hamburg, had an ownership structure 
comprising multiple large shareholders. Allianz, the German insurer, was the controlling 
shareholder of the company holding a 43,6% stake, while Tchibo, the coffee retailer controlled by 
the Herz family, held a 25% stake. In 2002, Tchibo increased its stake in Beiersdorf to 30,3%. In 
2002, Allianz initiated negotiations with Procter & Gamble, seeking to sell its 43.6% stake in 
Beiersdorf. There has been strong opposition to the sale by Beierdorf's deputy chairman, its 
                                                          
52
 The Deal Magazine. ‘The conspiracy defence’, 03.07.2008, available at 
http://www.thedeal.com/magazine/ID/017541/features/the-conspiracy-defense.php (last accessed 29.09.2011). 
53
 ibid. 
54
 Mark Solomons, Shock after watchdog sounds alarm over Eiffage, FT, 28.06.2007, available at 
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/7a46b776-2513-11dc-bf47-000b5df10621.html. 
55 
Kirchmaier et al (2009) supra note27. 
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employees and the city of Hamburg. Under an agreement, a consortium of buyers including 
Tchibo, a holding company for the assets of the City of Hamburg56 and Beiersdorf’s own pension 
fund, TROMA,57 purchased most of Allianz’s 43.6% stake in Beiersdorf. More specifically, Tchibo 
acquired a 19.6% stake, Hamburg a 10% stake, and the pension fund a 4% stake. After the 
acquisition, the consortium of buyers had obtained a stake of 33,6% without triggering the 
mandatory bid rule. 
3.2 Legal Framework at the time of the conflict 
Article 35 Sections 1 and 2 of WpÜG, the German Takeover Act58  provides for a mandatory bid 
rule. The mandatory bid obligation is triggered when the control rights over the target company 
obtained by an investor exceed the level of 30%59. Article 30 Section 2 of WpÜG specifically 
provides that the voting rights attached to shares held by a party that coordinates its conduct in 
relation to the target company with a third party, either on the basis of an agreement or in any 
other manner, shall be attributed to such party. In other words, the 'acting in concert' rule is 
triggered if there is a coordination of conduct with regard to the target company, which is 
exercised by virtue of an agreement or in any other manner, such as a tacit agreement or a 
gentlemen's agreement. In addition to administrative fines, Article 59 of WpÜG provides that the 
respective shareholder and the persons acting in concert with such shareholder are not entitled to 
exercise their rights under the shares for the period of non-compliance. In this light, the definition 
of 'acting in concert' is determining. 
3.3 BaFin investigation and decision
60 
BaFin, the German regulator, launched an investigation after complaints by minority shareholders 
in Beiersdorf against the actions of the consortium.61 The members of the consortium argued that 
                                                          
56
 Hamburger Gesellschaft für Vermögens und Beteiligungsverwaltung mbH. 
57
 TROMA Alters- und Hinterbliebenenstiftung. 
58
 § 30 Abs. 2 WpÜG Wertpapiererwerbs- und Übernahmegesetz. 
59
 § 29 Abs. 2 WpÜG. 
60
BaFin 23 January 2004, See Press Release available at 
http://www.bafin.de/cln_152/nn_721290/SharedDocs/Mitteilungen/DE/Service/PM__2004/pm__040123__acting.html?
__nnn=true (last accessed 29.09.2011). 
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the increase of Tschibo's stake from 30.3% to 49,6% did not trigger the application of the 
mandatory bid rule because there has been no change in control. In this respect, BaFin made clear 
that any shareholder who held 30% or more of the voting rights of a target company prior to the 
entry into force of the Takeover Act on January 1, 2002 is exempt from the obligation to launch a 
mandatory bid if such shareholder subsequently acquires additional shares in the target company. 
With regard to the joint acquisition of the shares by the consortium, BaFin stated that it found no 
conclusive evidence that the members of the investor group had acted in concert with respect to 
Beiersdorf. BaFin found no evidence of the existence of an agreement restricting or tying their 
voting rights or the intention to act jointly to exercise their influence over the target company. 
BaFin also found no conclusive evidence that the three entities of the consortium had reached an 
agreement to pursue, through the purchase of the shares, the protection of the company's seat in 
Hamburg.  
In its decision BaFin also provides valuable information as to how the term 'acting in concert' is to 
be interpreted. According to BaFin, the joint acquisition of shares can only be described as 'acting 
in concert', if the acquirers pursue a joint objective beyond the acquisition itself. More specifically, 
the acquirers must have the intention to jointly exercise their influence over the target company, 
for instance, in order to divest the company or change the company's seat or coordinate the 
composition of the supervisory and management boards. However, several points of criticism of 
the BaFin decision have been raised.62 For example, before the acquisition of the shares by the 
consortium, Allianz was the largest shareholder in the company but its stake was diluted after the 
sale. Moreover, there were indications that the parties in the consortium did not make 
independent investment decisions as it had been claimed. Instead, Beiersdorf’s Buyback 
Prospectus detailed: 1) a contractual agreement among the parties to transfer their rights in the 
share buyback to Allianz; 2) shared interests in blocking a takeover bid from Procter & Gamble; and 
3) the joint goal of retaining production in Hamburg. Additionally, the City of Hamburg declined 
representation on the Supervisory Board, stating that it 'fe[lt] well represented by the Tchibo 
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representatives.' The consortium together acquired a stake of 33.6%, well above Germany’s 
mandatory bid threshold of 30%. Under a broader construction of ‘acting in concert’, it would have 
been required to bid for the outstanding shares. 
 
 4. The mandatory bid rule and its impact on shareholder activism 
The negative impact of the MBR on shareholders agreements coupled with the legal uncertainty 
deriving from the interpretation of the rule by national courts acts as a disincentive for the 
participation of minority shareholders in the governance of their investments and promotes 
shareholder apathy. The aim of the rule, namely to protect minority shareholders by distributing to 
them the takeover premium otherwise accruing to the controlling shareholder, illustrates the 
inherent presumption embedded in the MBR, that minority shareholders are passive and have 
limited means to react. However, such a presumption is not aligned with the dynamic interactions 
taking place within a corporation owned by several large minority shareholders. Under these 
conditions, the shareholders have the incentives and the economic interest to react by forming 
coalitions. Consequently, the presumption upon which the MBR relies is not valid for a 
considerable number of EU corporations owned by multiple large shareholders. As multiple large 
shareholdings substantially differ from small, dispersed minority shareholdings, the MBR distorts 
rather than promotes the emergence of beneficial shareholders coalitions. 
To illustrate this argument, it would be useful to imagine the following scenario. A controller owns 
35% of a company, which stake makes him a controlling shareholder under most definitions of 
control provide by scholars and regulators. The ownership of the company is also shared by three 
additional shareholders each of whom owns around 15% of the shares of the company and a few 
smaller shareholders holding various stakes. The three large shareholders have the incentives to 
monitor the controlling shareholder and to challenge the decisions the latter wishes to pass. The 
three large shareholders have an interest to coordinate by entering into a shareholders agreement 
in order to facilitate monitoring and avoid both the collective action and the free rider problem. 
Assuming that the three large shareholders seek to effect a change of control, the existence of a 
shareholders agreement would trigger the MBR. Even in the absence of a shareholders agreement, 
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their behaviour could fall under the concerted action notion. Under the abovementioned 
conditions, the paradox effect of the MBR would be that the coalition of the three large 
shareholders would have to make a mandatory bid to acquire the shares of the existing controller, 
who for the purpose of the MBR, would count as a minority shareholder.  
The aforementioned example clearly shows the problematic impact of the MBR on three grounds. 
The first problem derives from the impact of the MBR on the ownership structure of the 
corporation. More specifically, the requirement that a shareholder who contests the control must 
offer to buy the shares of the minority shareholders eventually makes control harder to contest. It 
also only facilitates control changes between controlling shareholders which means that the new 
corporate structure to emerge following the takeover gives rise to the same risk of minority 
expropriation. The second problem involves the effect of the rule as a disincentive of large 
minority shareholders to challenge control internally. Either because of their wealth constraints or 
due to their investment strategy to hold a diversified portfolio, they may choose not to bear the 
risk of triggering the MBR. As a result, the challenge of the control of existing inefficient controlling 
coalitions or shareholders becomes less likely, while the inefficient controllers become 
entrenched. The third problem is associated with the impact of the MBR on maintaining the status 
quo of passive minority shareholders. More specifically, the risk of triggering the MBR effectively 
impedes any change or improvement of the marginal role of minority shareholders in corporate 
governance. 
The European Securities Markets Expert Group (ESME) has already identified the problem deriving 
from the different definitions of 'acting in concert' in Article 10 (a) of the Transparency Directive 
and in Articles 2.1(d) and 5 of the Takeover Bids Directive.63 The difference in the definitions is 
caused by the different aims of the Directives64 and the different elements required for the 
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 ESME 17.11.2008 supra note18. 
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 Article 10 of the Transparency Directive aims, inter alia, to provide transparency as to who has the power to exercise 
voting rights when voting-rights holders agree on pooling their votes. 
Articles 2.1. (d) and 5 of the Takeover Bids Directive aims at protecting minority shareholders by requesting the launch of 
mandatory bids at equitable prices when shareholders act in concert to acquire control. See ESME 17.11.2008 supra 
note18. 
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application of the rules.65 The general and abstract proposals set forward in the ESME 
Recommendations indicate the difficulty in addressing the problem. More specifically, the Group 
proposes that, with respect to the acting in concert notion, the Takeover Bids Directive should be 
de facto considered by Member States and competent authorities as a maximum harmonization 
one.66 In acknowledgment of the arising problem, the review of the Transparency Directive by the 
Commission also states that some technical adjustments to the text of the Directive would possibly 
be beneficial with a view to clarifying its obligations. Among the issues identified is the notion of 
'acting in concert' in Article 10(a). More specifically, the Commission acknowledges the fact that 
clarifications of some elements of the definition in Article 10 (a), namely, what does 'lasting 
common policy towards the management of the issuer' or 'agreement' mean are necessary in 
order to limit the exposure of market participants to legal risk.67 Similarly, such a clarification 
should also be provided as the Takeover Bids Directive is revised.  
 
C. SHAREHOLDERS AGREEMENTS AND THE BREAK-THROUGH RULE 
 
1. The function of the break-through rule in the context of shareholders agreements 
In addition to the MBR, the Break-through Rule (hereafter BTR) set out in Article 11 of the EU 
Takeover Bids Directive constitutes another example of the EU takeover regulation which affects 
shareholders agreements. The BTR is designed to render the takeover defences contained in a 
target company’s articles of association or in shareholders agreements ineffective against a bidder 
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 According to the Transparency Directive, the notification requirements prescribed by the Directive apply also to cases 
of an 'agreements' which 'obliges' to adopt, 'by concerted exercise' of the voting rights, a 'lasting common policy towards 
the management'. Therefore the necessary conditions for the EU legislation for the obligation to arise, are: an agreement 
between the parties, the aim of adopting a common policy towards the issuer, the duration of the common policy 
('lasting'), the object of the policy (not the issuer per se but the management of the issuer), and, finally, the rising above 
the relevant threshold (5% or less). 
According to the Takeover Bids Directive, persons acting in concert – for the launch of a mandatory bid - shall mean 
natural or legal person who 'cooperate' with the offeror or the offeree company 'on the basis of an agreement', either 
express or tacit, either oral or written, 'aimed' either at acquiring control of the offeree company or at frustrating the 
successful outcome of a bid. The conditions required in this case are the cooperation, an underlying agreement, the aim 
acquiring a company or frustrating a bid; the relevance is given only to the crossing of the threshold for the mandatory 
bid. See ESME 17.11.2008 supra note18. 
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during the offer. The aim of the BTR is to facilitate takeovers by lifting the disproportionate control 
rights of incumbent shareholders. The rationale for the rule is the well-functioning of the market 
for corporate control and the wider objective of the integration of the EU market. The BTR is 
particularly relevant in the context of shareholders agreements because it strikes down any 
restrictions on the transfer of securities or voting rights provided for in the articles of association of 
the offeree company, or in contractual agreements between the offeree company and the holders 
of its securities, or in contractual agreements between holders of the offeree company’s securities. 
According to par. 2 and 3 of Article 11 of the Takeover Bids Directive, such restrictions on the 
transfer of securities or on voting rights shall not apply vis-à-vis the offeror during the time allowed 
for acceptance of the bid. Similarly, par. 4 provides that the restrictions on the transfer of 
securities or on voting rights and any extraordinary rights of shareholders concerning the 
appointment or removal of board members are prohibited, if the bidder obtains 75% or more of 
the voting capital of the target company. 
To the extent that such provisions are included in shareholders agreements, the latter are 
ineffective. The purpose of the rule is to neutralise shareholders agreements by intervening in the 
contractual freedom of shareholders. The rule addresses shareholders agreements which limit the 
free transferability of shares or restrict voting rights to the extent they constitute typical pre-bid 
defences and applies to all shareholders agreements without taking into account the factual 
background and the ownership structure of the company involved. As the rule provides no means 
for differentiating between beneficial and harmful shareholders agreements, it effectively deters 
most types of shareholders interactions. Although the BTR clearly poses important obstacles to the 
effectiveness and the reliability of shareholders agreements as a governance mechanism, its 
impact is substantially mitigated because few Member States have chosen to apply it.68  
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 For an extensive analysis of how this rule has been implemented across member states see Davies P.L., Schuster E.-P. 
and Van de Walle de Ghelcke E.,(2010), The Takeover Directive as a Protectionist Tool?, ECGI - Law Working Paper No. 
141/2010. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1554616. Their analysis indicates that the actual impact of the 
breakthrough rule is limited because of the low rate of countries which adopted the rule. 
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2. Criticisms against the break-through rule 
In the context of the vast criticism against the Takeover Bids Directive, the BTR has held a central 
role.69 The criticism against the BTR ranges from the optional application of the rule to the limited 
impact of the rule on many problematic ownership structures, such as pyramids and cross-
shareholdings. Similarly, the interpretation of certain facets of Article 11, such as the concept of 
‘equal treatment’, could lead to inconsistencies and finally, defy the harmonisation objective.70 The 
extensive reference to the arguments against the BTR falls beyond the scope and limits of this 
thesis. However, in the context of shareholders agreements the BTR is found to be problematic in 
two important respects: Firstly, as regards the substance of the rule, and, secondly, as regards its 
impact on levelling the playing field.71  
More specifically, the BTR constitutes an example of the limitations imposed on the contractual 
freedom of shareholders and, thus their freedom to enter into shareholders agreements. In the 
context of the concentrated ownership prevalent in most EU countries, the most important 
argument against the BTR involves its limited effect to actually promote ownership structures 
which will reduce the risk of minority expropriation. On the assumption that the existence of 
multiple large shareholders should be promoted, the BTR appears to be bringing about the 
contrary, restrictive effect as it substantially undermines the reliability of shareholders agreements 
as effective corporate governance and coordination mechanisms. By negatively affecting the 
formation of coalitions among large shareholders, the BTR ultimately also limits the positive effect 
of multiple large shareholders within public corporations and discourages shareholders from 
playing an active role in the governance of their investments. Viewed from this perspective, the 
rule does not only hinder the emergence of shareholders agreements and coalitions but is also 
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 For criticism on the breakthrough rule see Mülbert P.O., (2003), Make It or Break It: The Break-Through Rule as a 
Break-Through for the European Takeover Directive?, ECGI - Law Working Paper No. 13/2003. Available at SSRN: 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=441120.  
For criticisms on the Takeover Bids Directive see further Wymeersch E. O, (2008), The Takeover Bid Directive, Light and 
Darkness, Financial Law Institute Working Paper No. 2008-01. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1086987; 
Berglöf E. and Burkart M. C., European Takeover Regulation. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=405660; For a 
recent review Burkart M.C. and Panunzi F., (2006), Takeovers, ECGI Finance Working Paper N°. 118/2006. 
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 Papadopoulos T., (2008), Legal Aspects of the Breakthrough Rule of the European Takeover Bid Directive. Takeover 
regulation: A legal approach, Icfai Books, Icfai University Press (IUP), Icfai University, 2008. Available at SSRN: 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1114671. 
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inconsistent with the calls of the European Commission for greater shareholder participation as 
part of the wider debate on shareholders activism and responsible ownership.72  
Moreover, the arguments in favour of the rule are misplaced to the extent that the BTR facilitates 
the transfer of control from one controller to the next. Provided that the law should be allowing 
for more competitive ownership structures, most notably through the emergence of multiple 
blockholdings, it is inconsistent to provide a potential acquirer with the ability to strike down 
existing shareholders agreements. Similarly, there are also limited indications that a takeover is the 
optimal corporate governance disciplining mechanism when compared to multiple blockholdings. 
According to this line of argument, the rationale for promoting takeovers as a whole is challenged, 
at least in the context of concentrated ownership structures.73 This argument is further 
corroborated by the fact that the disciplining effect of the market for corporate control in 
Continental Europe is not found to be as pervasive as in the UK and the US.74 Furthermore, 
provided that shareholders agreements promote internal control contestability, it appears that the 
BTR is ill-adapted to the distinct characteristics of concentrated ownership structures, 
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characterised by multiple large shareholders.75 In effect, the MBR only serves the interests of 
controlling block-holders and facilitates the transfers of control from one controlling block-holder 
to the other. Consequently, the problem of private benefits extraction persists, while the benefits 
of internal competition for control are minimised.  
The arguments against the BTR are reinforced by the lack of conclusive evidence that its actual 
benefits countervail its overall costs.76 Furthermore, the existence of the BTR could also not be 
justified on the basis that it promotes harmonisation and levels the playing field across the EU. 
More specifically, because of its optional application77, the BTR has failed to meet its 
harmonisation objective by establishing a level playing field for takeover bids at the EU level and 
has barely promoted the contestability of control, as originally envisaged.78 This failure partly 
derives from the fact that no jurisdiction has made the BTR mandatory. Instead, they all allow 
corporations to opt in. In this latter case, however, reciprocity is usually required.79 This renders 
the rule inapplicable, even if a company opts in, in the case that the tender offer is launched by a 
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'company which does not apply the same rules' or 'by a company controlled, directly or indirectly, 
by the latter'. 80 
 
III. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
In the context of this thesis, legal effectiveness refers to the extent to which an issue can be dealt 
with by the law and if so, how well it is dealt with in terms of consistency and predictability, on the 
one side, and the delivery of efficient and just outcomes, on the other. Legal effectiveness is 
assessed on the basis of the type of concentrated ownership involved.  For example, in the case of 
multiple blockholders, legal effectiveness refers to the capacity of the rules to allow for beneficial 
shareholder collaboration and responsible, active ownership, while it limits the risk that 
shareholders agreements are used as expropriating mechanisms. This thesis considers a number of 
factors when evaluating the effectiveness of the law in addressing the corporate governance issues 
involved. Such factors include the consistency and predictability in the application of the law, the 
enforceability of the legal rules and agreements, how the law facilitates the efficient use of 
resources and whether the law reflects the best practices and high standards of corporate 
governance. Against the abovementioned definition and the criteria of legal effectiveness this 
Chapter has assessed the effectiveness of the EU framework to address the corporate governance 
issues that arise in the context of ownership structures characterised by multiple large 
shareholders.  
 
The foregoing analysis highlights the deficiencies of the EU legal framework which is presented as 
an example of legal inefficiency due to a number of ill-adapted rules. For example, the complexity 
of the corporate disclosure regime and the resulting high compliance costs inhibit shareholders 
agreements and interactions, therefore imposing limitations on the activism and beneficial 
interactions of shareholders. Similarly, the promotion of takeovers as a corporate governance 
mechanism appears to be an ill-adapted response to the prevalent concentrated ownership 
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structures across the EU. Moreover, the underlying assumptions of rules such as the mandatory 
bid rule and the break-through rule are aligned with the absolute forms of concentrated 
ownership, according to which there is one controlling shareholder against many small, dispersed 
minority shareholders. As this view of concentration is overly simplistic and disregards the 
presence of multiple large shareholders in corporations across the EU, the rules are misplaced and 
ill-adapted. As a result, both the mandatory bid rule and the break-through rule in effect 
discourage shareholders activism and facilitate the transfer of control from one large blockholder 
to another rather than promoting internal control contestability. In this light, the failure of EU 
company law to adapt to the distinct characteristics of concentrated ownership structures 
characterised by the presence of multiple large shareholders substantially reduces the legal 
effectiveness of the EU regulatory framework of investor protection. Furthermore, the differences 
in the application of the rules across the EU add to the complexity of the legal framework and give 
rise to important inconsistencies of the law across Member States, which undermine the 
effectiveness of the applicable legal framework. 
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SUMMARY AND IMPLICATIONS OF THE THESIS 
 
 
I. CHALLENGING THE COMMON PERCEPTION ABOUT CONCENTRATED OWNERSHIP 
The positive impact of corporate governance on firm performance and on the cost of capital 
has sparked a vast discussion on the determinants of good corporate governance.  In the 
past years, this discussion has been driven by the creation of a variety of indices intended to 
measure the quality of investor protection, as a proxy for good corporate governance. 
Concentrated ownership has been associated with an important 'inefficiency bias' deriving 
from the proposition that concentration facilitates the expropriation of minority 
shareholders by the majority. In its absolute form, concentration is considered to give rise to 
important conflicts of interests among shareholders and provides a favourable environment 
for the extraction of private benefits of control. The problem is exacerbated by the use of 
control-enhancing mechanisms such as pyramids and dual-class shares. In this respect, this 
thesis highlights a variety of biases and misconceptions in relation to concentrated 
ownership structures. In particular, considering concentrated ownership as a per se 
inefficient form of ownership is an over-simplified view of a far more complex corporate 
reality. The important differences within the varieties of concentration render such an over-
generalisation inaccurate. This thesis argues that the underlying assumption of the 
'inefficiency bias' of concentration, according to which concentration only involves the 
presence of a controlling shareholder against many dispersed small shareholders, is wrong.  
Provided that the varieties of concentration are taken into account, strong investor 
protection is defined by reference to the ownership structure concerned. It is the case, that 
the different forms of ownership and shareholders' profiles pose different problems for 
investors and, therefore, require adapted legal solutions for their protection. As the 
corporate governance problems differ, the various minority protection mechanisms are not 
equally effective for all forms of concentrated ownership. Understanding this complex 
relationship of ownership structures and corporate governance is, therefore, a prerequisite 
of effective legal protection. Furthermore, in light of the interconnectedness of the systems 
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of corporate governance in the context of a global economy, understanding the complex 
relationship of ownership structures and corporate governance in now more imperative 
than ever. 
In this context, the role of the law is central. Concrete examples of investor protection 
mechanisms demonstrate how the law adapts to the distinct characteristics of the 
ownership structures concerned. For instance, the case study of Greece, a jurisdiction of 
concentrated ownership structures and civil law background, highlights a variety of minority 
protection mechanisms which are specific to the ownership structure of companies. Such 
mechanisms can be found in company law and civil law provisions, as well as within the 
articles of association and the founding laws of specific categories of companies, such as 
state-owned enterprises. Similarly, the comparative assessment of the effectiveness of the 
regulatory framework applying to shareholders agreements in the UK, Greece and the EU 
reveals certain grey areas and regulatory uncertainties which negatively affect the reliability 
of shareholders agreements as an effective corporate governance mechanism. While UK and 
Greek company law only exhibit some elements of ineffectiveness as part of a generally 
effective, well-adapted legal framework for multiple blockholdings, EU company law, as 
shaped by the Transparency Directive and the Takeover Bids Directive, is ill-adapted to the 
distinct ownership structures of corporations in most EU countries, which are often 
characterised by the existence of multiple large shareholders. 
The 'inefficiency bias' of concentration has been particularly reinforced by the LLSV Anti-
Directors Rights Index and the related studies, such as the DLLS Self-Dealing Index, according 
to which investor protection is weaker within jurisdictions of concentrated ownership. In 
particular, the 'legal origin' hypothesis, as established by LLSV, justified the low investor 
protection levels of the systems of concentrated ownership by reference to their legal origin. 
According to this hypothesis, low investor protection is the effect of the legal origin of the 
system, while concentration of ownership is the investors' response to the low investor 
protection offered by the legal system. Due to its simplicity and attractiveness, the LLSV 
hypothesis has been extremely influential. However, there is a strong case for re-stating the 
LLSV 'law matters' thesis due to the methodological deficiencies and the inaccuracies which 
substantially affect the reliability of their index.  
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Contrary to the LLSV propositions, it is the case that the 'legal effectiveness' rather than the 
'legal origin' of a legal system is the determinant of good corporate governance. In this 
context, the factor of ownership structures is central because corporate governance 
mechanisms are not equally effective across all contexts, jurisdictions and companies. In the 
case of concentration, in particular, effective investor protection is determined by a variety 
of characteristics which affect the corporate governance problems to be addressed. These 
important characteristics, as dictated by the ownership structure of the company, are the 
identity of the controller and the presence of multiple large shareholders. As indices fail to 
distinguish between dispersed and concentrated ownership structures and also among the 
different profiles and characteristics of the various forms of concentrated ownership, they 
are not a reliable metric of the quality of corporate governance. In this light, future 
comparative corporate governance studies aiming to measure the quality of minority 
protection across jurisdictions need to reflect the differences in the ownership structure and 
the particular characteristics of the companies concerned. To this effect, it is proposed that 
new comparative research methodologies should promote the substantive analysis of the 
law and employ a functional approach when assessing the effectiveness of a given legal 
system. 
 
II. THE VARIETIES OF CONCENTRATION AND THE 'LEGAL EFFECTIVENESS' 
ARGUMENT 
When viewed from this perspective, the relationship of concentrated ownership structures 
and corporate governance is better understood by complicating rather than simplifying the 
discussion. The closer observation of concentrated ownership structures reveals that the 
pervasiveness of the problem of private benefits extraction is determined by a variety of 
factors such as the identity of the controller. For example, conflicts of interests in the 
context of family ownership involve the entrenchment of the founder in the management 
and the extraction of pecuniary and non pecuniary benefits from being in control. These 
conflicts are often more intense due to the wide use by the family of control-enhancing 
mechanisms. Similarly, state ownership is also associated with low performance and high 
risk of expropriation because the state has a poor monitoring capacity and state-owned 
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enterprises often pursue other social goals, rather than the maximisation of shareholders' 
value.  
Furthermore, the absolute form of concentration, which is often the underlying assumption 
of many comparative corporate governance studies, is not as prevalent as suggested, due to 
the presence of multiple large shareholders. The presence of multiple large shareholders 
alters the nature of the conflicts of interests because the increased monitoring limits the risk 
of expropriation, while the internal control contestability upgrades the role of minority 
shareholders, as they participate in coalitions and may even be in the position to determine 
which of the competing coalitions will gain control. In this light, the different forms of 
ownership require different corporate governance mechanisms in order to mitigate the 
various manifestations of the problem of conflicts of interests. Consequently, the ownership 
structures become important determinants of the legal effectiveness of corporate law and 
governance. 
The aforementioned analysis indicates that the varieties of concentration and the 
effectiveness of the law in addressing the corporate governance issues arising within such 
structures are interrelated. Given the important differences in the type of corporate 
governance problems of concentration, which range from the extraction of private benefits 
of control in the case of family ownership to the inefficient monitoring of the state as a 
blockholder, there is no one-size-fits-all standard when determining the effectiveness of a 
legal system or framework to address such problems. Instead, what constitutes effective 
regulation is shaped according to the type of concentrated ownership. This is reflected in the 
definition of legal effectiveness as set out in this thesis, according to which legal 
effectiveness refers to the extent to which an issue can be dealt with by the law and if so, 
how well it is dealt with in terms of consistency and predictability, on the one side, and the 
delivery of efficient and just outcomes, on the other.  
 
Legal effectiveness is also defined on the basis of the type of concentrated ownership 
involved. For example, in the case of family ownership legal effectiveness refers to the 
capacity of the rules to limit the extraction of private benefits of control by the controlling 
family. In the case of state ownership, legal effectiveness refers to the capacity of the rules 
and complementary institutions to enhance the incentives of the state to monitor effectively 
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the managers, while mitigating the risk of corruption and the risk that the interests of the 
state-owned enterprises are secondary and subservient to political considerations. 
Furthermore, in the case of multiple blockholders, legal effectiveness refers to the capacity 
of the rules to allow for beneficial shareholder collaboration and responsible, active 
ownership, while limiting the risk of shareholders agreements being used as expropriating 
mechanisms. A number of factors are considered when assessing the effectiveness of the 
law in addressing the corporate governance issues involved. Such factors include the 
consistency and predictability in the application of the law, the enforceability of the legal 
rules and agreements, how the law promotes and facilitates the efficient use of resources 
and whether the law reflects the best practices and high standards of corporate governance. 
 
In this regard, the 'legal effectiveness' argument underpins the assessment of the distinct 
investor protection mechanisms which particularly apply to family-owned or state-owned 
enterprises. In the case of the Greek legal framework, a variety of special provisions of 
investor protection are included in the articles of association or the founding laws of state-
owned enterprises. For instance, these provisions confer to minority shareholders of state-
owned enterprises the right to directly elect their representatives on the board of directors 
through a separate minority shareholders meeting. Furthermore, an important corporate 
governance mechanism derives from the general principles established by the Greek Civil 
Code. The provisions of the Greek Civil Code prohibit the abuse of majority rights and are 
particularly relevant in the context of closely-held corporations, as they act as functional 
equivalents to mandatory rules of corporate law and effectively enhance investor protection 
in the particular context of concentrated ownership structures. The responsiveness of the 
distinct legal mechanisms of Greek law to the various forms of corporate ownership is an 
important factor of their effectiveness as minority protection devices. This example clearly 
illustrates the complex interactions of ownership structures and the law. 
Although both categories of aforementioned provisions promote the effectiveness of the 
minority protection framework, the numerical approach and indexing methodologies of 
comparative law scholarship have failed to capture their importance. In this respect, the 
analysis of the selected aspects of the minority protection framework in Greece serves as a 
case study which indicates the deficiencies of the LLSV indexing methodology and the 
problems associated with the index-based approach to comparative corporate law. The 
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variety of the sources of minority protection provisions within the Greek legal framework 
also demonstrates the importance of functional equivalents and the risks deriving from the 
over-reliance on indices, rather than the substantive analysis to measure the quality of the 
law. In the case of minority protection in Greece, the findings of the traditional substantive 
analysis of the law show that the LLSV indices are inaccurate, since the two least obvious 
legal responses against expropriation and inefficiency presented in this thesis have not been 
considered by LLSV. This important finding confirms the necessity of substantive legal 
analysis as part of any reliable assessment of the quality of corporate governance across the 
world. 
The 'legal effectiveness' argument is further corroborated by the comparative analysis of the 
legal treatment of multiple blockholders coordination through shareholders agreements in 
the UK, Greece and at the EU level. The legal treatment of shareholders agreements 
determines their enforceability and also affects the choices of market participants. The grey 
areas and legal uncertainty in the regulation of shareholders agreements by the law limit the 
effectiveness of shareholders agreements as a reliable corporate governance mechanism 
and discourage market participants from entering into such agreements in the first place. As 
a result, internal control contestability and shareholders interactions are negatively affected, 
while the economic reality established by shareholders agreements is distorted. In 
particular, EU company law provides an additional example of legal ineffectiveness, as the 
regulation imposed on blockholders interactions is ill-adapted to the ownership structures 
across EU countries, which are often characterised by multiple large shareholders. 
Furthermore, the comparison of the treatment of shareholders agreements in Greece and 
the UK reveals the similarities and differences which determine the impact of the law on 
shareholders interactions. The differences documented are not as important as to justify the 
characterisation that one system is substantially less effective than the other. Particularly, in 
the case of Greece, the legal system achieves a balance between promoting shareholders 
agreements and striking them down when they can be used as mechanisms of expropriation. 
For example, shareholders agreements are subject to limitations imposed by the articles of 
association and the mandatory company law provisions, which are interpreted in light of the 
purpose of the rule, the factual background and the general principles of the Greek Civil 
Code. The application of general rules of the Greek Civil Code, which prohibit abusive 
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agreements, is an additional determining factor because it filters the agreements which are 
used to expropriate minorities from the agreements that facilitate beneficial shareholders 
interactions and monitoring. This example clearly illustrates that legal effectiveness may 
take different forms and can be achieved by different investor protection mechanisms 
depending on the context involved. 
 
III. THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE VARIETIES OF CONCENTRATION 
The thesis is not only a description of the varieties of concentration or the complex law of 
shareholders agreements or the law of investor protection within concentrated ownership 
structures but shows how the aforementioned issues are interlinked and highlight the 
important implications involved. Although the substantive analysis of the law highlights the 
inherent complexity of comparative company law as one of the main difficulties, it also 
indicates how important it is to assess the legal effectiveness of different systems not in a 
particular rather than a general context. In this respect, the similarities in the legal 
treatment of shareholders agreements show that the same outcome can be achieved 
through different paths, notwithstanding the differences in the legal reasoning and the path 
through which the outcome is achieved. This finding confirms the proposition that 
measuring the effectiveness and responsiveness of the law is a delicate and complex task, 
which requires much more than the identification of the applicable rules: It necessitates 
their substantive analysis in a particular context.  
In this light, the methodology and findings of this thesis are aligned with the increased 
caution with which comparative corporate law scholars view the numerical approach to 
comparative corporate governance, most notably through the use of indices. More 
specifically, the indices and ratings compiled by financial economists and commercial 
providers of governance services to measure the quality of a company's governance 
arrangements fail to capture the multiple dimensions of a company's governance and the 
implications of the inherent differences across corporate governance systems. The 
underlying idea of an index or rating, namely to identify the best corporate governance 
system or the more effective corporate governance mechanism, contradicts the reality that 
there is no one, most effective system or arrangement of all. Instead, the most effective 
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governance system or mechanism appears to depend on the context and on a company's 
specific circumstances, which are shaped by the factor of the ownership structure.  
In the absence of accurate substantive analysis of the corporate governance arrangements 
at the company or country level, it would be difficult for an index or a rating to accurately 
reflect the quality of the corporate governance framework in order to enable investors' 
informed decisions. When viewed from this perspective, unless the methodology and 
variables of corporate governance indices and ratings evolve to take into account the 
characteristics of the companies and the financial systems in the context of which corporate 
governance arrangements operate, they will remain imperfect instruments, inadequate for 
investors or policy makers to rely on. The case of concentrated ownership and the important 
varieties arising within it clearly supports this point. In this light, future corporate 
governance research should reflect on a famous quote of Albert Einstein: 'Make everything 
as simple as possible, but not simpler.'  
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